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ARTICLES
QALYs and Policy Evaluation: A New Perspective
Matthew D. Adler, J.D.*

INTRODUCTION
The “quality-adjusted life year” (QALY) is a metric for health and longevity
that is now widely used by health economists, public health scholars, and others
researching the economics of health care.1 QALYs work like this: Imagine a life
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. Many thanks to Craig Phillips for excellent
research assistance, and to John Broome, Howard Chang, Robert Hahn, James Hammitt, Eric
Posner, Chris Sanchirico, Amy Sinden, Cass Sunstein, and Reed Shuldiner for very helpful
comments and conversations. This Article was written prior to the publication of JOHN BROOME,
WEIGHING LIVES (2004), a rich and systematic philosophical treatment of the problem of measuring
well-being and the impact of death on well-being. I have therefore, unfortunately, been unable to
incorporate Broome’s foundational discussion into my own, more applied, analysis.
1. Good overviews of the QALY approach to measuring health and longevity include OFFICE
OF RES. & DEV., U.S. EPA, HUMAN HEALTH METRICS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION SUPPORT
TOOLS: LESSONS FROM HEALTH ECONOMICS AND DECISION ANALYSIS (2001) [hereinafter U.S. EPA,
HUMAN HEALTH METRICS]; Paul Dolan, The Measurement of Health-Related Quality of Life for
Use in Resource Allocation Decisions in Health Care, in 1B HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS
1723 (A.J. Culyer & J.P. Newhouse eds., 2000); Robert Fabian, The Qualy Approach, in VALUING
HEALTH FOR POLICY 118 (George Tolley et al. eds., 1994); James K. Hammitt, QALYs Versus WTP,
22 RISK ANALYSIS 985 (2002) [hereinafter Hammitt, QALYs Versus WTP]; Magnus Johannesson et
al., Outcome Measurement in Economic Evaluation, 5 HEALTH ECON. 279 (1996); Robert M.
Kaplan, Utility Assessment for Estimating Quality-Adjusted Life Years, in VALUING HEALTH CARE:
COSTS, BENEFITS, AND EFFECTIVENESS OF PHARMACEUTICALS AND OTHER MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES
31 (Frank A. Sloan ed., 1996); Graham Loomes & Lynda McKenzie, The Use of QALYs in Health
Care Decisionmaking, 28 SOC. SCI. & MED. 299 (1989); and J. Brazier et al., A Review of the Use of
Health Status Measures in Economic Evaluation, HEALTH TECH. ASSESSMENT, May 1999, at 1. A
comprehensive guide is QUALITY OF LIFE AND PHARMACOECONOMICS IN CLINICAL TRIALS (Bert
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history or “profile” of health states h1, h2 . . . hn, where each state hj persists for tj
years. A health state can be death, perfect health, or any disease condition inbetween: angina, bronchitis, lung cancer, depression, headaches, heart disease,
and so on. Patients who have experienced the states, physicians familiar with the
states, or members of the general population will have been surveyed and asked
to rank each state hj on a 0-1 scale of health quality, with 1 representing perfect
health and 0 representing death. There are various techniques for eliciting the
quality ranking, q(hj), the two most popular being the “time-tradeoff” method and
the “standard-gamble” method. The first method seeks to determine the
respondent’s point of indifference between living y years with the condition hj,
and x years in perfect health (with x less than y), and assigns hj the number x/y.
The second method seeks to determine the respondent’s point of indifference
between living a given period of time with the condition, and a gamble with
probability p of living in perfect health for that same period of time and
probability 1-p of dying instantaneously. Health state hj is then assigned the
indifference probability, p, as its quality ranking.
The QALY number for a health profile is calculated as the sum of the
quality-weighted years spent in each of its component health states. For example,
if some person’s life-history, absent a medical intervention, would consist of
h1 . . . hn, and after intervention would improve to h1* . . . hn*, then the QALY
measure of the first profile is ∑jq(hj)×tj, the QALY measure of the second is
∑jq(hj*)×tj*, and the QALY gain secured by the intervention is the difference
between these two sums. Similarly, if the individual would live m years in perfect
health absent intervention, and m+x years in perfect health after intervention, the
QALY gain is x QALYs. QALYs are evidently a powerful tool for measuring the
impact of choices that affect morbidity, longevity, or both—not only the choices
of physicians, hospitals, HMOs, and insurers, but also governmental choices,
such as the FDA’s pharmaceutical licensure decisions, the regulation of toxins by
the EPA or OSHA, or HHS’s choices about Medicare coverage.
To date, QALYs have been generally employed in cost-effectiveness
studies.2 In a cost-effectiveness study, both the health and non-health impacts of
different health-affecting choices are determined. Non-health impacts are
measured in dollars, but health impacts are measured using some nonmonetary
scale (either a QALY scale, or some other scale, e.g., a disease-specific scale in
the case where the health effects of the choices at issue are confined to a single
disease). Cost-effectiveness ratios are then used to determine which choice
should be undertaken. Alternatively, the choice which maximizes health given a

Spilker ed., 2d ed. 1996).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 25-30 (discussing cost-effectiveness analysis and use of
QALYs in that context).
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fixed budget for non-health costs is selected.
Though QALYS were invented in the early 1970s,3 the use of QALYS—at
least by researchers—has skyrocketed in recent years. Literally hundreds of
health care cost-effectiveness studies now appear in academic journals every
year.4 An increasing fraction of these employ QALYs. One recent review found
that only one or two such studies were published annually during the 1980s and
less than ten annually during the early 1990s, but that since 1997 roughly fifty
“cost-utility” studies have appeared each year.5 This body of work has been
accompanied by new surveys, including a massive survey of the general
population performed a few years ago in England,6 and a burgeoning secondary
literature on QALYs.7
To be sure, QALYs remain largely an academic tool, at least in the United
States. Fifteen years ago, Oregon infamously relied upon, then abandoned,
QALYs in deciding what treatments it would cover under Medicaid.8 Around the
same time, HHS published, but never finalized, a proposal to use costeffectiveness in Medicare coverage decisions.9 More generally, “cost3. See Kaplan, supra note 1, at 35 (crediting the invention of QALYs to a 1970 article by S.
Fanshel and J.W. Bush); George W. Torrance & David Feeny, Utilities and Quality-Adjusted Life
Years, 5 INT’L J. TECH. ASSESSMENT IN HEALTH CARE 559, 568 (1989) (same).
4. See Anne Elixhauser et al., Health Care CBA and CEA from 1991 to 1996: An Updated
Bibliography, 36 MEDICAL CARE MS1, MS6 (May Supp. 1998) (surveying health care literature
and identifying 1792 published cost-effectiveness studies for the period 1991-96 and 1123 for the
period 1979-90).
5. See Dan Greenberg & Joseph S. Pliskin, Preference-Based Outcome Measures in CostUtility Analysis: A 20-Year Overview, 18 INT’L J. TECH. ASSESSMENT 461, 463 (2002). Another
study finds even greater numbers of published cost-utility studies. See Peter J. Neumann et al.,
Growth and Quality of the Cost-Utility Literature, 1976-2001, 8 VALUE IN HEALTH 3, 5 (2005).
6. See Paul Dolan et al., The Time Trade-Off Method: Results from a General Population
Study, 5 HEALTH ECON. 141 (1996).
7. For bibliographies, see Dolan, supra note 1, at 1755-60; and U.S. EPA, HUMAN HEALTH
METRICS, supra note 1, at 51. A useful list of references is provided at the end of each chapter in
Brazier, supra note 1.
8. See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 1, at 53-59 (discussing the Oregon episode).
9. See Medicare Program; Criteria and Procedures for Making Medical Services Coverage
Decisions that Relate to Health Care Technology, 54 Fed. Reg. 4302, 4308-09 (proposed Jan. 30,
1989); Medicare Program; Procedures for Making National Coverage Decisions, 64 Fed. Reg.
22,619, 22,620 (Apr. 27, 1999) (withdrawing proposed rule); see also Medicare Program; Criteria
for Making Coverage Decisions, 65 Fed. Reg. 31,124, 31,127 (May 16, 2000) (notice of intent to
publish proposed rule establishing criteria for Medicare coverage decisions, which suggests
QALYs as a possible measure of health benefits); Medicare Program; Revised Process for Making
Medicare National Coverage Determinations, 68 Fed. Reg. 55,634, 55,634-35 (Sept. 26, 2003)
(withdrawing intent to pursue rulemaking).
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effectiveness analysis has been used by [U.S.] public sector agencies on a very
limited basis” in the health policy area,10 by contrast with some foreign
jurisdictions, such as Australia, Britain, Canada, and New Zealand, which now
regularly evaluate the cost-effectiveness of pharmaceuticals or health
technologies proposed for public reimbursement.11 And private entities, such as
hospitals, HMOs, or medical insurers, which in principle could incorporate
QALYs into a wide range of their decisions, seldom do so at present.12
But there are signs of change. The FDA, over the last half-decade or so, has
repeatedly relied on QALYs in its rulemakings, pioneering a new approach to
QALY-based analysis that I will describe and defend below.13 The EPA, in its

10. Frank A. Sloan & Henry G. Grabowski, Introduction and Overview, 45 SOC. SCI. & MED.
505, 508 (1997); see also Eric A. Posner, Transfer Regulations and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 53
DUKE L.J. 1067, 1105-06 (2003) (defending use of cost-effectiveness analysis to assess transfer
regulations and stating that “[agencies] have rarely performed cost-effectiveness analysis, and their
occasional efforts have been inadequate”).
11. See Nancy Devlin & David Parkin, Does NICE Have a Cost-Effectiveness Threshold and
What Other Factors Influence Its Decisions? A Binary Choice Analysis, 13 HEALTH ECON. 437, 437
(2004); Paul P. Glasziou & Andrew S. Mitchell, Use of Pharmacoeconomic Data by Regulatory
Authorities, in QUALITY OF LIFE AND PHARMACOECONOMICS, supra note 1, at 114.
12. See Bryan R. Luce & Ruth E. Brown, The Use of Technology Assessment by Hospitals,
Health Maintenance Organizations, and Third-Party Payers in the United States, 11 INT’L J. TECH.
ASSESSMENT IN HEALTH CARE 79, 85 (1995); Peter Neumann, Why Don’t Americans Use CostEffectiveness Analysis?, 10 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 308, 308 (2004); Elaine J. Power & John
Eisenberg, Are We Ready To Use Cost-Effectiveness Analysis in Health Care Decision-Making? A
Health Services Research Challenge for Clinicians, Patients, Health Care Systems, and Public
Policy, 36 MED. CARE MS10, MS11-12 (May Supp. 1998). But see Bernard S. Bloom, Use of
Formal Benefit/Cost Evaluations in Health System Decision Making, 10 AM. J. MANAGED CARE
329, 332-33 (2004) (reporting results of a 2002 survey of public and private health care
organizations, and finding that a majority of the private respondents employ cost-benefit or costeffectiveness analysis). For general discussions of the use of QALYs by governmental agencies or
private actors, see COST-EFFECTIVENESS IN HEALTH AND MEDICINE 18-20 (Marthe Gold et al. eds.,
1996); U.S. CONGRESS OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, IDENTIFYING HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES THAT
WORK 122-30 (1994); Bloom, supra; Glasziou & Mitchell, supra note 11; Luce & Brown, supra;
Power & Eisenberg, supra; Sloan & Grabowski, supra note 10; Neumann et al., supra note 5; and
Frank A. Sloan & Christopher J. Conover, The Use of Cost-Effectiveness/Cost-Benefit Analysis in
Actual Decision Making: Current Status and Prospects, in VALUING HEALTH CARE, supra note 1, at
207. Two important works that were published subsequent to the drafting of this Article, and that
discuss the use of QALYs or cost-effectiveness analysis, are: PETER J. NEUMANN, USING COSTEFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS TO IMPROVE HEALTH CARE: OPPORTUNITIES AND BARRIERS (2005); and
Symposium, Cost-Effectiveness Analysis in U.S. Healthcare Decision-Making: Where Is It Going?,
43 MED. CARE II-1 (July Supp. 2005).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 192-201.
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major arsenic and radon rulemakings during the late 1990s, specifically declined
to employ a QALY-based monetary valuation of the morbidity- and mortalityreduction benefits of the rules.14 In other rulemakings around the same time,
however, and more recently as well, the EPA has experimented with the so-called
“value of statistical life year” (VSLY) approach to monetizing mortality, an
approach closely related to QALYs.15 The D.C. Circuit opinion in the American
Trucking case, after striking down a provision of the Clean Air Act on
nondelegation grounds, suggested that the EPA might cure those constitutional
difficulties by measuring the benefits of air pollution regulations on a QALY
scale.16 The HHS, in a recent rulemaking facilitating flu and pneumonia
vaccinations, cited the cost-effectiveness of these vaccinations in promoting
“year[s] of healthy life”—a synonym for a QALY.17 The Office of Management
and Budget’s (OMB) current guide for Executive Order 12,866, which requires
formal regulatory analyses of major rules, stipulates that these documents must
include a cost-effectiveness analysis in the case of rules targeted at public health
and safety,18 and it gives a qualified endorsement to QALYs as an appropriate
effectiveness metric.19 The Public Health Service’s “Healthy People” initiative,
an informational program which measures progress towards public health goals,

14. See National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic and Clarifications to
Compliance and New Source Contaminants Monitoring, 66 Fed. Reg. 6976, 7044 (Jan. 22, 2001);
National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Radon-222, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,246, 59,337 (Nov. 2,
1999).
15. See Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles: Heavy Duty Engine and Vehicle
Standards and Highway Diesel Fuel Sulphur Control Requirements, 66 Fed. Reg. 5002, 5104 (Jan.
18, 2001); Control of Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles: Tier 2 Motor Vehicle Emissions
Standards and Gasoline Sulfur Control Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. 6698, 6784-87 (Feb. 10, 2000);
Findings of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking on Section 126 Petitions for Purposes of
Reducing Interstate Ozone Transport, 65 Fed. Reg. 2674, 2721-22 (Jan. 18, 2000); U.S. EPA,
TECHNICAL ADDENDUM: METHODOLOGIES FOR THE BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF THE CLEAR SKIES
INITIATIVE 35-37 (2002) [hereinafter U.S. EPA, TECHNICAL ADDENDUM]; Laura J. Lowenstein &
Richard J. Revesz, Anti-Regulation Under the Guise of Rational Regulation: The Bush
Administration’s Approaches to Valuing Human Lives in Environmental Cost-Benefit Analyses, 34
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,954 (2004) (describing the EPA’s use of VSLYs).
16. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. U.S. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1039-40 (D.C. Cir. 1999), rev’d in
part, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (finding that the Act was not an unconstitutional delegation).
17. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Conditions of Participation: Immunization Standards
for Hospitals, Long-Term Care Facilities, and Home Health Agencies, 67 Fed. Reg. 61,808,
61,813-14 (Oct. 2, 2002).
18. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4, at 9 (2003), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gove/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf.
19. See id. at 12-14.
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employs QALYs as one of its key metrics.20
In short, large amounts of money, time, and brainpower are currently being
expended on QALY research, and that research now promises (or threatens, if
you prefer) to shape policy. Legal scholars and policy analysts outside the health
field should therefore pay more attention than they have done to QALYs. Are
QALYs more than a mere artifact of the resistance of physicians and public
health officials to cost-benefit analysis? Is there a good reason, other than mere
squeamishness about the monetary pricing of life and health that inheres in costbenefit analysis, to incorporate QALYs in policy evaluation?
This Article addresses that question and answers it, affirmatively, in a novel
way.21 My focus is governmental rather than private sector decision-making. I
shall adopt a welfarist approach to policy analysis but—building on my prior
work with Eric Posner22—shall advance a conception of welfarism quite different
from that held by many welfare economists, particularly the health economists
who write about QALYs. Many welfare economists, and certainly many health
economists, continue to structure their work around the criterion of Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency23—a criterion that, Posner and I have argued, should be rejected.
Instead, welfarists should care about overall well-being. Overall well-being and
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency are distinct criteria.
Traditional cost-benefit analysis, understood as the sum of willingness-to-

20. See PENNIFER ERICKSON ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTHY PEOPLE
2000 STATISTICAL NOTES NO. 7 (1995) (discussing “years of health life” measure), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/statnt/statnt/statnt07.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
HEALTHY PEOPLE 2010: UNDERSTANDING AND IMPROVING HEALTH 10 (2000) (same), available at
http://www.healthypeople.gov/document/pdf/uih/2010uih.pdf.
21. Richard Pildes and Cass Sunstein have explored the role of QALYs in public policy, but
their approach is different from mine. They see QALYs as an alternative to monetization, while I
conceptualize QALYs as the input to a nontraditional, but monetized, cost-benefit analysis. See
Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 8385 (1995).
22. See MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2006) [hereinafter ADLER & POSNER, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS]; Matthew
D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis when Preferences are Distorted, in
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 269 (Matthew D.
Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2000) [hereinafter Adler & Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit
Analysis]; Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J.
165 (1999) [hereinafter Adler & Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis].
23. A policy is Kaldor-Hicks efficient, relative to some alternative, if there is a hypothetical
costless redistribution of wealth, from those whose welfare is increased by the policy to those
whose welfare is reduced, which would make the policy Pareto-efficient, i.e., no one would be
worse off and some would be better off.
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pay/accept (WTP/WTA) amounts, is often seen by applied economists and policy
analysts as a way to implement Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. Whatever the
connection here,24 traditional cost-benefit analysis is at best an imperfect proxy
for overall well-being. Under certain conditions, QALY measures can better
track overall welfare than do WTP/WTA measures. In addition, the cognitive
difficulties that ordinary individuals have in processing probabilities, and in
trading off life and health for money, mean that the WTP/WTA amounts that
individuals express in contingent-valuation studies or reveal through their
behaviors may deviate substantially from the true WTP/WTA amounts—the
amounts that genuinely track the individuals’ welfare. QALY interviews and
QALY aggregation can partly circumvent these cognitive failures.
So QALYs do have a place in welfarist policy evaluation, but not as the
outcome measure in cost-effectiveness analysis. Rather, welfarist policy
evaluation properly employs a nontraditional kind of cost-benefit analysis—one
that monetizes certain impacts, such as health impacts, using valuation constructs
other than WTP/WTA. Cost-benefit analysis, in the nontraditional form that I
describe and defend in this Article, remains a technique that monetizes the
welfare impact of governmental choices on affected individuals, then aggregates
those monetary sums. But the use of QALY-to-dollar conversions, rather than
WTP/WTA amounts derived from contingent valuation or revealed preference
studies, is sometimes the best welfarist approach to monetizing welfare impacts.
Part I of the Article surveys existing scholarship about the role of QALYs in
policy evaluation, split between extrawelfarists and welfarists. Extrawelfarists
see QALYs as a measure of “healthiness” rather than well-being, while welfarists
either support QALY-based cost-effectiveness analysis for the pragmatic reason
that many in the health care field are averse to cost-benefit analysis, or reject
QALYs altogether.
Part II and III present a novel defense of QALYs. Part II outlines the
construct of overall well-being, understood (as per John Harsanyi) as the sum of
utility numbers assigned by impartial spectators to individual life histories. I shall
call these utility numbers “lifetime welfare units” (LWUs). Part III argues that
QALYs are sometimes better proxies for LWUs than WTP/WTA amounts, for
both conceptual and cognitive reasons.

24. Traditional cost-benefit analysis is not a perfect measure of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency given
the Boadway paradox. See ROBIN BOADWAY & NEIL BRUCE, WELFARE ECONOMICS 263-71 (1984).
Since I deny the moral significance of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and see traditional cost-benefit
analysis as a decision procedure that implements overall well-being rather than Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency, it is not important for my purposes to determine whether the Boadway paradox, in
practice, creates a large or only a small gap between cost-benefit analysis and Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency.
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But QALYs are hardly a perfect welfarist measuring rod. The LWU value of
a life-history is a product of both its health and non-health attributes. QALYs
capture only the first. Further, the overall health utility of a life-history may not
be perfectly decomposable into the sum of the quality-adjusted durations of its
component health states. These difficulties with QALYs are described in Part IV.
Part V describes the role that QALYs should play in cost-benefit analysis,
given both the strengths and limitations of QALYs. It argues that QALY
measures of health and longevity impacts should be converted into dollar
amounts using a conversion factor, such as $100,000 per QALY. Part V
discusses how to set an optimal conversion factor. And it specifies the conditions
under which QALY-to-dollar conversions should be used as inputs to costbenefit analysis in lieu of WTP/WTA amounts.
Part V also provides a concrete illustration of my approach, on a topic of
much contemporary interest: the debate between those who argue that agencies
should use a monetary value of life that is insensitive to (or at least not
proportional to) the life expectancy of the persons whose lived are saved or lost,
and those who contend that agencies should price life-years rather than lives. I
argue for the pricing of life-years, at least under some circumstances. Many
economists have criticized that approach, because it is at odds with traditional
cost-benefit analysis. But once cost-benefit analysis is understood as a pragmatic
technique that need not always rely on WTP/WTA measures, the life-years
approach may be vindicated.
I. QALYS: THE CURRENT VIEW
This Part briefly reviews the current scholarly understanding of QALYs.
Readers acquainted with this scholarship may want to proceed directly to Part II,
but others are likely to find this review helpful as a point of departure. My own,
novel approach to QALYs, presented in Parts II through V below, is best
understood by contrast with the current literature.
Existing scholarship conceptualizes QALYs as an effectiveness metric for
the purposes of a health policy cost-effectiveness analysis.25 This is true both of
scholars who adopt an “extrawelfarist” approach to health policy and of those
who adopt a “welfarist” approach—a distinction to which I will return shortly.
The literature on QALYs is characterized by various debates and divisions, but
concurs in seeing QALY measures as a component of cost-effectiveness analysis.
Cost-effectiveness analysis of health policy is best described as a set of
25. On health care cost-effectiveness analysis generally, and cost-utility analysis specifically,
see COST-EFFECTIVENESS IN HEALTH AND MEDICINE, supra note 12; and MICHAEL F. DRUMMOND ET
AL., METHODS FOR THE ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF HEALTH CARE PROGRAMMES 96-204 (2d ed.
1997).
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decision-analytic techniques that measure non-health effects in dollars but
measure health and longevity on some nonmonetary scale, such as QALYs. Costeffectiveness analysis has two main variants. The first variant assumes that nonhealth costs should be incurred up to some fixed budget, which is given
exogenously, and picks the policy choice that maximizes health benefits within
the budget. The second variant is not constrained by, nor intent on expending, an
exogenous budget. Instead (roughly speaking) it excludes “dominated” choices
(those that both produce smaller total health benefits than some alternative and
are more expensive than that alternative); arrays the remaining choices in the
order of their total health benefits, smallest to largest; and selects the choice
furthest down the list whose incremental cost-effectiveness ratio does not exceed
some cut-off ratio, for example $50,000 per QALY.26
Appendix I provides an extended example of both variants of costeffectiveness analysis. The first variant, maximizing health benefits for a fixed
budget, is easy to understand. The second variant, which increases health
production until the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio reaches some cut-off
level, is a bit harder to grasp. One way to characterize this second variant of costeffectiveness analysis is as follows: This technique reaches the same result that
traditional cost-benefit analysis would if individual willingness-to-pay/accept
(WTP/WTA) for a QALY were a constant value and the cut-off ratio were set to
equal this constant.27
26. This description is rough because the technique actually uses two different “dominance”
notions to exclude choices: ordinary dominance, as described above, and “weak” or “extended”
dominance. Further, it is structured to accommodate the possibility that health policies can be
pursued simultaneously rather than being mutually exclusive. See Magnus Johannesson, The
Relationship Between Cost-Effectiveness Analysis and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 41 SOC. SCI. & MED.
483, 483-84 (1995); Magnus Johannesson & Milton C. Weinstein, On the Decision Rules of CostEffectiveness Analysis, 12 J. HEALTH ECON. 459, 460-62 (1993); Göran Karlsson & Magnus
Johannesson, The Decision Rules of Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 9 PHARMACOECONOMICS 113
(1996); infra App. I.
The second variant of cost-effectiveness analysis, unlike the first, relies on a cut-off value.
There are various methods, suggested in the literature, to generate this cutoff value. For example,
the analyst might consult tables that show the cost-per-QALY of a range of existing programs, and
might choose a cutoff value in the middle of that range. Or, recognizing that willingness-to-pay per
QALY is heterogeneous, the analyst might try to determine what individuals are (in some sense) on
average willing to pay. For a discussion, see Hans-Georg Eichler et al., Use of Cost-Effectiveness
Analysis in Health-Care Resource Allocation Decision-Making: How Are Cost-Effectiveness
Thresholds Expected To Emerge?, 7 VALUE IN HEALTH 518 (2004); and Milton C. Weinstein, From
Cost-Effectiveness Ratios to Resource Allocation: Where To Draw the Line?, in VALUING HEALTH
CARE, supra note 1, at 91-96.
27. See Mohan V. Bala et al., Conditions for the Near Equivalence of Cost-Effectiveness and
Cost-Benefit Analyses, 5 VALUE IN HEALTH 338, 339-40 (2002); Johannesson, supra note 26, at
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In reality, however, both variants of cost-effectiveness analysis deviate from
traditional cost-benefit analysis (the sum of individual WTP/WTA amounts). The
first variant obviously does, because it takes for granted that the fixed budget
should be expended on health. It selects the choice that maximizes health within
the budget, over the choices of not expending all or any of the budget, even if the
monetized benefits of the health-maximizing choice are less than the monetized
costs.
As for the second variant, the premise that makes this coincide with
traditional cost-benefit analysis, namely the existence of a constant WTP/WTA
per QALY, is counterfactual. WTP for a given QALY gain is in fact
heterogeneous.28 Wealthier individuals will tend to pay more for a given QALY
gain.29 If health does not change the welfare effect (“marginal utility”) of
material consumption, healthier individuals will tend to pay less for a given
QALY gain. Where health does change the marginal utility of consumption,
healthier individuals may pay more for a given QALY gain.30 Individuals for
whom consumption is relatively more important, and health less important, will
tend to pay less for a given QALY gain than their less materialistic counterparts.
All these points are true both if WTP is keyed to preferences and even if WTP is
keyed to a conception of well-being which is allowed to deviate from
preferences. Since health and consumption do not make linear contributions to
well-being at a single, constant rate—on any plausible account of well-being,
preferentialist or not—WTP per QALY is heterogeneous. Thus the second
variant of cost-effectiveness analysis can reach different results than traditional
cost-benefit analysis. Appendix I may be helpful here, as it provides a concrete
example that shows how both variants of cost-effectiveness analysis can diverge
from traditional cost-benefit analysis.

485-86.
28. See Paul Dolan & Richard Edlin, Is It Really Possible To Build a Bridge Between CostBenefit Analysis and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis?, 21 J. HEALTH ECON. 827, 837-38 (2002); Alan
M. Garber & Charles E. Phelps, Economic Foundations of Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 16 J.
HEALTH ECON. 1, 28-29 (1997); Johannesson, supra note 26, at 486-87; see also Bala et al., supra
note 27, at 344-45 (finding that constant WTP per QALY is sufficient but not necessary for the
equivalence of cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit analysis, and identifying weaker necessary
conditions that “are unlikely to hold in practice.”). For a recent empirical study confirming
heterogeneity of WTP per QALY, see Duska M. Franic et al., Quality-Adjusted Life Years Was a
Poor Predictor of Women’s Willingess To Pay in Acute and Chronic Conditions: Results of a
Survey, 58 J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 291, 301 (2005).
29. See, e.g., William N. Evans & W. Kip Viscusi, Income Effects and the Value of Health, 28
J. HUM. RESOURCES 497, 498-99, 516 (1993).
30. See id. at 499-500 (noting that ill health can increase or decrease the marginal utility of
income).
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Given the deviation between QALY-based policy evaluation, in the form of
cost-effectiveness analysis, and traditional cost-benefit analysis, why use
QALYs? The literature provides two answers to this question, “extrawelfarist”
and “welfarist.”31 The extrawelfarist view sees health as a measurable
characteristic of each person, distinct from that person’s well-being;
conceptualizes QALYs as the measure of health; and argues that health programs
should aim at some health-related goal (be it maximizing aggregate population
QALYs, equalizing lifetime QALYs across the population, or something in
between) rather than welfarist goals such as Kaldor-Hicks efficiency or overall
well-being.
The best-known proponent of the extrawelfarist view is A.J. Culyer, who—
drawing on scholarship by Amartya Sen—sees health as a “capability.”32 Sen’s
work, in turn, is part of a larger philosophical school, including such luminaries
as John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin, which suggests that the “currency of
justice” consists in something other than welfare.33 Rawls famously argues that
distributive justice concerns the distribution of “primary goods,” rather than wellbeing. Dworkin argues that genuine equality between persons involves their
starting from a position of equal “resources,” not attaining equal welfare levels.
Sen’s notion of a “capability” is a variation on Rawlsian primary goods and
Dworkinian “resources.”
Extrawelfarists such as Culyer have a ready answer for why health policy
analysts should continue to use cost-effectiveness analysis or some other form of
QALY-based analysis rather than cost-benefit analysis: namely that health, rather
than welfare, ought to be the underlying concern of health policy.34 Costeffectiveness analysis, as seen by the extrawelfarist, is a technique for
maximizing the population’s health. The fact that the health-maximizing choice
need not be the same as the welfare-maximizing choice or the Kaldor-Hicks
efficient choice is no surprise, and no demerit for this technique, since health and
welfare are different.
31. See Dolan, supra note 1, at 1727-29.
32. See, e.g., A.J. Culyer, Commodities, Characteristics of Commodities, Characteristics of
People, Utilities, and the Quality of Life, in QUALITY OF LIFE: PERSPECTIVES AND POLICIES 9 (Sally
Baldwin et al. eds., 1990) [hereinafter Culyer, Commodities]; A.J. Culyer, The Normative
Economics of Health Care Finance and Provision, 5 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 34, 50-55 (1989).
Sen has developed the capability view in many works, including AMARTYA SEN, Equality of What?,
in CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 353 (1982). For a recent symposium discussing the
application of the capability approach to health policy, see Symposium, Equity, Capabilities and
Health, 60 SOC. SCI. & MED. 219 (2005).
33. This extrawelfarist school is surveyed and criticized in Adler & Posner, Rethinking CostBenefit Analysis, supra note 22, at 212, 215-16.
34. See, e.g., Bala et al., supra note 27, at 345; Dolan & Edlin, supra note 28, at 838.
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Is the extrawelfarist defense of QALY-based analysis persuasive? The
extrawelfarist is plausibly correct that health is a measurable characteristic of
individual lives which is distinct from welfare.35 For example, restoring a
paraplegic to full mobility would dramatically improve her health, but might not
dramatically improve her welfare if she is happy as a paraplegic and her lifestyle
with full mobility would remain sedentary.36
Whether health rather than welfare should be the concern of health care
policy and, more generally, whether the maximization or fair distribution of
“capabilities” or “resources” or “primary goods” rather than welfare should be
the focus of social planning and policy evaluation, are thorny questions that I will
not address in detail here. Richard Arneson and others have ably defended the
view that welfare is the currency of justice,37 and I have elsewhere made my own
modest contribution to this deep normative debate.38 Sometimes, extrawelfarism
is linked to egalitarianism.39 But that linkage is a mistake, since welfarist views
can be as egalitarian as you like, and reciprocally extrawelfarist views need not
be particularly egalitarian. More concretely, there is nothing egalitarian about
cost-effectiveness analysis, which will choose a program that benefits healthy
individuals over one that benefits sick individuals if further health improvements
for the healthy are less expensive.40
Sometimes, instead, a linkage is drawn between extrawelfarism and the
morally attractive notions of responsibility and desert.41 Simple welfarism

35. See Culyer, Commodities, supra note 32, at 14-15 (distinguishing between arthritic’s health
need and her marginal or total utility).
36. Cf. Philip Brickman et al., Lottery Winners and Accident Victims: Is Happiness Relative?,
36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 917, 920-21 (1978) (finding that paraplegic and quadriplegic
accident victims were surprisingly happy).
37. See, e.g., Richard J. Arneson, Welfare Should Be the Currency of Justice, 30 CAN. J. PHIL.
497 (2000); Andrew Moore & Roger Crisp, Welfarism in Moral Theory, 74 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL.
598,
613
(1996)
(defending
welfarism
against
influential
criticisms,
and
concluding that “welfarism [is] a powerful and attractive position”).
38. See Matthew D. Adler, Beyond Efficiency and Procedure: A Welfarist Theory of
Regulation, 28 FL. ST. U. L. REV. 241, 307-09 (2000) [hereinafter Adler, Beyond Efficiency and
Procedure]; Adler & Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 22, at 215-16.
39. See Dolan, supra note 1, at 1727 (“[Extrawelfarists] will typically focus attention on
equality of health . . . . ”).
40. See Peter A. Ubel et al., Improving Value Measurement in Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 38
MED. CARE 892, 893-94 (2000) (noting that QALY-based cost-effectiveness analysis ignores the
distribution of health benefits, and in particular has been criticized for not giving sufficient priority
to interventions that are life-saving interventions, benefit those who are severely ill, or benefit those
with limited treatment potential due to disability or chronic illness).
41. See Arneson, supra note 37, at 504-05.
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ignores the fact that a given individual might be responsible for a shortfall in her
welfare. But welfarism need not be so simplistic.42 Conversely, traditional costeffectiveness analysis is no more sensitive to responsibility and desert than
traditional cost-benefit analysis. Cost-effectiveness analysis will channel social
resources to individuals who are responsible for their poor health states or high
mortality risks, and away from more deserving types, if the poor health or high
risk of the less deserving is cheaper to remedy.
I will not belabor these arguments here, but will simply take as given the
welfarist framework for policy evaluation. To be sure, even if welfarists are
correct as a moral matter—even if it is true that governmental choice morally
ought to track some function of welfare, rather than some function of health or
other capabilities/resources/primary goods—it remains the case that welfarism is
legally precluded in certain domains. For example, the Clean Air Act requires the
EPA to set air quality standards that “are requisite to protect the public health”
and “allow[] an adequate margin of safety.”43 The Occupational Safety and
Health Act stipulates that OSHA shall regulate toxic substances in the workplace
so as to ensure, to the extent feasible, that no worker suffers “material
impairment of health or functional capacity.”44 These provisions evidently give
special priority to health. They would therefore seem to preclude cost-benefit
analysis (both the traditional form and the nontraditional or “hybrid” variant this
Article will defend), and indeed have been read to preclude cost-benefit analysis
by the Supreme Court.45 Yet, as Cass Sunstein has demonstrated, there are plenty
of regulatory domains in which health, safety and environmental agencies such as
the EPA, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), OSHA,
and the FDA are statutorily permitted and perhaps even required to engage in
cost-benefit analysis.46 In these domains, the extrawelfarist has no particularly
strong legal leg to stand on, nor (as I believe Arneson has shown) does she have a
particularly strong moral leg either.
In short: Do QALYs have a role to play in welfarist policy evaluation? The
remainder of this Article will focus on this question, and place the broader debate
between welfarists and extrawelfarists to one side. The welfarists who have
written about QALYs, mainly health economists, divide into two groups. One
group recognizes that cost-effectiveness analysis can diverge from traditional
cost-benefit analysis and therewith Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, but offers a

42. See id. at 506-08.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2000).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2000).
45. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 464-71 (2001); Am. Textile Mfg.
Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 506-23 (1981).
46. See Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651 (2001).

13

1_ADLER FINAL PAGINATED.DOC

12/16/2005 5:25:24 PM

YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS

VI:1 (2006)

pragmatic defense of QALYs: The health care field will not accept cost-benefit
analysis. For example, Alan Garber explains:
[Cost-benefit] analysis requires placing dollar valuations on the outcomes of
any program or intervention . . . . To many in the worlds of medicine and of
public health, any attempt to place a value on a human life . . . is anathema.
Thus most ‘economic’ evaluations in health care have applied [costeffectiveness] analysis, which limits the analyst’s responsibility to providing
information about the efficiency with which alternative strategies achieve
health effects.47

Similarly, Cost-Effectiveness in Health and Medicine, the influential report
by an expert panel of economists and public health scholars commissioned by the
Public Health Service, states:
Because of [cost-benefit analysis’s] explicit grounding in welfare-economic
principles, it is natural to ask why one would use cost-effectiveness rather than
cost-benefit analysis if one wants to build from a welfare-economic foundation.
Our interest in cost-effectiveness analysis derives largely from its broad
acceptance within the health care field, in contrast to the skepticism that often
greets cost-benefit analyses in that arena.
It is the distinguishing feature of [cost-benefit analysis] that offends some
sensibilities: In [cost-benefit analysis], the benefit of the health intervention is
expressed in dollar terms rather than in terms of a nonmonetary effectiveness
measure.48

Other health economists reject this pragmatic defense of QALYs and argue
that, given the divergence between cost-effectiveness analysis and Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency, QALYs should not be used in policy evaluation. Instead, they think,
traditional cost-benefit analysis is the appropriate tool. For example, Mark Pauly
explains how cost-benefit analysis implements Kaldor-Hicks efficiency (“the
reason for preferring programs that maximize net benefits is [that] any such
program can always be financed in such a way that everyone in society can be
made better off”49), describes efficiency as the foundation of welfare economics
(“[the] potential compensation test . . . is the one welfare economics generally

47. Alan M. Garber, Advances in Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Health Interventions 4 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7198, 1999).
48. COST-EFFECTIVENESS IN HEALTH AND MEDICINE, supra note 12, at 28.
49. Mark V. Pauly, Valuing Health Care Benefits in Money Terms, in VALUING HEALTH CARE,
supra note 1, at 101.
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uses”50) and concludes by rejecting cost-effectiveness analysis: “[In general]
cost-effectiveness analysis is much less suitable . . . than cost-benefit analysis.”51
Similarly, Paul Dolan and Richard Edlin suggest that the only way to justify
QALYs is by moving to extrawelfarism:
In showing that there is currently no meaningful link between [cost-benefit
analysis] and [cost-effectiveness analysis], we have also shown that [costeffectiveness analysis] is not currently justifiable on strictly welfarist grounds.
Instead, [cost-effectiveness analysis] would seem to be justifiable only on nonwelfarist grounds where the output of health care is judged according to its
contribution to health itself, rather than according to the extent to which it
contributes to overall welfare.52

Or, to quote Don Kenkel: “[W]hen we accept the methodology of welfare
economics, we should use cost-benefit analysis, not cost-effectiveness
analysis.”53
Both of these positions are problematic. Consider first the welfarist defense
of QALY-based analysis as a second-best decision procedure justified by the
resistance of the relevant community (doctors and public health officials) to the
first-best procedure, cost-benefit analysis. At least at the regulatory level, any
norm against pricing life that might once have existed has long been dissipated.
Federal agencies have published numerous cost-benefit analyses incorporating an
explicit, monetary valuation of human life.54 More than thirty-five years ago,
welfare economists demonstrated how the WTP/WTA methodology could be
employed to monetize fatalities, by asking for WTP/WTA for a change in the risk
of death rather than for certain death or the avoidance of certain death.55 This
theoretical scholarship generated a vast body of empirical work, typically
employing wage-risk studies to estimate a “value of statistical life”;56 and these

50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id. at 111.
Dolan & Edlin, supra note 28, at 838.
Don Kenkel, On Valuing Morbidity, Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, and Being Rude, 16 J.
HEALTH ECON. 749, 755 (1997).
54. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Fear Assessment: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Pricing of
Fear and Anxiety, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 977, 981 n.21 (2004) [hereinafter Adler, Fear Assessment]
(finding that more than twenty-five percent of the cost-benefit analyses in the American Enterprise
Institute database of major rulemakings for 1996-99 monetized death, illness, or injury).
55. See Michael W. Jones-Lee, The Value of Changes in the Probability of Death or Injury, 82
J. POL. ECON. 835 (1974); E.J. Mishan, Evaluation of Life and Limb: A Theoretical Approach, 79 J.
POL. ECON. 687 (1971); T.C. Schelling, The Life You Save May Be Your Own, in PROBLEMS IN
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 127 (Samuel B. Chase, Jr. ed., 1968).
56. For overviews of the theoretical and empirical scholarship on valuing life, see, for
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empirical and theoretical literatures, in turn, have now decisively influenced
agency practice.
Pragmatic constraints are surely relevant to policy evaluation. If a strong
taboo on pricing life were in place, then that might justify governmental agencies
in employing a non-cost-benefit procedure that, albeit second-best, did not offend
the taboo. But there is no such taboo, now, at least in the governmental context.
And the anti-pricing norms that might still obtain in other contexts (for example,
among physicians or hospital administrators) would presumably weaken or
dissolve once cost-benefit analysis started to be practiced there.
Consider next the welfarist position that rejects QALYs because cost-benefit
analysis, not cost-effectiveness analysis, tracks Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. This
position is doubly problematic. First, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency itself lacks moral
significance. To recapitulate very quickly arguments that Posner and I have set
forth in great detail elsewhere,57 and that many others have made as well:58 A
Kaldor-Hicks efficient policy is merely one that could, hypothetically, be
transformed into a Pareto-superior policy, through a costless redistribution from
those who gain to those who lose. If the redistribution actually occurs, then the
policy is actually (not just potentially) Pareto-superior and the criterion of
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is not needed to explain why the policy is attractive. If
the redistribution doesn’t occur, then the choice actually produces both winners
and losers, and the link to Pareto-superiority has disappeared. Overall welfare, by
contrast with Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, is a morally important notion; but a
welfare-maximizing policy need not be potentially Pareto-superior, or vice versa.
Because Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is no gold standard, the divergence between
QALY-based analysis and the Kaldor-Hicks criterion is not an indictment of
QALYs.
The welfarist position that rejects QALYs is problematic, too, because it
hews to the widely shared but mistaken assumption that QALY-based analysis is
necessarily a species of cost-effectiveness analysis. Once we shift from
efficiency to the genuine gold standard—overall welfare—it will emerge that
QALYs might function not as the measure of health in a cost-effectiveness
example, A. MYRICK FREEMAN III, THE MEASUREMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE
VALUES: THEORY AND METHODS 297-351 (2d ed. 2003); W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS:
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK 17-74 (1992); W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Aldy,
The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical Review of Market Estimates Throughout the World, 27 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5 (2003).
57. See Adler, Beyond Efficiency and Procedure, supra note 38, at 248-59; Adler & Posner,
Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 22, at 273-74; Adler & Posner, Rethinking CostBenefit Analysis, supra note 22, at 187-94.
58. See Adler, Beyond Efficiency and Procedure, supra note 38, at 249 (citing critics of
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency).
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analysis, but in a new analytic role.
I will ultimately argue below, in Part V, for a nontraditional, “hybrid” form
of cost-benefit analysis in which health impacts are monetized by measuring
those impacts on a QALY scale and then converting them to dollars using a
QALY-to-dollar conversion factor.59 Such QALY-to-dollar conversions should
be used as a supplement to, and in some cases in lieu of, WTP/WTA measures of
health impacts. The preferred tool for welfarist health policy evaluation should be
neither traditional cost-benefit analysis alone nor cost-effectiveness analysis, but
rather should include the “hybrid” cost-benefit technique just described.
This concrete recommendation will be my practical advice to policymakers.
But it will not make much sense until we reconceptualize welfarist policy
analysis in substantial, novel ways: by seeing overall welfare, not Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency, as the underlying goal; and by understanding both QALYs and
WTP/WTA amounts as workable but imperfect tools for measuring changes to
overall welfare. Let us turn now to that reconceptualization.
II. OVERALL WELL-BEING AND LWUS
This Part provides the philosophical foundations for my revisionary account
of QALYs. It clarifies the construct of overall well-being, drawing upon John
Harsanyi’s notion of “extended” lotteries, specifically “extended” lotteries over
life-histories. Overall well-being, thus construed, should be representable as the
sum of “lifetime welfare units” (LWUs). LWUs are the true metric for
interpersonal welfare—the true welfarist gold standard for evaluating
governmental decisional techniques.
The discussion here is quite theoretical. But it is, I believe, absolutely
essential to a proper understanding of QALYs. In order to see how QALYs and
WTP/WTA amounts are both imperfects proxies for LWUs—the thrust of Parts
III and IV below—it is crucial to grasp the concept of an LWU.
Overall well-being is morally relevant, if not morally decisive.60
Utilitarianism, the moral view that gives decisive weight to overall welfare, is
often criticized because it ignores rights, distributive considerations, and
“perfectionist” values such as the alleged value of preserving the environment
quite apart from its welfare value. But none of these criticisms speaks to the
59. See infra Part V.
60. This Part draws heavily on my prior work, particularly Adler & Posner, Rethinking CostBenefit Analysis, supra note 22, and Adler, Beyond Efficiency and Procedure, supra note 38. I
therefore generally cite to those works, rather than to the underlying scholarship in philosophy and
economics, which they reference. My forthcoming book with Eric Posner, ADLER & POSNER, COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS, supra note 22, will present a yet fuller account of the foundations of welfarist
policy evaluation. The arguments in this Part are fleshed out in great detail in chapter 2 of the book.
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weaker, pluralistic view that overall well-being is one criterion among others that
together determine what ought morally to be done. Surely it is morally incorrect
for government to reject a policy that increases overall welfare if the policy does
not infringe any rights, distributive claims, or “perfectionist” values.61
There is one objection that applies to this weaker, pluralistic view as well as
its more austere cousin, utilitarianism—namely, that interpersonal welfare
comparisons are impossible and that talk about “overall well-being” is therefore
meaningless. But this objection is misconceived. The scholarly skepticism about
interpersonal comparisons that was widespread a half-century ago, tied to a
broader skepticism about moral truth, has dissipated—certainly among
philosophers and, to a substantial extent, among theoretical welfare economists
too.62 Moral truth does not entail the existence of unnatural moral objects and
properties.63 Rather, moral assertions can plausibly be unpacked as assertions
about the judgments or reactions of impartial and well-informed observers, and
are true just in case such observers would indeed judge or react in the manner
asserted.64 Folk moral discourse presupposes the existence of moral truths, not
just coincidentally, but because it ends up being extremely difficult to maintain a
thoroughgoing moral skepticism. Consider the welfare economist who purports
to be a moral skeptic but then claims that government “should” implement
Pareto-superior policies. What is the status of that “should”?
Once moral skepticism goes by the wayside, skepticism about interpersonal
comparisons also naturally disappears. Why would it be the case that murdering,
raping or torturing me truly violates my moral rights, but there can never be any
truth of the matter about whether a welfare gain for me exceeds a welfare loss for
you? Note also that if interpersonal welfare comparisons are impossible, then a
wide range of moral theories must be rejected out of hand—not just
utilitarianism, and the softer pluralistic view I am defending here, but also the
egalitarian view currently popular among philosophers known as
“prioritarianism,”65 as well as any other partly or wholly egalitarian moral view
61. See Adler, Beyond Efficiency and Procedure, supra note 38, at 302-19; Adler & Posner,
Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 22, at 209-16, 243-45.
62. See Adler & Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 22, at 204-09.
63. For an overview of “cognitivist” accounts of morality (accounts that recognize the
existence of moral truths, moral beliefs, and moral facts) and their criticisms of noncognitivism, see
generally ALEXANDER MILLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY METAETHICS (2003).
64. See id. at 195-201.
65. Prioritarians claim that distributive and utilitarian considerations are fused in a single moral
criterion, namely overall weighted welfare. Greater weight is given to welfare changes affecting
individuals whose welfare levels are low, and less weight to changes affecting those whose welfare
levels are high. See, e.g., SHELLY KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS 52-54 (1998). I have previously
argued against prioritarianism, in favor of a moral view that incorporates ordinary, unweighted,
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that requires a comparison of the welfare levels of different persons.66 Welfarism,
in all its plausible variants, just goes out the window.
How then should interpersonal welfare comparisons be understood? What
does it mean to say that overall welfare in outcome O is truly greater than overall
welfare in outcome O*? One plausible approach derives from Adam Smith and
has been endorsed in modern times by such scholarly luminaries as Kenneth
Arrow, R.M. Hare, and Donald Davidson and formalized by John Harsanyi.67
Harsanyi suggests that the two outcomes might be viewed as “extended”
lotteries. Assume, for simplicity, that the same N individuals exist in each
outcome. Then the extended lottery (O; p1, p2 . . . pN) offers a p1 chance of
assuming the identity of individual 1 in outcome O, a p2 chance of assuming the
identity of individual 2 in outcome O, and so on. The extended lottery (O*; q1,
q2 . . . qN) offers a q1 chance of being individual 1 in outcome O*, a q2 chance of
being individual 2 in outcome O*, and so on. Harsanyi argues that individuals
can have “extended” preferences—preferences over extended lotteries—and that
humans who were fully informed, fully rational, and otherwise idealized (let us
call these idealized humans “spectators” or “observers”) would have the same
extended preferences. Harsanyi proposes to analyze interpersonal welfare
comparisons as involving an equiprobability extended lottery—one where the
probabilities of assuming the identities of different persons are equal. Intuitively,
overall welfare embeds a certain kind of equality among persons: Your welfare
has no greater weight than mine, just because it is yours, in determining overall
welfare.68 In Harsanyi’s schema, this deep impartiality is realized by stipulating
the following: O is better for overall welfare than O* just in case all spectators
would prefer the extended lottery (O; 1/N, 1/N . . . ) to (O*; 1/N, 1/N . . . ). There
are N persons in each outcome and the chance of being any one is 1/N.
Harsyani’s schema is an idealization. Asking actual humans, with all their
various cognitive limitations, to rank life-histories, let alone lotteries over lifehistories, might be thought a ludicrous undertaking. In fact the undertaking may
not be so ludicrous: There is a small but growing survey literature, an offshoot
overall welfare as one among a plurality of moral criteria, and Posner and I do so at greater length
in our forthcoming book. ADLER & POSNER, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, supra note 22, ch. 2; Adler,
Beyond Efficiency and Procedure, supra note 38, at 309-11.
66. See ADLER AND POSNER, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, supra note 22, ch. 2.
67. See Adler & Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 22, at 206-08; Adler,
Beyond Efficiency and Procedure, supra note 38, at 292-302; John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the
Theory of Rational Behavior, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 39 (Amartya Sen & Bernard
Williams eds., 1982); John A. Weymark, A Reconsideration of the Harsanyi-Sen Debate on
Utilitarianism, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING 255 (Jon Elster & John E.
Roemer eds., 1991).
68. See KAGAN, supra note 65, at 49.
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from the main body of QALY surveys, which seeks to elicit individuals’
preferences for temporally extended health profiles consisting of a sequence of
different health states.69 In any event, the Harsanyi schema is not offered here as
a decision-procedure that governmental decision-makers seeing to maximize
overall welfare should actually employ. Rather, its function is analytic: It tells us
what overall well-being means. Harsanyi invokes the preferences of idealized
spectators contemplating extended lotteries in an attempt to define overall
welfare.70 This should not seem so strange to anyone familiar with contemporary
welfare economics or contemporary philosophical scholarship about welfare;
appeals to “fully-informed” or otherwise idealized preferences are very common
in these literatures.71
But how, then, should actual policymakers go about their business? The
quick answer is that maximizing overall welfare in the Harsanyi sense poses the
predicament of choice under uncertainty (uncertainty about which extended
lotteries the spectators would prefer) by decision-makers (the actual humans who
make policy choices) with various cognitive limits. The technique of cost-benefit
analysis is one response to this predicament. It may not be the ideal technique,
but it is (or seems to be) the best available technique given the state of policy
science at the dawn of the twenty-first century.72 The trick is to design costbenefit analysis so as to be sensitive to the Harsanyi construct and, more
concretely, so as to incorporate whatever evidence we might have about what the
preferences of fully-informed humans would be, without exceeding the cognitive
capacities of actual policymakers or system-designers. So the field of policy
analysis faces a difficult, but not insoluble, problem of specifying the optimal,
feasible variant of cost-benefit analysis. Part V of the Article addresses this
problem at somewhat greater length. The point I wish to emphasize here is that

69. See Paul F.M. Krabbe & Gouke J. Bonsel, Sequence Effects, Health Profiles, and the
QALY Model, 18 MED. DECISION MAKING 178 (1998); Miriam Kuppermann et al., Can Preference
Scores for Discrete States Be Used To Derive Preference Scores for an Entire Path of Events?, 17
MED. DECISION MAKING 42 (1997); Jeffrey Richardson et al., The Measurement of Utility in
Multiphase Health States, 12 INT’L J. TECH. ASSESSMENT IN HEALTH CARE 151 (1996); Anne
Spencer, A Test of the QALY Model When Health Varies over Time, 57 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1697
(2003); Jonathan R. Treadwell, Tests of Preferential Independence in the QALY Model, 18 MED.
DECISION MAKING 418 (1998). Indeed, the so-called HYE (“healthy years equivalent”)
methodology for health policy analysis, a competitor to QALYs that some scholars have vigorously
defended, requires individual valuations of temporally extended profiles. See Dolan, supra note 1,
at 1729 (discussing HYEs); Johannesson, supra note 1, at 286-88 (same).
70. See Adler & Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 22, at 216-25
(distinguishing between moral criteria and morally justified decision procedures).
71. See id. at 203 & n.100.
72. See id. at 225-43.
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Harsanyi’s schema defines a moral notion, overall well-being, as an esoteric
standard (one framed in terms of spectators’ extended preferences) which will
never be transparent to us, but which we can do our best to grasp and apply in the
design of actual governmental choice-procedures.
A more troubling feature of Harsanyi’s schema is his claim that spectators
would have the same extended preferences. What would justify this claim? Our
ordinary preferences might diverge, even with full information. I might prefer to
eat chocolate ice cream, while you might prefer to eat vanilla ice cream. If so, it
is hard to see why idealized extended preferences must converge: I might prefer,
ceteris paribus, a life history in which the subject eats chocolate to one in which
the subject eats vanilla, while you might have the opposite preference.73
This flaw in Harsanyi’s account can be remedied, I have argued elsewhere,
by appealing to convergent extended preferences.74 O is better for overall welfare
than O* just in case the spectators would all prefer a lottery that delivers outcome
O and a 1/N chance of being each individual in O, over a lottery that delivers
outcome O* and a 1/N chance of being each individual in O*. On this
modification of Harsanyi’s schema, the extent to which extended preferences
converge under full information is an empirical issue, dependent on the facts
about human nature; full convergence is not presupposed a priori.75
In their seminal work on decision theory, von Neumann and Morgenstern
proposed axioms for the rationality of preferences over lotteries which, if
satisfied, will permit those preferences to be represented by “utility” numbers.76
Given those axioms, an individual will prefer a lottery to another just in case it
has greater utility, in turn calculated as the expected utility of its component
parts. 77 In the Harsanyi setup, the component parts of the lotteries are what I
have referred to as life-histories: having the identity of some individual i in
outcome O. An equiprobability extended lottery can be represented as a lottery
over life histories {L1, L2 . . . LN}, each of which has probability 1/N. The axioms
of expected utility theory are, famously, violated in actual practice by untrained

73. See Adler, Beyond Efficiency and Procedure, supra note 38, at 293.
74. See id. at 297-300.
75. Indeed, respondents to QALY surveys do not fully converge on the weights they assign to
health states. See U.S. EPA, HUMAN HEALTH METRICS, supra note 1, at 23; infra text accompanying
notes 136-137.
76. See JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THE THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC
BEHAVIOR 15-31, 617-32 (3d ed. 1953).
77. On expected utility theory, see, e.g., SIMON FRENCH, DECISION THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE MATHEMATICS OF RATIONALITY 149-209 (1986); DAVID M. KREPS, NOTES ON THE THEORY
OF CHOICE (1988); and MICHAEL D. RESNIK, CHOICES: AN INTRODUCTION TO DECISION THEORY 81120 (1987).
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humans with their various biases and limitations.78 But a strong case can be made
that the axioms, if not descriptive, are normative—they are partly constitutive of
rational choice—and thus would be satisfied by idealized spectators. So each
spectator’s extended preferences can be represented by a utility function W, such
that the spectator prefers an equiprobability lottery over life-histories {L1 . . . LN}
to an equiprobability lottery over life-histories {L1* . . . LN*} just in case: 1/N
W(L1) + 1/N W(L2) + . . . 1/N W(LN) > 1/N W(L1*) + 1/N W(L2*) + . . . 1/N W
(LN*).79 Since the same number of individuals exist in each outcome, and since
each life history is given an equal probability, the 1/N factors drop out and it
emerges that a given spectator prefers one extended lottery to a second just in
case the sum of utility numbers for the life histories involved is greater in the first
case: W(L1) + W(L2) + . . . W(LN) > W(L1*) + W(L2*) + . . . W(LN*).
Because (pace Harsanyi) extended preferences might not converge, the
utility numbers tracking the various spectators’ extended preferences might not
be identical either. Formally, there is a family of interpersonal utility functions
W1 . . . WM, corresponding to the M spectators; and one outcome O has greater
overall welfare than another O* just in case, for each of the utility functions
W1 . . . WM, the sum of the utility numbers assigned to the component lifehistories of O is greater than the sum of the utility numbers assigned to the
component life-histories of O*.80 The technical term for this is a
“supervaluation”: Overall well-being is a supervaluation over the extended utility
functions of fully-informed spectators, conceiving each outcome as a lottery over
life-histories with an equal chance of living each one. For simplicity, in the
analysis of QALYs, WTPs, and cost-benefit analysis below, I will omit the
supervaluationist caveat, assume convergence of extended preferences (as does
Harsanyi), and refer to a single extended utility function W. But the argument
carries over, I conjecture, to the more plausible case of partly divergent extended
preferences. Because the analysis will prove to be long and complicated even on
the assumption that spectators’ extended preferences fully converge, I will not
attempt to verify the conjecture in this Article.
To sum up: Overall well-being has at least prima facie moral relevance. Talk
of “overall well-being” presupposes the possibility of interpersonal welfare
comparisons—but comparisons of welfare levels or differences are presupposed
by a wide variety of moral views, skepticism about them is no more plausible
than general moral skepticism, and Harsanyi’s construct of extended preferences

78. See, e.g., SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 84-188
(1993).
79. See Weymark, supra note 67, at 289-97.
80. Cf. AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 46-49 (1992) (discussing an approach to
social choice that focuses on convergent judgments and tolerates incompleteness).
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and utility functions is a plausible way to give content to the notion of overall
welfare. In the simple, limiting case, the spectators—our idealized counterparts—
have convergent extended preferences, representable by a single utility function
W. W assigns numbers to life-histories, and the overall well-being in some
outcome is the sum of the utility numbers assigned to its component lifehistories. The W function constitutes a cardinal and interpersonally comparable
scale of welfare: a numerical representation of the degree to which changes in
individual lives change the overall level of well-being.
Let us call the W-numbers “lifetime welfare units” (LWUs). I use this term,
rather than “utility,” because “utility” is a very general concept that subsumes a
host of numerical representations of preferences, including but not limited to the
extended preferences of our idealized counterparts. Further, the word “lifetime”
underscores that overall welfare is first and foremost a composite of whole lives,
not momentary time-slices. Individual moments or periods within an individual
life contribute to overall well-being by contributing to the goodness of the
individual life-history of which they are a part. To assume otherwise—to
stipulate that overall well-being is necessarily decomposable into the sum of
momentary or periodic well-being—is to rule out the very possibility of
sequencing effects.81 That would be deeply counterintuitive. Certain constituents
of well-being, such as pains and pleasures, may not be subject to significant
sequencing effects;82 but to insist a priori that this is true of all constituents seems
wrongheaded.83 As David Velleman explains:
Consider two different lives that you might live. One life begins in the depths
but takes an upward trend . . . . Another life begins at the heights but slides
downhill . . . . Surely, we can imagine two such lives as containing equal sums
of momentary well-being. Your retirement is as blessed in one life as your
childhood in the other; your nonage is as blighted in one life as your dotage in
the other.
Yet even if we were to map each moment in one life onto a moment of equal
well-being in the other, we would not have shown these lives to be equally

81. See infra text accompanying notes 160-163 (discussing empirical studies of sequencing
effects).
82. See Daniel Kahneman, Experienced Utility and Objective Happiness: A Moment-Based
Approach, in 1 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ECONOMIC DECISIONS: RATIONALITY AND WELL-BEING 187,
191-94 (Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carrillo eds., 2003) (presenting an “objective happiness”
account of the experiential component of well-being in which total experiential utility is a function
of momentary experiential utility without sequencing effects).
83. See id. at 205 (“Objective happiness is not proposed as a comprehensive concept of human
well-being, only as a significant constituent of it.”).
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good. For after the tally of good times and bad times had been rung up, the fact
would remain that one life gets progressively better while the other gets
progressively worse . . . . To most people, I think, the former story would seem
like a better life story . . . in the sense that it is the story of a better life.84

The notion of preferences over whole lives, rather than moments or periods,
might seem odd. Yet this notion is accepted by the welfare-economic literature
on inter-temporal choice, where the decomposability of utility functions over
lives into the sum of utility functions over periods is understood as a contingent
rather than necessary fact.85 The same holds true of the QALY literature, where
once more the additive formula ∑j q(hi,j)×tj (the sum total of time alive, with each
time span weighted for the quality of health in that period) is understood to be an
accurate representation of a lifetime health history only if certain axioms are
satisfied.86
III. QALYS VERSUS WTP/WTA AMOUNTS AS PROXIES FOR LWUS: THE
ADVANTAGES OF QALYS
What are QALYs? What are WTP/WTA amounts? And how do they relate
to LWUs, the welfarist gold standard?
Section A answers these questions. Sections B and C then demonstrate how
QALYs can, under some conditions, be better proxies for LWUs than
WTP/WTA amounts. Section B brackets issues of measurement and shows that
QALYs, if accurately measured, can in some special contexts perfectly track
LWUs, while accurately measured WTP/WTA amounts will not. Section C
describes various cognitive phenomena that make the measurement of
WTP/WTA amounts particularly difficult and that may not interfere as
substantially with QALY measurement.
It should be stressed that Sections B and C are not meant to demonstrate the
overall superiority of QALYs to WTP/WTA amounts as proxies for LWUs.
QALYs have their own difficulties, which will be discussed in Part IV. But it is
crucial to see that the comparison of QALYs and WTP/WTA is a mixed bag.
WTP/WTAs are not perfect welfarist measures. They have disadvantages, as well
as advantages, vis-a-vis other practicable measures such as QALYs. This point is
wholly overlooked in the existing welfarist literature on QALYs, where the only
reason advanced to prefer QALY-based policy analysis to WTP/WTA-based

84. J. David Velleman, Well-Being and Time, in THE METAPHYSICS OF DEATH 329, 331 (John
Martin Fischer ed., 1993).
85. See, e.g., Han Bleichrodt & Amiram Gafni, Time Preference, The Discounted Utility
Model, and Health, 15 J. HEALTH ECON. 49, 53-58 (1996).
86. See infra Section IV.B.
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analysis is a taboo on monetization.87
This Part therefore breaks new ground. Showing that WTP/WTAs do not
dominate QALYs as a welfarist tool is a vital point, which policy-analytic
scholarship has yet to grasp. My intention is not to ignore the limitations of
QALYs, but rather to shine a bright light on the welfarist imperfections of the
WTP/WTA measure, in this part of the Article, and then to do the same for
QALYs in Part IV below.
A. What Are WTP/WTA Amounts? What Are QALYs?
QALYs and WTP/WTA amounts, like LWUs themselves, can be understood
as idealized constructs. They constitute different ways to measure the welfare
goodness of a life-history. These idealized constructs should serve to orient the
actual practice of policy analysis: Responses to QALY surveys provide evidence
that policy analysts can employ in estimating (idealized) QALYs, and similarly,
responses to contingent-valuation surveys, or market behavior, are evidence of
(idealized) WTP/WTA amounts.
Traditionally, cost-benefit analysis is defined as the sum of WTP/WTA: the
money amounts that individuals are willing to pay or accept in return for choices
that affect them. Posner and I have suggested that WTP/WTA amounts may need
to be “laundered” in various ways, to correct for perceptual and evaluative biases
that may cause individuals to be mistaken about what truly benefits them.88 This
suggestion motivates the following definition of (idealized) WTP/WTA
amounts:89 If O is the status quo and O* is an alternative outcome, then
individual i’s WTP/WTA for O* is the amount of wealth subtracted from or
added to her life-history Li* in O* (at the present time) such that her life-history
Li*, with this wealth subtracted or added, is just as good as her baseline lifehistory Li in O. By “just as good,” I mean that the incremental resources just
compensate for the difference in LWUs between Li and Li*. The “laundering”
here occurs because it is the preferences of idealized spectators—not the

87. See supra Part I.
88. See ADLER & POSNER, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, supra note 22, ch. 5; Adler & Posner,
Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 22, at 220-22; Adler & Posner, Implementing CostBenefit Analysis, supra note 22, at 289-300; Matthew Adler, Incommensurability and Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1371, 1381-83 (1998) [hereinafter Adler, Incommensurability and
Cost-Benefit Analysis].
89. In prior work, I have used the term “welfare equivalent” (WE) to mean an idealized or
“laundered” WTP/WTA amount. So as to avoid burdening the reader with too much unfamiliar
jargon, I will stick to the WTP/WTA terminology here. But the substance of my analysis is fully
consistent with my prior claims that cost-benefit analysis, ideally, should be understood as the sum
of WEs rather than the sum of actual WTP/WTA.
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individual’s actual preferences—that determine the LWU values of the
individual’s various possible lives.
What about QALYs? How do they fit into my framework of life-histories
and LWUs? An individual’s longevity and morbidity profile is part of her lifehistory—part of the agglomeration of facts that affect her well-being—but not
the only part. A given life history Li might be thought of as a combination of a
health-and-longevity history Hi, plus many other background features Bi,
including individual consumption, recreational activities, social life, professional
accomplishment, sexuality, and so on.90 What do QALYs mean, given these other
features in the background? Note that this question about the interaction between
QALYs and background characteristics does not arise for the extrawelfarist, for
whom two individuals with identical health profiles, but different consumption,
leisure, social, professional and sexual profiles, are equally “healthy.” The
extrawelfarist social planner focused on the capability/resource/primary good of
“health” can, quite correctly, insist that these lives should be assigned the same
QALY value. But how can the welfarist social planner insist on that? Indeed, is it

90. The philosophical literature on objective welfare goods specifies a range of plausible
dimensions of human well-being, such as life, bodily health, bodily integrity, the use of the “senses,
imagination and thought,” emotions, practical reason, affiliation, interaction with other species,
play, and control over one’s environment (Martha Nussbaum’s list). See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM,
WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 78-80 (2000); see also JOHN
FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 59-99 (1980) (identifying life itself, knowledge, play,
aesthetic experience, sociability, practical reasonableness, and religion as objective welfare goods);
JAMES GRIFFIN, VALUE JUDGEMENT: IMPROVING OUR ETHICAL BELIEFS 29-30 (1996) (identifying
accomplishment, agency, understanding, enjoyment, and deep personal relations); DEREK PARFIT,
REASONS AND PERSONS 499 (1984) (identifying moral goodness, rational activity, the development
of one’s abilities, having children and being a good parent, knowledge, and the awareness of true
beauty). These philosophers’ lists are, in effect, scholarly speculation about which feature of lifehistories idealized spectators would intrinsically prefer. See Adler, Beyond Efficiency and
Procedure, supra note 38, at 297-300. The World Health Organization has recently undertaken a
more rigorous and comprehensive process, involving focus groups, surveys, and expert
consultation, to arrive at an index of quality of life, the World Health Organization Quality of Life
(WHOQOL) assessment, that encompasses twenty-four attributes. Some of these involve health,
but many do not (for example, positive feelings, self-esteem, body image, personal relationships,
social support, sexual activity, home environment, financial resources, leisure, and spirituality). See
The World Health Organization Quality of Life Group, The World Health Organization Quality of
Life Assessment (WHOQOL): Development and General Psychometric Properties, 46 SOC. SCI. &
MED. 1569, 1576-78 (1998) [hereinafter The WHOQOL Group]; infra text accompanying note 170
(discussing the WHOQOL).
In short, there is much disagreement about what the welfare-relevant dimensions of lifehistories are, but no disagreement that there are a considerable number of dimensions and that
welfare transcends mere health and longevity.
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even a coherent enterprise for the welfarist to measure the welfare contribution of
health to a life that depends not only on health, but much else?
In answering this question, I shall draw upon important recent scholarship in
utility theory by Miyamoto, Wakker, Bleichrodt, and Peters.91 A very general
problem in utility theory involves so-called “multidimensional” objects: objects
with multiple types of attributes, falling into different domains or “dimensions.”
The general question is whether the utility numbers for the objects can in turn be
decomposed into a sum, a product, or some other relatively tractable function of
“subutility” numbers representing the different dimensions.92 The simplest
decomposition is additive, but it seems clear that the additive approach will not
work for the problem at hand. A life-history Li, as I have conceived it, is
comprised of health-and-longevity attributes Hi plus background characteristics
Bi. It would be nice if W(Li), the LWU measure of a given life-history, were
representable as the sum of two subutility functions Q(Hi) + V(Bi), but the
requisite conditions for additive decomposition are too stringent to be met here.
Those conditions say that two dimensions are additively separable if and only if a
given change in one dimension has the same effect on overall utility, regardless
of where the object (here, life-history) is located in the other dimension.93 That
surely is not true of the interaction between health and longevity, on the one
hand, and leisure, consumption, social interaction, professional accomplishment
and the other non-health constituents of welfare, on the other. For example, it is
typically and plausibly supposed by welfare economists that health can change
the welfare benefit of consumption.94 If that is true, then presumably health can
also change the welfare benefit of sex, socializing and so on. An additive
representation of lifetime welfare as the sum of health-and-longevity subutility
plus background subutility would preclude all of these sorts of interactions.
What Miyamato et al. demonstrate is that a multiplicative decomposition of
utility is possible if two conditions are met: the “zero condition” and “standardgamble invariance.” The “zero condition” says that one of the dimensions must
have a zero level, such that all objects at that level in that dimension have equal
utility regardless of where they are located in the other dimension. Standard91. John M. Miyamato et al., The Zero-Condition: A Simplifying Assumption in QALY
Measurement and Multiattribute Utility, 44 MGMT. SCI. 839 (1998).
92. See generally FRENCH, supra note 77, at 102-201 (discussing multiattribute value theory
and utility theory); RALPH L. KEENEY & HOWARD RAIFFA, DECISIONS WITH MULTIPLE OBJECTIVES:
PREFERENCES AND VALUE TRADEOFFS (1976) (same); DETLOF VON WINTERFELDT & WARD
EDWARDS, DECISION ANALYSIS AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 259-350 (1986) (same).
93. See, e.g., FRENCH, supra note 77, at 182-91; VON WINTERFELDT & EDWARDS, supra note
92, at 302-08, 334-41.
94. See, e.g., Evans & Viscusi, supra note 29, at 499-500; Hammitt, QALYs Versus WTP,
supra note 1, at 991-92 & n.11.
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gamble invariance says that lotteries in which the first dimension (the one with
the zero level) is varied and the second held fixed must be ranked the same way,
regardless of where the second dimension is fixed.95 These axioms, albeit
technical and a bit difficult to grasp, turn out to have considerable relevance for
QALYs, LWUs, and policy evaluation.96 For I suggest that health-and-longevity
and background characteristics do interact in just the way required by the
Miyamato conditions. At a minimum, the assumption that they do thus interact is
a reasonable working premise, one that I will consider relaxing later on but, for
now will take as true.97
The health-and-longevity dimension satisfies the “zero condition.” Because
being alive is a precondition for consumption, leisure, sex, socializing, and so on,
a life-history whose health profile Hi has zero longevity must be given the same
ranking by extended spectators, and have the same LWU number, regardless of
whatever background characteristics we might link to that life-history. As for
standard-gamble invariance: Imagine that idealized spectators are indifferent
between a given life history Li = (Hi, Bi), and a lottery over health characteristics
holding fixed the background characteristics of that life-history, where there is a
chance p of getting (Hi', Bi) and a chance (1 – p) of getting (Hi'', Bi). Then
idealized spectators must also be indifferent between the same lottery over the
health dimension with a different set of background characteristics. Li* = (Hi,
Bi*) must be just as good as a chance p of getting (Hi', Bi*) and a (1 – p) chance
of getting (Hi'', Bi*). Being wealthier or poorer, more or less social, more or less
accomplished, cannot change the relative attractiveness of different health

95. See Miyamato et al., supra note 91, at 845-48. The Miyamato conditions allow for any
finite number of attributes or “dimensions.” I have stated the conditions as they apply to the twoattribute case, since I am here conceptualizing life-histories as involving two broad dimensions of
welfare (each of course encompassing a variety of more specific subdimensions): health/longevity
and background characteristics.
96. Han Bleichrodt and John Quiggin have also employed the standard-gamble invariance
condition and zero condition to analyze the interaction between health and consumption, and James
Hammitt has employed the standard-gamble invariance condition. See Han Bleichrodt & John
Quiggin, Life-Cycle Preferences over Consumption and Health: When Is Cost-Effectiveness
Analysis Equivalent to Cost-Benefit Analysis?, 18 J. HEALTH ECON. 681, 688-90 (1999); James
Hammitt, How Much Is a QALY Worth? Admissible Utility Functions for Health and Wealth 3-6
(May 2002) (unpublished manuscript, prepared for Association of Environmental and Resources
Economists at the Allied Social Sciences Associations meeting), available at
www.feem.it/NR/Feem/resources/conferences/PRE2004-01-03-01.Hammitt.pdf)
[hereinafter
Hammitt, How Much Is a QALY Worth?]. My analysis, with its focus on LWUs and the relative
accuracy of QALYs and WTP/WTA in tracking LWUs, is quite different from Bleichrodt and
Quiggin’s and Hammitt’s, but I am indebted to their work.
97. See infra Section IV.A.
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profiles and gambles over health profiles. This health-gamble-invariance
condition, while surely less compelling than the proposition that all zerolongevity lives are equally good for welfare, seems just as plausible as standard
restrictions on the structure of preferences that welfare economists employ so as
to achieve tractable formalization and, therewith, cheap and feasible policyevaluation procedures.98
If spectators’ extended preferences over life-histories indeed satisfy the
Miyamato conditions, then W(Li) = Q(Hi) × V(Bi). The welfare value of a life is
representable as the multiplicative product of the value of its health-andlongevity characteristics and the value of its background characteristics. This
brings us to QALYs. My proposal is that the QALY value of a given life be
defined as this first value: Q(Hi), the numerical value of the health-and-longevity
profile partly constitutive of that life, which when multiplied by a numerical
value V(Bi) representing the consumption, leisure, professional, and other nonhealth attributes of the life, equals the overall utility or LWU value W(Li).
To reiterate: Assuming the Miyamato conditions hold true, we can define a
“subutility” number Q(Hi) encapsulating the health-and-longevity characteristics
of a given life-history, and a “subutility” number V(Bi) encapsulating the
background characteristics of that life-history. The overall utility or LWU value
of the life-history will be the multiplicative product of these two “subutilities.” Hi
is a nonnumerical description of the nature and duration of the health states
making up a life history. Q(Hi) is the “subutility” that represents that health
profile. Similarly, Bi is a nonnumerical description of the background
characteristics of a life history. V(Bi) is the subutility that represents that nonhealth profile. I define the QALY value of a life history as Q(Hi). This QALY
value is one input, along with V(Bi), in a multiplicative formula that determines
the LWU value associated with that life-history.
At this point, the reader might wonder how my definition of the QALY
value of a life history, as Q(Hi), relates to the standard formula for calculating
QALYs, namely ∑jq(hi,j)×tj, where hi,j is the health of individual i in period j and
tj is the duration of period j. The answer is that Q(Hi) is an idealized construct:
the true health subutility of a life. ∑jq(hi,j)×t, is a practicable formula for
estimating Q(Hi). If certain axioms hold true, the estimate will be perfect:
∑jq(hi,j)×tj will necessarily equal Q(Hi). If those axioms do not hold true, then
∑jq(hi,j)×tj will not necessarily equal Q(Hi), and must be understood as a rough

98. For example, it is standardly assumed that preferences are complete and transitive and
often assumed that they can be represented by well-behaved (continuous, differentiable, monotonic,
quasi-concave) functions. See, e.g., DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 17-37
(1990) (discussing economic theory of consumer choice); CARL P. SIMON & LAWRENCE BLUME,
MATHEMATICS FOR ECONOMISTS 544-57 (1994) (same).
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estimate, perhaps quite rough. The axioms, and the possible divergence between
the QALY value of a life and ∑j q(hi,j)×tj, are discussed below in Part IV.99
B. How QALYs Can Improve on WTP/WTA Amounts (Bracketing Measurement
Problems)
This Section brackets measurement issues and shows that accurately
measured QALYs, i.e., Q(Hi) values, will, under certain conditions, be perfect
proxies for LWUs. Under the same conditions, accurately measured WTP/WTA
amounts will not be perfect proxies for LWUs. This analysis is admittedly
artificial, because policymakers do not have direct access to Q(Hi) values, any
more than they do to LWUs themselves. Measurement problems are in fact
omnipresent. Still, the analysis will help highlight one of the potential advantages
of nontraditional, QALY-based cost-benefit analysis, as compared to traditional,
WTP/WTA-based cost-benefit analysis.
The proposition that accurately measured QALYs will perfectly track
LWUs, under some conditions, is a direct upshot of the Miyamato conditions.
The qualifying phrase “under some conditions” is crucial. If one life is different
in the value of its background characteristics than another, then a health
improvement in the first life will have a different impact on overall welfare than
a health improvement in the second life. This is a point I will return to below.100
But the reciprocal point is also true: Where the lives being compared have the
same, or equally valuable, background characteristics, differences in their QALY
values will perfectly track differences in their welfare goodness.
Imagine a class of life-histories {L1, . . . Lm}, composed of health profiles
{H1, . . . Hm} and profiles of consumption, leisure and other background
characteristics {B1, . . . Bm}. Assume that all the life-histories are equal in the
value of these non-health profiles: that is, V(B1) = V(B2) = . . . = V(Bm) = K. As a
shorthand, let us call this a “background-equivalent” class of lives. The QALY
values of the lives may vary. Q(H1) does not necessarily equal Q(H2) or Q(H3)
and so on. The Miyamato model entails that W(Li) = Q(Hi) × V(Bi), which
reduces to W(Li) = Q(Hi) × K. In other words, the LWU value of a life within the
background-equivalent class equals its QALY value multiplied by a constant K
representing the background value of all the lives in the class. It follows that
QALY changes are a perfect indicator of the welfare impacts of policy choices
whose effects are limited to changing, either for certain or probabilistically,
which life-histories within the class occur.
Consider first a policy that affects morbidity rather than mortality. In the

99. See infra Section IV.B.
100. See infra Section IV.C.
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status quo, individual 1 has life-history L1, and individual 2 has life-history L2.
The policy would improve the first individual’s health, changing her life-history
to L1', and degrade the second individual’s health, changing her life-history to L2'.
Assume, crucially, that the status quo and alternative possible lives, L1, L2, L1',
and L2', fall within the same background-equivalent class. Then the overall
change in QALYs achieved by implementing the policy would be Q(H1') +
Q(H2') – Q(H1) – Q(H2). And the overall change in welfare, represented by
LWUs, would be Q(H1') × K + Q(H2') × K – Q(H1) × K – Q(H2) × K = K[Q(H1')
+ Q(H2') – Q(H1) – Q(H2)]. So the policy improves overall welfare if and only if
it increases total QALYs.
Consider next a policy that affects mortality risks, again assuming that all
the lives involved fall in the same background-equivalent class, with scaling
constant K representing the value of the lives’ background characteristics. In the
status quo, individual 1 has life-history L1, and individual 2 has life-history L2.
The policy would create a risk p for individual 1 of life-history L1', and a risk (1 –
p) of life-history L1'', where L1' and L1'' involve a longer or shorter life-span than
the baseline L1. Similarly, the second individual would incur a r risk of lifehistory L2', and a (1 – r) risk of L2'', again with different life-spans than baseline
L2. As before, each life history Li has a component health history Hi; in this
example, the various health histories differ in the length of time that the subject
lives. The expected QALY change from the policy is p × Q(H1') + (1 – p) ×
Q(H1'') – Q(H1) + r × Q(H2') + (1 – r) × Q(H2'') – Q(H2). And the expected
change in LWUs produced by the policy turns out to be that amount multiplied
by the scaling constant K. Once more, the policy produces an expected increase
in overall welfare if and only if it produces an expected increase in QALYs.
What about WTP/WTA amounts? There are various ways in which
WTP/WTA measures of welfare effects on individual lives can fail to be
perfectly correlated with utility measures of those effects. Our concern here is
extended preferences and “laundered” or “idealized” WTP/WTA amounts, but
the imperfections in money measures of utility carry over to this context.
WTP/WTA amounts, again, are present wealth changes that compensate for
welfare changes. Specifically, a present wealth increase compensates for a
subject’s loss in welfare by increasing the subject’s expected material
consumption over his lifetime. A present wealth reduction compensates for a
subject’s increase in welfare by decreasing the subject’s expected material
consumption over his lifetime.
One reason why WTP/WTA amounts do not perfectly track LWUs is that
changes in consumption need not translate into changes in LWUs at an
interpersonally constant rate. To see this point, consider the following case. In
the status quo, individual 1 has life L1; if the policy were implemented, his life
would instead be L1'. In the status quo, individual 2 has life L2, replaced by L2'
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under the policy. Each of these lives is a combination of health characteristics
and background characteristics including consumption. So L1 = (H1, B1) = (H1,
(C1, S1, P1 . . .)); and L2 = (H2,B2) = (H2, (C2, S2, P2 . . .)). The change in LWUs
resulting from the policy would be W(L1') + W(L2') – W(L1) – W(L2). Assume that
present wealth changes directly translate into present changes in consumption. In
other words, the first individual’s laundered WTP/WTA for the policy is that
present change in his consumption profile C1', ∆C1', such that the lifetime welfare
units of the amended L1' equals W(L1). The same holds for the second
individual’s WTP/WTA.
If LWU changes are proportional to WTP/WTA amounts—that is, if
[W(L1') – W(L1)] / ∆C1' = [W(L2') – W(L2)] / ∆C2'—then the sum of WTP/WTA
does track LWUs. But there are a variety of reasons why, in general, the
proportionality constraint just articulated need not hold true. Individual 1 may
have a much higher level of lifetime consumption than individual 2, so that
changes in his consumption have a smaller effect on lifetime welfare.
Consumption has diminishing “marginal utility,” to use the standard economic
lingo.101 Or sequencing effects might kick in: Although the two individuals have
roughly the same level of lifetime consumption, the ∆C1' would occur at a point
in individual 1’s consumption sequence where his welfare is particularly
sensitive, or insensitive, to consumption changes. Finally, consumption might
interact with health, or with other background characteristics.102
A different reason why the sum of WTP/WTA amounts need not perfectly
track the sum of LWUs is that present wealth changes need not always induce the
same expected consumption changes in different individuals. WTP/WTA
amounts involve changes to present wealth, and the linkage between that change
and the change in the individual’s expected consumption (and therewith his
welfare), need not be interpersonally constant. The so-called “dead anyway”
effect, first discovered by Pratt and Zeckhauser,103 and evident in various
economic models of WTP/WTA for longevity,104 might be understood in these
101. See, e.g., Adler, Incommensurability and Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 88, at 13981401.
102. See sources cited supra note 94.
103. See John W. Pratt & Richard Zeckhauser, Willingness To Pay and the Distribution of Risk
and Wealth, 104 J. POL. ECON. 747, 750-53 (1996). For an accessible discussion of this effect, see
Hammitt, QALYs Versus WTP, supra note 1, at 992-93.
104. See, e.g., Anna Alberini et al., Does the Value of a Statistical Life Vary with Age and
Health Status? Evidence from the US and Canada, 48 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 769, 771-73
(2004); Maureen Cropper & Frances Sussman, Valuing Future Risks to Life, 19 J. ENVTL. ECON. &
MGMT. 160, 162-65 (1990); Hammitt, QALYs Versus WTP, supra note 1, at 992-93; cf. Friedrich
Breyer & Stefan Felder, The Dead-Anyway Effect Revisited 9 (CESifo, Working Paper No. 805,
2002), available at http://www.cesifo.de/~DocCIDL/805.pdf (analyzing dead-anyway effect in
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terms. To see the effect most simply, ignore non-consumption background
characteristics, assume that the value of consumption is a constant function of
lifetime consumption, and assume that all the individuals involved are healthy.
So, for all lives, W(Li) = Q(Hi) × V(Ci) = yi × k × ci (yi is years, ci is total lifetime
consumption.) In the status quo, individual 1 is currently y1 years old. He has a
baseline risk r of dying immediately, in which case his lifetime consumption will
have been c1, and (1 – r) of living until age y2, in which case his lifetime
consumption will be c2, which is larger than c1. He is asked for his willingness to
pay for a policy that will reduce the risk of dying immediately to q, which is less
than r.
The welfare change induced by the policy, measured in LWUs, turns out to
be: (r – q) × k × [y2c2 – y1c1]. This is, as it should be, solely a function of the risk
reduction (r – q) and the difference in value of the lives involved (k × (y2c2 –
y1c1)). The LWU change is the same regardless of the absolute level of initial
mortality risk r or residual risk q. But the amount of wealth—potential future
consumption—that the individual is willing to sacrifice for the risk reduction
depends on the absolute level of risk. In this case, WTP = (r – q) × (y2c2 – y1c1) /
[(1 – q) × y2]. So WTP is partly a function of q, the residual risk of dying that
remains after the risk reduction. Note that, the larger the residual risk q, holding
constant the risk reduction (r – q), the larger WTP becomes. Why? The larger the
residual risk, the larger the chance that the present resources that the individual is
sacrificing will not eventuate in consumption: The individual will “die anyway.”
The expected change in lifetime consumption for a present change in wealth
depends, not just on the wealth change, but on the probability that death will
intervene and preclude consumption. That is the essence of the “dead anyway”
effect.105
A different source of slippage in the wealth-consumption nexus is the fact
that individuals might face different investment opportunities, for example
investment horizons, so that (even bracketing differences in the risk of death)
present wealth changes can produce different changes in lifetime consumption
for different individuals.106 Individuals 1 and 2 have identical health histories,
leisure profiles, and so on, but the first is older than the second. At present,
models with and without bequests and under perfect and imperfect insurance markets and finding
that “for individuals without a bequest motive the value of a statistical life always increases with
the level of risk exposure if and only if they are risk-averse with respect to wealth”).
105. See Olivier Armantier & Nicholas Treich, Social Willingness To Pay, Mortality Risks and
Contingent Valuation, 29 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 8 (2004) (showing that heterogeneity in
individuals’ survival probabilities can lead sum-of-WTP criterion to deviate from overall welfare).
106. This effect is evident in Yew-Kwang Ng’s model of WTP/WTA for longevity. See YewKwang Ng, The Older the More Valuable: Divergence Between Utility and Dollar Values of Life as
One Ages, 55 J. ECON. 1, 4-11 (1992).
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individual 1 will live for five more years, while individual 2 will live for twenty
years. Both can invest their resources at a nonzero real interest rate, and
spectators have no time preference for present over future consumption.107 Then
the two individuals will have different, “laundered” WTP/WTA amounts for the
very same morbidity change. Specifically, the older individual will be willing to
pay more to avoid increased morbidity, and demand more to accept it, because he
has fewer years in which to invest present dollars in the market, so that present
wealth increments translate into smaller consumption increments for him than for
the younger individual. This “horizon” effect, along with the “dead anyway”
effect, helps explain why the elderly might have inflated WTP/WTA amounts for
morbidity or mortality changes, relative to the welfarist gold standard for
measuring those changes, namely LWUs.
I have discussed different ways in which WTP/WTA amounts might be
imperfect indicators of LWUs.108 I have not yet shown that the WTP/WTA
amounts can, under some conditions, be worse proxies than QALYs. To see that,
consider the conditions where QALYs are perfect proxies: where all the lives
affected by the policy choice fall in the same background-equivalent class. It is
straightforward to demonstrate that the various imperfections of WTP/WTA can
occur under these conditions, and I do that in the margin.109 To be sure,
107. See infra text accompanying notes 153-154 (suggesting that spectators might lack an
intrinsic time preference).
108. Cf. Armantier & Treich, supra note 105, at 17 (using simulation analysis and finding that,
where wealth, baseline risk, and risk reduction are heterogeneous and uncorrelated, the sum-ofWTP method overestimates overall welfare for a risk reduction project by fifteen percent).
109. Here are some simple models illustrating that WTP/WTA amounts can fail to be perfect
proxies for LWUs even where all the lives affected by a policy choice fall in the same backgroundequivalent class. This is an important difference from QALYs, which cannot fail to be perfect
proxies under these conditions. (1) Diminishing marginal utility of consumption. Imagine that each
Li = (Hi, Bi), where background characteristics are decomposable into consumption Ci and other
characteristics Zi. By hypothesis, W(Li) = Q(Hi) × V(Bi) = Q(Hi) × V(Ci, Zi). Assume that V(Ci, Zi)
is increasing in Ci and Zi; that Ci has a diminishing marginal impact on V(Ci, Zi); and that the
marginal impact of Ci does not decrease with increasing Zi. Consider now a class of lives {Li} with
the same V value = K. Some of these lives are high consumption, others low consumption, in each
case with corresponding Zi characteristics such that overall V(Ci, Zi) = K. A larger ∆Ci will be
required to compensate for a given health change (meaning here both the initial level of Q(Hi) and
the change in health value) and concomitant LWU change in a high-consumption life than in a lowconsumption life. (2) Interaction between consumption and health. Assume that Li = (Hi, Ci) and
that W(Li) = Q(Hi) × ci. Consider the background equivalent class of lives with the same total
consumption c. Imagine that the lives in the status quo are L1 and L2 and that a policy would
improve their health to L1' and L2', such that Q(H1') – Q(H1) = Q(H2') – Q(H2) = q for both pairs of
lives. It follows that ∆W = qc for both pairs of lives. But the ∆c amount required to balance the
change in the first life is cq/Q(H1'), while the ∆c amount required to balance the change in the

34

1_ADLER FINAL PAGINATED.DOC

12/16/2005 5:25:24 PM

QALYS AND POLICY EVALUATION

background equivalence is a special set of conditions; under other conditions,
WTP/WTA may well track LWUs better than QALYs do. But my aim here is not
to claim general superiority for QALYs. Rather, it is the more modest—but still
important—aim of demonstrating that, contrary to the general wisdom in the
welfarist literature on QALYs, QALYs are not dominated by WTP/WTA.
C. Measuring QALYs and WTP/WTA Amounts
The previous Section bracketed the problem of measuring QALYs and
WTP/WTA and argued that a well-informed respondent’s (“spectator’s”) QALY
valuations for various life-histories, if perfectly measured, might under some
conditions more accurately track her preferences over those possible lives than
her WTP/WTA values, again perfectly measured. This Section suggests that
QALY values might be easier to measure than WTP/WTA.110 Certain cognitive
difficulties interfering with the elicitation of WTP/WTA for mortality and
morbidity may not afflict QALY measurement, at least not as substantially.
In this Section, I will assume that the QALY formula ∑jq(hi,j)×tj is a
reasonably good estimate of the true QALY value of a life, namely Q(Hi). It may
not be—as mentioned above, and further elaborated in the next Part. But if the
axioms implying the equivalence of Q(Hi) and ∑jq(hi,j)×tj are not grossly
violated, then Q(Hi) may well be easier to measure—via the additive formula
∑jq(hi,j)×tj—than WTP/WTA amounts.
Consider first the measurement of WTP/WTA amounts. One technique for
determining these amounts is “contingent valuation”: an interview-based
methodology. Various interviewing techniques have been developed.111
Respondents might be asked to state the maximum amount of money they would

second life is cq/Q(H2'). (3) Dead anyway effect. Imagine healthy individuals who live yi years,
with consumption level ci and further characteristics zi such that W(Li) = yi × ci × zi. Within a
background equivalent class, ci × zi = K, or zi = K/ci. In the status quo, an individual has a risk r of
dying now after living y1 years and consuming c1, and risk (1 – r) of living longer to y2 years,
consuming c2. He is asked for WTP to reduce r to q. The LWU change is (r – q) × (y2 – y1) × K.
But the WTP amount equals (r – q) × (y2 – y1) × c2 / [y2 × (1 – q)].
110. But see Richard D. Smith, The Relative Sensitivity of Willingness-To-Pay and Time-TradeOff to Changes in Health Status: An Empirical Investigation, 10 HEALTH ECON. 487, 495-96 (2001)
(finding WTP survey to be a more sensitive indicator of changes in health status than QALY
survey).
111. For overviews of this methodology, see IAN BATEMAN ET AL., ECONOMIC VALUATION WITH
STATED PREFERENCE TECHNIQUES: A MANUAL (2002); FREEMAN, supra note 56, at 161-87;
VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL PREFERENCES: THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE CONTINGENT VALUATION
METHOD IN THE US, EU, AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Ian J. Bateman & Kenneth G. Willis eds.,
1999).
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be willing to pay in return for a good, or the minimum amount they would be
willing to accept in exchange for a bad. Or they might be asked about their
willingness to trade goods or bads for particular amounts of money, with the
pattern of “yes” and “no” answers then used to infer a maximum WTP or
minimum WTA. Whatever the technique employed, contingent-valuation studies
in the area of health and mortality have collided with certain characteristic biases.
These biases emerge most dramatically in contingent-valuation studies of
mortality or morbidity risks.112 Expected utility theory implies that WTP for
reducing the risk of death or harm should be nearly proportional to the change in
risk, if it is small. “[I]f a reduction in annual mortality risk from 20 in 100,000 to
18 in 100,000 is valued at $20, then a larger reduction from 20 to 16 in 100,000
should be valued at about $40 (ignoring a tiny income effect).”113 Hammitt and
Graham surveyed published contingent-valuation studies of mortality or health
risks, focusing on the studies that allowed either “internal” tests of
proportionality or “external” tests. If each respondent is asked for WTP for
multiple risk reductions, and her responses are proportional, then that provides
“internal” evidence of proportionality. Asking one group of respondents for their
WTP for a particular risk reduction, and a different group for their WTP for a
different reduction, permits an “external” test of proportionality.
Hammitt and Graham found that, of the ten studies permitting an “internal”
test of proportionality, not a single study confirmed it.
[T]he average respondent [in these studies] does state a larger willingness to
pay for larger risk reductions—i.e., the direction of change in payment size is in
accordance with expectations. Yet a significant minority of respondents often
report the same willingness to pay, regardless of the size of risk reduction . . .
When the proportionality assumption is tested through internal tests, it
generally fails. Mean willingness to pay is less—usually much less—than
proportional to risk reduction. It is not uncommon for a doubling of risk

112. To be sure, the problems in measuring WTP/WTA for morbidity risks might be avoided by
measuring WTP/WTA for disease states that occur with certainty, but the same is not true of
mortality. WTA for certain death may well be infinite; WTP to avoid certain death may equal the
subject’s entire stock of wealth. The money amounts that traditional cost-benefit analysts employ to
value lifesaving, the so-called “value of statistical life” (VSL), are therefore derived from
contingent-valuation or revealed-preference studies examining WTP/WTA for the risk of death. See
Matthew D. Adler, Against “Individual Risk”: A Sympathetic Critique of Risk Assessment, 153 U.
PA. L. REV. 1121, 1198 n.300 (2005) [hereinafter Adler, Against “Individual Risk”] (citing sources
discussing the VSL method).
113. James K. Hammitt & John D. Graham, Willingness To Pay for Health Protection:
Inadequate Sensitivity to Probability?, 8 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 33, 35 (1999).
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reduction to be associated with far less than a 50% increase in payment.114

Proportionality was similarly disconfirmed by all nine of the “external”
studies.115 Indeed, “[e]ven the less demanding test that willingness to pay be
larger among respondents who are offered larger risk reductions, while satisfied
in some studies . . . is not always satisfied in others.”116
What explains these disheartening results? In other contexts, for example
contingent-valuation studies of environmental preservation, the insensitivity of
WTP/WTA to the magnitude of the good produced or destroyed might reflect the
fact that respondents are voicing moral rather than self-interested preferences.117
That is a less compelling explanation, however, of the magnitude-insensitivity
that Hammitt and Graham describe.118 More plausibly, respondents queried about
WTP/WTA for mortality and morbidity risks are affected by well-known biases
that interfere with the evaluation of risk—for example, a misunderstanding of the
basic rules of probability, or a departure from expected-utility theory in valuing
lotteries, such as lotteries over personal health and longevity.119
A different set of biases, also presumably at play in the contingent-valuation
studies about mortality and morbidity risk, involves tradeoffs between different
kinds of goods—here money, on the one hand, and health and longevity, on the
other. “[M]aking tradeoffs is a cognitively demanding task that people will try to
minimize.”120 There can also be emotional resistance to commensuration, for
example where one good in the tradeoff is understood (pre-theoretically) by the
114. Id. at 39; see also id. at 37-38 (listing the studies that the authors relied upon, showing that
proportionality failed in every study where it could be tested).
115. See id. at 39-40.
116. Id. at 40. For similar findings that WTP/WTA is not sensitive to the magnitude of risk
reduction, see Jane Beattie et al., On the Contingent Valuation of Safety and the Safety of
Contingent Valuation: Part 1-Caveat Investigator, 17 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5 (1998), and the
sources cited in U.S. EPA, HUMAN HEALTH METRICS, supra note 1, at 18; Jonathan Baron, Biases in
the Quantitative Measurement of Values for Public Decisions, 122 PSYCHOL. BULL. 72, 74 (1997);
and Hammitt, QALYs Versus WTP, supra note 1, at 997.
117. See, e.g., Baron, supra note 116, at 75.
118. See also Alan Shiell & Lisa Gold, Contingent Valuation in Health Care and the
Persistence of Embedding Effects Without the Warm Glow, 23 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 251 (2002)
(finding “embedding effects” in a health care contingent-valuation study designed to exclude moral
preferences).
119. See PLOUS, supra note 78, at 84-188 (discussing these biases). But see Hammit & Graham,
supra note 113, at 35 (“There is a variety of descriptive models of choice that predict responses to
risk that are nonlinear in the probabilities [such as prospect theory] . . . but even these models are
locally linear . . . .”).
120. John W. Payne et al., Measuring Constructed Preferences: Towards a Building Code, 19 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 243, 257 (1999).
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respondent as “protected” relative to the second good—as qualitatively more
valuable than the second.121 Life and health are often thought of this way, relative
to money.122
The literature on tradeoff difficulty suggests that respondents to contingentvaluation studies, facing cognitively or emotionally demanding questions about
the relative significance of wealth and nonmonetary goods for their personal
welfare, will refuse to answer entirely or (less dramatically) will employ various
strategies for answering the questions—strategies that will produce stated
WTP/WTA amounts that do not reflect their well-informed self-interested
preferences for the goods. For example, the respondent may articulate a
WTP/WTA amount that expresses the general “importance” of the type of good
at issue, not the welfare-significance of the particular quantity involved. He may
construct a mental budget that permits a limited expenditure on the good, and
refuse to spend more than the budget even where additional expenditures would
be worthwhile. Or the respondent may say what a fair price for the good would
be, in effect focusing on the cost of supply rather than the personal benefits.123
These sorts of tradeoff biases, together with risk biases, help explain the
insensitivity of stated WTP to the magnitude of mortality or morbidity risk
reduction. They also imply that stated WTP may inaccurately measure health
benefits even where risk processing is not an issue. That implication seems to be
confirmed by a study conducted by Alan Shiell and Lisa Gold, who asked
respondents for WTP for two vaccines to treat two different infectious diseases
and for a composite vaccine for both diseases.124 In a majority of cases, the
respondent’s WTP for the composite vaccine was less than the sum of WTP for
the two individual vaccines. Similar evidence of magnitude-insensitivity apart
from risk125 shows up in other health contingent-valuation studies.126
My discussion thus far has focused on the contingent-valuation format and
121. See id. at 257. On the cognitive and emotional obstacles to trading off different kinds of
goods, see also MARY FRANCES LUCE ET AL., EMOTIONAL DECISIONS: TRADEOFF DIFFICULTY AND
COPING IN CONSUMER CHOICE 1-10 (2001); and Baron, supra note 116, at 83-84.
122. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV.
779, 834-40 (1994).
123. See Baron, supra note 116, at 75-77, 79-80, 83-84; Shiell & Gold, supra note 118, at 25860.
124. See Shiell & Gold, supra note 118, at 253-58.
125. To be sure, risk comes into play in the Shiell and Gold study because the vaccinations
would merely reduce the risk of the infectious diseases, but given the study design it is hard to see
how difficulties in processing risk would fully explain the magnitude-insensitivity observed.
126. See Jan Abel Olsen et al., The Insensitivity of “Willingness-To-Pay” to the Size of the
Good: New Evidence for Health Care, 25 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 445 (2004); id. at 447 (citing
literature); Shiell & Gold, supra note 118, at 258-59 (same).
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the evidence that risk and tradeoff biases interfere with the measurement of
WTP/WTA for mortality and morbidity in that context. To be sure, a variety of
so-called “revealed preference,” noninterview techniques for estimating
WTP/WTA are also widely used by applied economists.127 Here the idea is to
infer valuation from behavior. There is a large empirical literature that seeks to
correlate wage differences with differences in occupational risks.128 A smaller
literature uses nonoccupational data to estimate WTP/WTA for mortality risks
(for example, consumer purchases of safety devices), or morbidity (for example,
using the variation in housing prices to estimate WTP/WTA for air pollution and
related morbidity).129 Revealed-preference techniques may eliminate some biases
associated with the contingent-valuation method—for example, the so-called
“hypothetical bias,” namely that asking respondents what they would be willing
to pay or accept in hypothetical choice situations may not elicit sincere and
considered statements of the respondents’ real preferences130—but it is hard to
see how the shift from discursive to observational preference-measurement
methods would eliminate risk or tradeoff biases. Individuals who process
probabilities irrationally, or have cognitive or emotional difficulties trading life
or limb for money, should exhibit insensitivity to the magnitude of risk or
morbidity reduction in their purchasing or precautionary behavior.131
What about QALYs? My suggestion is that risk and tradeoff biases may
pose less of a problem for the measurement of QALY values—assuming
∑jq(hi,j)×tj is a good estimate of the genuine QALY value of a life, i.e., Q(Hi)—
than for the measurement of WTP/WTA. Consider first the QALY measurement
of pure mortality or mortality risk—that is, measuring the QALY loss for each

127. For an overview of these techniques, see FREEMAN, supra note 56, at 95-136.
128. See, e.g., id. at 317-19, 401-06; VISCUSI, supra note 56, at 34-65.
129. These literatures are discussed in VISCUSI, supra note 56, at 65-67; F. Reed Johnson et al.,
Valuing Morbidity: An Integration of the Willingness-To-Pay and Health-Status Index Literatures,
16 J. HEALTH ECON. 641, 644 (1997); and Richard Clemmer et al., Household Health Production,
Property Values, and the Value of Health, in VALUING HEALTH FOR POLICY, supra note 1, at 105.
130. See, e.g., Kevin J. Boyle & John C. Bergstrom, Doubt, Doubts, and Doubters: The Genesis
of a New Research Agenda?, in VALUING ENVIRONMENTAL PREFERENCES, supra note 111, at 18486 (discussing concerns about the hypothetical nature of contingent-valuation questions).
131. I am aware of no study that tests magnitude sensitivity in the revealed preference context.
It may be difficult to design such a study. See E-mail from James K. Hammitt, Professor of
Economics and Decision Sciences, Harvard School of Public Health, to Matthew D. Adler,
Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School (Oct. 29, 2004, 11:38:53 EST) (on file
with author). For a general discussion of difficulties with revealed-preference studies of
WTP/WTA for morbidity and mortality, see U.S. EPA, HUMAN HEALTH METRICS, supra note 1, at
18-19; Johnson et al., supra note 129, at 644; Hammitt & Graham, supra note 113, at 33-34; and
Hammitt, QALYs Versus WTP, supra note 1, at 997-98.
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affected individual of a policy which causes each to lose ∆Ti years of healthy life
or (more realistically) imposes an incremental ri risk of losing ∆Ti years of
healthy life. In these cases, proportionality to the amount of longevity at stake
(∆Ti) and the risk (ri) is guaranteed by the additive formula ∑jq(hi,j)×tj. If Q(Hi) =
∑jq(hi,j)×tj then, in the case of an individual who lives Ti years in perfect health,
the QALY value of her life-history is simply Ti. If she loses or gains ∆Ti years,
the QALY measure of the change is ∆Ti. If healthy individual 1 loses ∆T1 years,
and healthy individual 2 loses ∆T2 years, and ∆T2 is twice ∆T1, then the QALY
value of the second loss is automatically twice the QALY measure of the first.
Tradeoff, risk and other biases are, in this limiting case, wholly circumvented
because QALY values are derived using the additive formula, not from
individual statements of preference. Ditto for the case in which individual 1
incurs an r1 risk of losing ∆T1 years of life and individual 2 incurs an r2 risk of
losing ∆T2 years. The ratio of the expected QALY losses for the 2 individuals is
necessarily equal to the ratio of the longevity risks that the individuals face ((r2 ×
∆T2) / (r1 × ∆T1)), regardless of what the individuals might say about the dollar or
nondollar value of these risks.
Of course, the QALY method is a tool for measuring morbidity and
longevity on an integrated scale, and individual statements of preference are
crucial in determining morbidity values—thus the massive efforts undertaken by
QALY researchers to survey doctors, patients, or members of the public about
their ranking of health states. But even where morbidity comes into play, biases
that might induce individual insensitivity to the magnitude of morbidity change
are still partly avoided through the additive formula ∑jq(hi,j)×tj. Consider a
policymaker faced with the options of a temporary or medium-term reduction of
some form of air pollution, thereby producing a temporary (one-year, say) or
medium-term (five-year) abatement of asthma among certain asthmatics whose
symptoms are caused by the pollution. Assume, for the sake of illustration, that
the pollution causes asthma only on days when weather patterns lead to a
particularly high amount of inhaled pollutant, which occur on average every tenth
day. Asthma has a QALY value of 0.683.132 Then the per-individual QALY value
of the medium-term reduction (0.317 × 5 × 0.1 = 0.1585 QALY) will
automatically be five times the per-individual value of the temporary reduction
(0.317 × 1 × 0.1 = 0.0317 QALY). Bracketing income effects, WTP for the
medium-term reduction should also be five times WTP for the temporary
reduction; but in fact contingent-valuation studies eliciting WTP for longer
versus shorter relief from the same symptoms generally fall far short of
proportionality.133

132. See Johnson et al., supra note 129, at 651.
133. See Johnson et al., supra note 129, at 650-51 (summarizing results of contingent-valuation
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As for the measurement of morbidity values themselves: Risk and tradeoff
biases will, to some extent, affect these measurements. The two most widely
accepted methods for eliciting morbidity values, as already mentioned, are the
standard-gamble (SG) and time-tradeoff (TTO) methods.134 The SG format,
again, seeks to determine respondent’s indifference probability p between a given
health state, and a lottery with probability p of perfect health and (1 – p) of dying
immediately; while the TTO format focuses on the indifference ratio x/y between
living for y years in the health state, and x years in perfect health. There is a
substantial meta-literature that looks at the practicability, reliability, and validity
of the two methods.135 The methods appear to be practicable as well as
“internally” reliable and valid, in the sense that a high proportion of respondents
complete the surveys with internally consistent values that are stable over time.
Elicited values diverge, to some extent, among respondents,136 but this itself does
not impugn the QALY technique, since (as I have already discussed)
convergence in preferences or extended preferences is a contingent matter.137
Other questions about the validity of SG and TTO values have to do with the
decomposability of preferences for lifetime health histories into the sum of the
durations of the component health states weighted by valuations of those states—
studies of short-term health conditions); Thomas Klose, The Contingent Valuation Method in
Health Care, 47 HEALTH POL’Y 97, 106 (1999) (discussing magnitude insensitivity in these
studies); U.S. EPA, HUMAN HEALTH METRICS, supra note 1, at 25 (same). But see Richard M.
O’Conor et al., Urge Incontinence: Quality of Life and Patients’ Valuation of Symptom Reduction,
14 PHARMACOECONOMICS 531, 536-37 (1998) (finding that WTP is sensitive to the degree of
reduction of urinary incontinence). For a recent survey of the health care contingent valuation
literature, see Jan Abel Olsen & Richard D. Smith, Theory Versus Practice: A Review of
‘Willingness-To-Pay’ in Health and Health Care, 10 HEALTH ECON. 39 (2001).
134. Good reviews of the SG, TTO and other methods employed to elicit QALY valuations of
morbidity are: U.S. EPA, HUMAN HEALTH METRICS, supra note 1, at 16-18; Baron, supra note 116,
at 80-82; Brazier et al., supra note 1, at 23-56; Dolan, supra note 1, at 1732-36; and Johannesson et
al., supra note 1, at 283-85. The visual analogue scale (“VAS”) approach to eliciting QALYs, like
SG and TTO, is widely used, see Brazier, supra, at 24, but it is quite controversial, because of
concerns that VAS valuations have no theoretical foundations and are merely ordinal, rather than
cardinal measures, see Brazier, supra at 34-35; Dolan, supra, at 1733. Two other methods,
magnitude estimation and the person-tradeoff, are less often used. See Brazier, supra, at 24-27.
135. The meta-literature is exhaustively reviewed in Brazier et al., supra note 1, at 30-34, 36-39.
136. See Dolan, supra note 6, at 150.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 73-75. To be sure, the fact that some divergence in
QALY values is to be expected, given the possibility that different individuals might have
divergent preferences over life-histories, is hardly the end of the story. When survey respondents
voice divergent QALY values, which ones should policy makers use? This is an important but
difficult question which, along with the related problem of divergent extended preferences, I will
not attempt to address in this Article.
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an issue I will consider below.138 Here, the problem is not really that biases are
interfering with the measurement of SG and TTO values, but rather that the
equivalence of ∑jq(hi,j)×tj and Q(Hi) presupposed by techniques for eliciting SG
and TTO values is breaking down.
That said, there is some evidence that biases can interfere with the
measurement of SG and TTO values.139 The SG format involves both risk (since
respondents are asked for indifference probabilities) and tradeoffs among
different dimensions (since a lottery with a chance of dying is being compared to
a health state). Note, however, that the different dimensions are health and
longevity, not health or longevity and money. So the problem of trading off
“protected” for “unprotected” goods is less pressing—certainly when it comes to
trading off longevity for improvements in grave health conditions. Note also that
risk biases can be eliminated by shifting to the TTO format.140 Tradeoff biases
remain, here,141 but respondents do generally voice TTO values that are less than
one—indicating that they have traded off some longevity for an improvement in
the health state—and voice lower TTO values for more serious conditions.
Dolan, in a very large TTO survey of the general public (3395 respondents) in
the United Kingdom, found that:
46% of respondents were willing to sacrifice life expectancy to avoid all of the
[13] dysfunctional states they were presented with . . . A further 29% were
willing to sacrifice life expectancy for all but one or two of the states. In such
cases, the unwillingness to trade-off time was almost exclusively associated
with one or both of the very mild states. In all, 95% of respondents were
prepared to sacrifice life expectancy for 6 or more states.142

In a different, smaller survey, Dolan looked at each respondent’s
“consistency rate”—the percentage of pairings of more and less serious
conditions in which the respondent gave the more serious condition a lower TTO
value—and found that the median respondent had a consistency rate exceeding
ninety percent.143

138. See infra Section IV.B.
139. See Brazier et al., supra note 1, at 30-34, 36-39.
140. It should be emphasized that, if the conditions for additive decomposition of preferences
over lifetime health histories as per the QALY formula obtain, then the TTO and SG methods
should produce identical valuations of health states. See Johannesson et al., supra note 1, at 285;
Hammitt, QALYs Versus WTP, supra note 1, at 995.
141. See Brazier, supra note 1, at 38-39.
142. Dolan, supra note 6, at 149.
143. See P. Dolan et al., Valuing Health States: A Comparison of Methods, 15 J. HEALTH ECON.
209, 217-20 (1996).
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IV. THE LIMITATIONS OF QALYS AS PROXIES FOR LWUS
Although QALYs have certain advantages over WTP/WTA amounts as
proxies for LWUs, QALYs are hardly a perfect welfarist measuring rod. This
Part discusses their limitations, in particular: violations of the basic
presupposition that the health and non-health characteristics of welfare are
multiplicatively separable, such that W(Li) = Q(Hi) × V(Bi); violations of the
further conditions requisite for an additive decomposition of the overall QALY
value of a health-profile, Q(Hi), into the sum of the quality-weighted durations of
its component health states; the dependence of LWUs on both QALYs and
background characteristics; and the related fact that QALYs cannot be used to
measure changes in the non-health determinants of well-being, by contrast with
the WTP/WTA method, which in principle is applicable to all aspects of welfare.
A. Is Lifetime Utility Separable into Health-Related Subutility and Background
Subutility?
QALY values are typically elicited, in QALY surveys, without any
discussion of the background characteristics (wealth or other attributes) that the
subjects whose health states are being valued should be assumed to have.144 This
procedure is justified, for the welfarist, only if the Miyamato “standard-gamble
invariance” condition is satisfied: Namely, respondents (or at least idealized
spectators) should have preferences among lotteries over different lifetime health
histories that are the same for every fixed level of background characteristics. If
this condition holds true, along with the “zero condition” (less contestable), then
respondents’ utilities for life-histories are expressible as the multiplicative
product of a health subutility and a background subutility, and stated QALY
values should be the same regardless of the background characteristics, as long as
they are held fixed.145 If the Miyamato “standard-gamble invariance” condition
does not hold true, then the current elicitation procedures are problematic. More
fundamentally, if W(Li) is not equal to Q(Hi) × V(Bi), it is not clear what the
QALY value of a life-history means for the welfarist. At a minimum, if the
Miyamato condition fails and W(Li) does not equal Q(Hi) × V(Bi), the stated
valuations that respondents provide in QALY surveys will be less useful to
policymakers as proxies for LWUs.
Keeny and Raiffa, in their seminal work on multiattribute utility theory,
write that different attributes satisfy “independence” conditions such as standard144. See Hammitt, How Much Is a QALY Worth?, supra note 96, at 5; Mark J. Sculpher &
Bernie J. O’Brien, Income Effects of Reduced Health and Health Effects of Reduced Income:
Implications for Health-State Valuation, 20 MED. DECISION MAKING 207, 209, 211 (2000).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 91-98.
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gamble invariance “[i]n a surprisingly large number of contexts.”146 I have
suggested that, intuitively, the Miyamato condition is at least approximately true
of health versus non-health attributes. That suggestion is, in effect, just a guess
about what spectators’ preferences would be. The guess is not particularly wellinformed. There appears to be very little empirical scholarship, at least in the
QALY field, examining the structure of preferences over combinations of health
profiles and background profiles.147
QALY scholars have examined a related issue: What predicts variations
among respondents in QALY values? “[M]ost studies show[] that the values are
independent from socio-economic factors or professional level.”148 This finding
might be adduced as evidence for the standard-gamble invariance condition. If
(1) preferences for lotteries over health characteristics do depend on the level of
background characteristics, and (2) respondents to QALY surveys assume, absent
instruction, that the health states being valued are packaged with the respondents’
actual background characteristics, it would follow that (3) variation in QALY
values would correlate with variation in respondents’ background
characteristics—which has not been observed. However, the finding of noncorrelation is at best circumstantial evidence for the standard-gamble invariance
condition.149 More direct testing remains to be done.150
B. Can QALYs Be Decomposed as per the Standard Additive Formula?
A different issue concerns the additive decomposition of Q(Hi) into
∑jq(hi,j)×tj, where hi,j is the health of individual i in period j and tj is the duration
of period j. The vast bulk of the QALY literature assumes that the health value of
a lifetime health-history or “profile” can, at least approximately, be represented
as the sum of years in its component health states adjusted by values for those

146. KEENY & RAIFFA, supra note 92, at 226.
147. See Hammitt, How Much Is a QALY Worth?, supra note 96, at 5 (“The literature on
QALYs is virtually silent on the extent to which [valuations of health states] depend[] on wealth,
income, or consumption.”).
148. U.S. EPA, HUMAN HEALTH METRICS, supra note 1, at 21; see also Dolan, supra note 1, at
1747; Paul Dolan & Jennifer Roberts, To What Extent Can We Explain Time Trade-off Values from
Other Information About Respondents?, 54 SOC. SCI. & MED. 919, 927-28 (2002).
149. For example, it may be that respondents assume that the subject’s background
characteristics are population average characteristics, rather than the respondents’ own
characteristics. In this case, we would not expect QALY values to vary depending with
respondents’ background characteristics even if the Miyamato condition fails.
150. For an unusual example of a direct test of the independence of valuations of health and
background characteristics, see Antonio Ciampi et al., Measurement of Individual Preferences: The
Importance of “Situation-Specific” Variables, 2 MED. DECISION MAKING 483 (1982).
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health states.151 Cost-effectiveness studies use this additive formula for
determining the effectiveness of different interventions; and typical QALY
surveys, which attempt to elicit SG or TTO values for states rather than whole
histories, assume additivity as well. But additivity is not entailed by the more
basic conditions—the Miyamato conditions—that allow the LWU assigned to
each life-history to be represented as the product of an overall health subutility
for its component health history, Q(Hi), and an overall non-health subutility for
its component background characteristics, V(Bi). Rather, theoretical work on
QALYs has demonstrated that three further conditions that are “internal” to the
valuation of health are required for this overall health utility Q(Hi) to be
additively decomposable into ∑jq(hi,j)×tj: (1) No discounting of future health; (2)
risk neutrality with respect to longevity; and (3) no sequencing effects.152
The no-discounting condition is the least problematic. No discounting means
that the spectator’s present valuation of a life history in which he incurs a given
health state does not vary depending on whether that state occurs in the near or
more distant future. Although actual individuals often exhibit a time
preference,153 preferring present to future pleasures and future to present pains,
and although policymakers certainly might use discounting to reflect the
opportunity cost of current expenditures given the alternative of investing the
resources in inter-temporal markets, a strong case can be made that the absence
of an intrinsic time preference is normative.154 Idealized spectators, one might
suppose, would not give greater weight to the temporally proximate aspects of
the lives they might lead just because of the proximity. In any event, if the riskneutrality and no-sequencing conditions hold true, the formula ∑jq(hi,j)×tj can be
adjusted to incorporate a temporal discount factor.155

151. To be sure, the HYE approach drops this assumption; but HYEs have not been used much
in practice, see Hammitt, QALYs Versus WTP, supra note 1, at 989.
152. For a discussion of these conditions or equivalent ones, see generally Han Bleichrodt,
QALYs and HYEs: Under What Conditions Are They Equivalent?, 14 J. HEALTH ECON. 17, 20-25
(1995); Han Bleichrodt et al., Characterizing QALYs by Risk Neutrality, 15 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY
107 (1997); Dolan, supra note 1, at 1729-31,1740-43; Hammitt, QALYs Versus WTP, supra note 1,
at 986-88; Magnus Johannesson et al., A Note on QALYs, Time Tradeoff, and Discounting, 14 MED.
DECISION MAKING 188 (1994); Johannesson et al., supra note 1, at 285-86; Miyamato et al., supra
note 91, at 839-45; and Joseph S. Pliskin et al., Utility Functions for Life Years and Health Status,
28 OPERATIONS RES. 206, 207-15 (1980).
153. See, e.g., Bleichrodt et al., supra note 152, at 110. Surprisingly, actual individuals may also
exhibit a negative time preference. See Dolan, supra note 1, at 1742.
154. See David O. Brink, Prudence and Authenticity: Intrapersonal Conflicts of Value, 112
PHIL. REV. 215 (2003).
155. See, e.g., Johannesson et al., A Note on QALYs, supra note 152. Discounting is not
consistent with risk neutrality over life years, but it is consistent with risk neutrality over
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Risk-neutrality and no sequencing are more serious difficulties for this
formula. The risk-neutrality condition, here, means that longevity has constant
rather than increasing or decreasing marginal health utility. Formally, for any
health profile consisting of a constant health state, risk neutrality requires that a
given increment in longevity produce the same increase in the overall Q(Hi)
value of the health profile regardless of the baseline longevity. For example,
doubling the lifespan of an individual with chronic bronchitis from thirty-five to
seventy years doubles the Q(Hi) value. It is obvious that risk-neutrality in this
sense is presupposed by the ∑jq(hi,j)×tj formula, which makes estimated QALY
values a linear function of longevity, holding health constant. But Q(Hi) need not
be a linear function of longevity, holding health constant, if the idealized
spectators whose preferences ground LWU and Q(Hi) values depart from riskneutrality.
Would they? Empirical tests find that actual respondents are not always riskneutral with respect to longevity.156 Nor can it be said here—by contrast with
discounting—that risk-neutrality with respect to longevity is normative. If money
can have a declining marginal impact on welfare, then presumably so can
lifespan. One solution, proposed in the literature, is to adjust the longevity
component of a health history by a risk-aversion factor. In the case of a chronic
health state hi*, Q(Hi) would equal the value of that state q(hi*) multiplied by the
longevity raised to a risk-aversion factor.157 But it is unclear how one might
extend this formula to accommodate risk aversion in the more realistic case of
health profiles where health varies over time.158 Further, even in the case of
unvarying health profiles, there are empirically documented instances of
preferences that cannot be represented by either the ordinary QALY formula or
the risk-adjusted version: namely the preference to live more than zero time, but
less than an unbearable amount of time, in a painful health state.159 Once more, it
is hard to see why general considerations of rationality would preclude spectators
from having such preferences. In short, departures from risk neutrality can create
discounted life years. See id.
156. Risk neutrality can be tested directly (by asking for the number of years in a health state
that the respondent views as equivalent to a gamble over the chance of immediate death and longer
duration in the health state) or indirectly, by testing the other conditions that are implied by risk
neutrality plus the zero condition. See Bleichrodt et al., supra note 152, at 112-13. Both sorts of test
show that risk neutrality can fail. See Dolan, supra note 1, at 1740-42.
157. See Johannesson et al., supra note 152, at 188-90; Miyamato et al., supra note 91, at 84245.
158. See Johannesson et al., supra note 1, at 285.
159. See, e.g., Miyamato et al., supra note 91, at 844-45; Paul Dolan & Peep Stalmeier, The
Validity of Time Trade-Off Values in Calculating QALYs: Constant Proportional Time Trade-Off
Versus the Proportional Heuristic, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 445 (2003).
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a divergence between the ∑jq(hi,j)×tj formula and the genuine QALY value of a
life Q(Hi), and there appear to be no simple modifications to the QALY formula
to circumvent the problem.
The same is true of sequencing. In a few studies, researchers have tested the
no-sequencing condition directly by asking respondents to value sequences of
states, and comparing the values with the sum of QALY values for the states
involved.160 Other research employs more indirect tests.161 The literature is small
and conclusions are mixed, but sequencing does emerge in some cases. For
example, Richardson asked women to value separately three differentially serious
breast cancer states, then a deteriorating holistic scenario composed of a
progression from less to more serious, and found that the values could not be
reconciled even allowing for discounting. A better explanation, he suggests, is
that the “knowledge of future suffering and death casts a shadow over, or
devalues, the enjoyment of earlier life years.”162 Note how this coheres with the
philosopher David Velleman’s suggestion that a life history where momentary
welfare has a deteriorating trajectory is worse than a counterpart life history with
the same overall sum of momentary welfare but an increasing trajectory.163
C. Background Characteristics Redux
Even if LWUs can be decomposed into the product of health and non-health
subutility, and even if health subutility can in turn be decomposed as per the
additive QALY formula into the cumulative time in different health states
adjusted for the value of those states, QALYs are not generally a perfect proxy
for LWUs. The problem of background characteristics reemerges here. I
demonstrated earlier that QALY aggregation does perfectly track overall wellbeing where all the lives affected by the policy choices being considered fall in
the same background-equivalent class. In general, of course, that need not be
true. If life history L1 has a higher level of consumption, or leisure, or socializing,
or professional accomplishment, as compared to L2, then a change in L1’s health
history has a greater impact on overall well-being than the very same change (as
measured in QALY units) in L2’s health history. This follows immediately from
the multiplicative representation of LWUs implied by the Miyamato conditions,
i.e., the standard-gamble invariance and zero conditions.164 If those conditions
160. See Kuppermann et al., supra note 69; Richardson et al., supra note 69.
161. See Krabbe et al., supra note 69; Spencer, supra note 69; Treadwell, supra note 69.
162. Richardson et al., supra note 69, at 157.
163. See supra text accompanying note 84.
164. Bleichrodt and Quiggin make a similar point in the context of their own model, which (like
mine) has a multiplicative structure deriving from standard-gamble invariance and the zero
condition:
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obtain and the multiplicative model therefore does indeed accurately represent
LWUs, health cannot generally have equal welfare value for different persons;
rather, its value is necessarily scaled up or down by the value of the non-health
attributes, V(Bi), with which health partly interacts.
Rejecting the standard-gamble invariance condition, which would mean that
W(Li) need not equal Q(Hi) × V(Bi), will not solve the problem. In that event,
LWUs will neither be additively nor multiplicatively separable into health and
non-health subutilities, and health and non-health attributes would continue to
interact, albeit in a more complicated way. Rejecting the zero condition and
adding other conditions to ensure the additive separability of health and nonhealth attributes would ensure that equal QALYs have equal welfare value across
persons. An additive decomposition, here, would mean that W(Li) = Q(Hi) +
V(Bi), precluding any interaction between health and non-health attributes. But it
is implausible, given our sense of what well-informed individuals can prefer, that
spectators’ preferences would separate health and background characteristics so
completely. The additive form would mean that the marginal utility of
consumption cannot depend on health, nor vice versa.165
Within the context of the multiplicative model, W(Li) = Q(Hi) × V(Bi), is
there any way to limit the scaling effect and make QALYs a reasonable proxy for
LWUs even where all the lives involved do not fall in the same backgroundequivalence class? One way to do that might be to expand the definition of
health. If health merely subsumes the physical condition of the subject, excluding
his hedonic, emotional, or cognitive state, then hedonic, emotional, and cognitive
attributes become background characteristics. QALYs, as a measure of health
thus narrowly defined, would be a poorer proxy for welfare than if health were
defined more inclusively—since a narrower definition of health, or equivalently a
broader definition of background characteristics, implies a smaller number of
choice situations in which the lives involved fall in the same backgroundequivalent class, and presumably a greater average range of the scaling factor
V(Bi) in other choice situations.
Fortunately, health for QALY purposes is not normally defined so narrowly.
QALY surveys are often conducted using so-called “health state classification
systems,” which seek to regiment the evaluation task by describing health states
[In our model] the utility of health status is multiplied by the utility of consumption.
Consequently, a given gain in quality of life will be more appreciated at higher levels of
consumption. This implies that in the allocation of health care resources, larger welfare
gains can be obtained by devoting resources to those individuals who have a high level
of general consumption. . . . This result is ethically troubling . . . . However, the need for
a multiplicative utility structure shows that . . . such implications cannot be escaped.
Bleichrodt & Quiggin, supra note 96, at 685.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 93-94 (discussing additive decomposition).
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as packages of health attributes.166 Respondents are then asked to use the SG,
TTO, or some other method to place the packages on a 0-1 scale, with 0 meaning
death and 1 the very best package. For example, the Health Utilities Index, one of
the most widely used health state classification systems,167 conceptualizes health
states as a combination of vision, hearing, speech, ambulation, dexterity,
emotion, cognition, and pain. Each of these eight attributes has five or six levels.
The very best health state in the HUI system, i.e., the state with the QALY value
of 1, is a state where the subject is at the best level with respect to all eight
attributes. He is able to see well enough to read newsprint and recognize a friend
across the street without glasses (vision); is able to hear what is said in a group
conversation with at least three other people, without a hearing aid (hearing); is
able to be understood completely when speaking with strangers or friends
(speech); is able to walk around the neighborhood without difficulty and without
walking equipment (ambulation); has the full use of two hands and ten fingers
(dexterity); is happy and interested in life (emotion); is able to remember most
things, think clearly and solve day-to-day problems (cognition); and is free of
pain and discomfort (pain).168 The crucial point, for our purposes, is that the HUI
system does have a more inclusive definition of health than the merely physical;
and this is true of the other health classification systems as well, as the following
table shows.

166. See Dolan, supra note 1, at 1731-32, 1744-45 (generally discussing health state
classification systems); QUALITY OF LIFE AND PHARMACOECONOMICS, supra note 1, at 161-362
(describing specific systems in detail).
167. See Chaim Bell et al., An Off-the-Shelf Help List: A Comprehensive Catalog of Preference
Scores from Published Cost-Utility Analyses, 21 MED. DECISION MAKING 288, 290 (2001) (finding
that the Rosser Index, Quality of Well-Being Scale, and Health Utilities Index are the most widely
used health-state classification systems in published cost-utility analyses).
168. See David H. Feeny et al., Health Utilities Index, in QUALITY OF LIFE AND
PHARMACOECONOMICS, supra note 1, at 239 (describing the HUI system). The HUI system has
been updated several times, and the version described in the text is the most recent one.

49

1_ADLER FINAL PAGINATED.DOC

12/16/2005 5:25:24 PM

YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS

VI:1 (2006)

TABLE 1: PRINCIPAL CONCEPTS COVERED IN EXISTING HEALTH CLASSIFICATION
SYSTEMS169
Concept
Health
Perceptions
Social Function
Speech/
Communication
Mental Function
(Cognitive,
Emotional,
and/or
Affective)
Physical
Function
(Mobility,
Physical
Activity and/or
Self-Care)
Sensory
Function or
Other
Impairments

DDR

EQL

15D

HUI1

HUI2

HUI3

IHQOL

X
X

HP2000

QWB

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Still, there are limits to the inclusiveness of QALYs. The QALY healthclassification systems do not define health nearly as inclusively as the World
Health Organization, which has developed a conception of the “quality of life”
subsuming twenty-four attributes grouped into six domains—physical,
psychological, “independence,” social, environmental, and spiritual.170 The first
three domains cover the territory of QALY health-classification systems, but also
include a self-esteem attribute, a body-image attribute, and an attribute for
positive as well as negative feelings—all attributes that the QALY systems, and
traditional QALY research, treat as background characteristics. The same is true

169. DDR = Disability Distress Ratio; EQL = EuroQOL; 15D = Fifteen Dimension Scale; HUI
= Health Utility Index Mark I, II or III; IHQOL = Index of Health Related Quality of Life; HP2000
= Years of Healthy Life; QWB = Quality of Well-Being Scale. This is based on a table in Donald
L. Patrick & Pennifer Erickson, Applications of Health Status Assessment to Health Policy, in
QUALITY OF LIFE AND PHARMACOECONOMICS, supra note 1, at 721. See also COST-EFFECTIVENESS
IN HEALTH AND MEDICINE, supra note 12, at 95 (listing “core concepts and domains of healthrelated quality of life,” including health perceptions, social function, psychological function,
physical function, and impairment).
170. On the development of the WHO quality of life instrument (WHOQOL), see The
WHOQOL Group, supra note 90; and Adler, Fear Assessment, supra note 54, at 1051 n.197.
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of the attributes covered by the last three WHO domains. The “social” domain
asks about the quality of the subject’s personal relationships, social support, and
sex life. The “environment” domain covers personal security, housing quality,
wealth, access to information and education, access to social services,
recreational activities, pollution, and transport. The spiritual domain asks about
the perceived meaningfulness of the subject’s life. Traditional QALY research
does not see these domains as constitutive of “health.”
In fact, there is very little that seems relevant to well-being which is not
covered by one of the WHO quality of life domains. “Quality of life” ends up
being a synonym for “welfare,” and not merely “health,” normally understood as
a proper subset of the welfare-affecting features of life-histories. But why not
scrap or redefine the concept of “health,” for QALY purposes, so that the set of
background characteristics shrinks to zero? Respondents would be asked to use
the SG or TTO formula to place states on a 0-1 scale, where 0 is death and 1 is an
ideal state not just with respect to physical, emotional, cognitive and hedonic
attributes, but also with respect to body image, self-esteem, personal
relationships, social support, sex life, personal security, housing quality, and
everything else that makes life worth living.
There are some apparent difficulties with making QALYs this inclusive.
Many if not all respondents would presumably find it cognitively overwhelming
to make cardinal comparisons (using TTOs or SGs) among states that vary with
respect to the totality of welfare-relevant attributes. Current QALY surveys hold
fixed most attributes, the non-health ones, and give respondents the more
manageable task of making cardinal comparisons of states that vary only with
respect to health attributes. Relatedly, QALY valuations elicited from many (if
not all) respondents relative to a maximally inclusive QALY scale would be less
sensitive to small changes than traditional QALYs.171 States that are not radically
different with respect to the physical, cognitive, emotional, and hedonic attributes
subsumed by traditional QALY measures, and do not differ at all with respect to
other attributes, might be lumped together and assigned the same number on a
maximally inclusive QALY scale, but differentiated by traditional QALYs. For
example, a recent synthesis of traditional QALY research suggests that 0.75 is a
plausible QALY score for angina, and 0.80 for pancreatitis.172 If 0 is death and 1
171. See generally Brazier et al., supra note 1, at 13 (discussing desirable properties of health
valuation instruments, including “responsiveness,” which is defined as “the ability of an instrument
to measure clinically significant changes in health”). See also Cam Donaldson et al., Should QALYs
Be Programme-Specific?, 7 HEALTH ECON. 239 (1988) (suggesting that program-specific health
scales may be more sensitive than general scales).
172. Cf. Harvard Center for Risk Analysis, Cost-Effectiveness Analysis Registry, http://www.
hpsh.harvard.edu/cearegistry (database of cost-utility analyses, including 0.75 as one QALY
valuation for angina and 0.808 as the valuation of recurrent pancreatitis).
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is a state that is ideal with respect to all the dimensions of welfare, would the
typical respondent using the TTO or SG method be able to differentiate
numerically between an ideal welfare state marred only by angina and an ideal
welfare state marred only by pancreatitis, assigning the first (say) a score of 0.92
and the latter a score of 0.93?173 It is quite plausible that he would not.
Given these measurement problems, the optimally inclusive QALY scale for
purposes of standard surveys eventuating in policy evaluation might well be less
than fully inclusive, and exclude some of the attributes that the WHO conception,
philosophers of welfare, and ordinary intuition see as relevant to welfare. In any
event, existing QALY surveys are much less than fully inclusive, and policy
evaluation using these valuations must be sensitive to the fact that they are less
than perfect proxies for LWUs, given background characteristics.
D. Non-Health Changes
The final difficulty with the QALY scale is intimately related to the one just
described. If some determinants of welfare fall outside the domain of “health,”
then some welfare changes will not be measurable using QALYs (equivalently,
the measure of the change will be zero). Changes in consumption provide the
most practically compelling example. These sorts of welfare effects are the
heartland of standard cost-benefit analysis, and are pervasively counted as costs
or benefits in actual policy-evaluation practice, but do not register, as such, on
the traditional QALY scale.174 Extravagant consumption plus angina has the
same QALY score, ceteris paribus, as moderate consumption plus angina—given
a QALY scale that counts consumption and wealth as background attributes. A
different example comes from environmental regulation. Environmental
economists and, increasingly, agencies such as the EPA incorporate the following
sorts of nonmarket benefits into cost-benefit studies: the enjoyment experienced
by visitors to parks or other protected areas, the recreational benefits of hunting
and fishing, the improved visibility that accompanies better air quality, smell- or
noise-avoidance, the “scenic” benefit of viewing a nice landscape, and the sheer
satisfaction of knowing that a site, ecosystem or species exists.175 All these
effects will show up in WTP/WTA amounts, as elicited using contingentvaluation or revealed preference techniques, but none fall within the domain of
173. This calculation assumes that health is one-third of overall welfare and rounds valuations
to two digits. If health is less important to overall welfare, the problem is exacerbated.
174. See Hammitt, How Much Is a QALY Worth?, supra note 96, at 5; Schulpher & O’Brien,
supra note 144, at 214. But see COST-EFFECTIVENESS IN HEALTH AND MEDICINE, supra note 12, at
122 (recommending that financial consequences related to health status be measured on a QALY
scale and be included in the denominator, rather than the numerator, of cost-effectiveness ratios).
175. See Adler, Fear Assessment, supra note 54, at 981-82.
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health, at least as defined by the traditional QALY health-classification
systems.176
V. QALYS, NONTRADITIONAL COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, AND WELFARIST
POLICY EVALUATION
What role should QALYs play in welfarist policy evaluation, given both
their advantages relative to a WTP/WTA metric and their limitations? This Part
answers the question in two different ways. First, I sketch a theoretically
appealing, but currently unrealistic, decisional approach where LWUs themselves
serve as the policy metric, and QALY surveys, WTP/WTA surveys, revealed
preference data, and other information is used by the decision-maker in a
Bayesian fashion to “update” her estimate of LWUs. Second, I describe an
approach that is less elegant but more realistic, given current practices: a
nontraditional kind of cost-benefit analysis that incorporates dollar amounts
derived from QALY measurements, not merely WTP/WTA amounts, to measure
health effects. The FDA has, over the last half-decade or so, followed precisely
this approach in some of its important rulemakings—converting QALYs to
dollars using a conversion factor ranging from $100,000 to $500,000, and then
plugging those dollar amounts into a monetized cost-benefit analysis.
The FDA, here, is traversing the frontiers of policy science, and in a way
that (I believe) constitutes a true advance. This Part will argue that the FDA’s
nontraditional cost-benefit procedure can improve on traditional policy analysis,
at least in some choice situations, and will analyze, in a preliminary way, how the
procedure is optimally structured. At what rate should QALYs be converted to
dollars? When should QALYs be substituted for traditional WTP/WTA
measurements of health effects? I conclude by discussing a concrete case where
the applicability of traditional cost-benefit analysis has been hotly contested and
where QALY-based cost-benefit analysis may well be an improvement: the use
of WTP/WTA amounts to measure the cost of premature death.
A. First-Best Policy Evaluation: LWU Maximization with Some Help from Bayes
I have argued, to this point, that overall welfare is relevant to policy
evaluation; that overall welfare is best understood in terms of the convergent
preferences of idealized spectators contemplating extended lotteries; and that
LWUs, a numerical scale of these preferences, constitute the welfarist goldstandard. One outcome has greater overall well-being than a second just in case
the sum of LWUs is greater in the first case. Correctly measured WTP/WTA
176. See Klose, supra note 133, at 115 (noting that WTP/WTA amounts, by contrast with
QALYs, “provide[] a more comprehensive measure of the effects of a health care technology.”).
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amounts are not perfect proxies for LWUs, and in any event the WTP/WTA
valuations revealed by behavior or expressed in surveys diverge from true
WTP/WTA amounts. Correctly measured QALYs, too, are not generally perfect
proxies for LWUs, given the problem of background characteristics; further, the
additive formula for estimating QALYs will be inaccurate, if the conditions for
additive decomposition break down; and cognitive failures may interfere with
QALY surveys, just as they interfere with the measurement of WTP/WTA
amounts.
What does this analysis imply for welfarist policy evaluation? It suggests
that—placing to one side problems of deliberation costs, including computational
limits—the optimal welfarist procedure would use neither dollar amounts, nor
QALY amounts, but rather the LWU scale itself to evaluate different policy
options. The proposal may seem outlandish—but remember that measurement
techniques now intimately familiar to us, such as monetized cost-benefit analysis,
are themselves quite new on the scale of human time, invented only one or two
generations ago.177 The science of measurement evolves, and my notion of an
LWU scale is in fact well-grounded in current measurement theory, representing
the application of utility theory—a theory very widely accepted by contemporary
welfare economists—to a particular set of preferences, the spectators’
preferences over life-histories.
To be sure, the spectators are idealized, and this raises a large problem of
uncertainty. Who knows what life-histories, and lotteries over life-histories, we
would favor, if we were fully informed, fully deliberative about the different lifehistories and lotteries being considered, and unhampered by errors in cognition or
judgment? Humans’ actual preferences for life-histories and lotteries over lifehistories, as evidenced by their verbal or physical behavior, are only very
imperfect evidence of their idealized preferences. But policy-analytic techniques
for handling uncertainty continue to develop apace, just as measurement
techniques do.178 The best, general approach to uncertainty is the “Bayesian”
approach. Given some item of interest whose numerical value is uncertain, the
policymaker starts with a “prior” probability distribution over possible numerical
values of the item, and then updates her probability distribution as new
information arrives.179 Practicable, statistical techniques for implementing the
177. See Adler & Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 22, at 167-76
(summarizing the history of cost-benefit analysis).
178. See generally M. GRANGER MORGAN & MAX HENRION, UNCERTAINTY: A GUIDE TO
DEALING WITH UNCERTAINTY IN QUANTITATIVE RISK AND POLICY ANALYSIS (1990).
179. On Bayesian approaches to probability generally, see Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death and
Harm: The Normative Foundations of Risk Regulation, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1293, 1312 n.73 (2003)
(citing sources). On Bayesian statistics, see, e.g., JOSE M. BERNARDO & ADRIAN F.M. SMITH,
BAYESIAN THEORY (1994).
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Bayesian idea are now available,180 and these are increasingly employed by
policy analysts. For example, such techniques are employed to determine the
optimal design of nuclear reactors or other large, dangerous structures in the teeth
of uncertainty about the external stresses that the structures will be subjected to
and the processes that will occur inside them;181 or to predict the number of
deaths that will result from pollution or other environmental releases of toxic
chemicals, despite fairly deep uncertainty about dose-response relationships, the
environmental “fate and transport” of toxins, and demographic patterns over
time.182
I suggest that Bayesian techniques could, in principle, be used to estimate
LWUs. For a given type of welfare impact (a risk of death, a headache, a scenic
view, angina, and so on), a prior probability distribution over the LWU values of
that impact would be defined. That distribution might be quite “diffuse”—the
analyst might have a very poor initial sense of how idealized spectators would
value the impact—or her priors might be less diffuse, incorporating for example
her own intuitions about welfare, or philosophical wisdom, or her knowledge
about the psychological processes of preference formation (all supporting
probabilistic guesses about what the spectators would want).183 QALY surveys,
contingent-valuation surveys, revealed-preference studies, as well as LWU
surveys184 focused directly on measuring the LWU value of the impact could then
180. See, e.g., ANDREW GELMAN ET AL., BAYESIAN DATA ANALYSIS (2d ed. 2004).
181. See, e.g., ROGER M. COOKE, EXPERTS IN UNCERTAINTY: OPINION AND SUBJECTIVE
PROBABILITY IN SCIENCE 27-41 (1991) (discussing use of Bayesian approaches in analyzing nuclear
reactor safety).
182. See Adler, Against “Individual Risk,” supra note 112, at 1208-10 (discussing Bayesian
approaches to risk assessment).
183. See, e.g., GELMAN ET AL., supra note 180, at 33-72 (discussing informative and
noninformative priors).
184. LWU studies would seek to determine respondents’ utilities for whole life histories. Unlike
QALY surveys, these studies would characterize life histories in terms of background
characteristics as well as health. Unlike contingent-valuation or revealed-preference studies they
would seek to measure the respondent’s preferences among different life histories on a utility scale,
not a dollar scale. I see nothing to preclude this sort of LWU study, and indeed it would not be
radically different from some existing survey work (for example, the surveys in the QALY
literature that ask about preferences over entire health histories rather than assuming temporal
decomposition, see supra note 69 and accompanying text; the survey work leading up to WHO’s
inclusive quality-of-life index, see supra note 170 and accompanying text; and the survey work
looking to preferences among different life-saving programs, see infra text accompanying notes
238-240). To be sure, as suggested earlier, see supra text accompanying notes 171-172, the
ordinary respondent might find it more difficult to complete an LWU survey than a standard QALY
survey. A successful LWU survey might therefore need to incorporate cognitive aids (for example,
visual aids to help the respondents grasp the different life-histories being compared; tutorials in the

55

1_ADLER FINAL PAGINATED.DOC

12/16/2005 5:25:24 PM

YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS

VI:1 (2006)

be used to “update” the analyst’s priors—just as, for example, the Bayesian
scientist’s prior beliefs about the toxicity of a given chemical compound,
grounded in the existing scientific literature, are updated by the results of a
particular experiment, such as feeding the chemical to a group of rats and seeing
how many die.185
QALY studies, contingent-valuation studies, revealed-preference data, and
LWU studies themselves—”observational” evidence analogous, for the Bayesian,
to the rat experiment—will have a substantial effect in changing the analyst’s
priors if the individuals who are surveyed, or whose behavior is examined, are
particularly well-informed and deliberative. If the individuals’ deliberational and
informational characteristics are less proximate to the spectators’ characteristics,
then the studies and data may have a less dramatic impact on the analyst’s
probability distribution. In either event, the analyst will integrate the sources of
information available to her to arrive at a probability distribution over LWUs.
The crucial point, here, is that LWUs need not be known for certain for them
to figure in policy choice. Uncertainty about LWUs can, in principle, be
expressed probabilistically and updated systematically with observations about
what people do or say, and the welfarist rule for policy analysis could be: Pick
the alternative with the greatest expected LWUs.
I will not elaborate on the approach just sketched, which asks analysts and
decision-makers to use the LWU scale itself as their basic decisional tool, rather
than QALYs, WTP/WTA amounts, or some other proxy measure. First, once
deliberation costs and the problems of administrative error and opportunism are
taken into consideration, the approach may be welfare-suboptimal186—although it
should be pointed out that increases in computing power have made Bayesian
techniques feasible in a much wider range of contexts, and much cheaper, than a
generation ago.187 Second, my primary aim here is to inform current welfarist
policy-evaluation practices. Cost-benefit analysis is the dominant technique, at
least at federal agencies, and describing a different, nonmonetized, LWU-based
technique is not of much use to analysts constrained by current practices,
axioms of rational choice; interviewer interventions to point out inconsistencies in valuations), or
perhaps to be limited to particularly able respondents.
185. See, e.g., Ryan A. Hill, From Science to Decision-Making: The Applicability of Bayesian
Methods to Risk Assessment, 2 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 636 (1996) (discussing use
of new data to update prior beliefs about the carcinogenicity of a chemical).
186. See ADLER & POSNER, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, supra note 22, chs. 3, 4 (arguing that
welfare-maximizing procedures are sensitive to deliberation costs and decision-maker error and
opportunism); Adler & Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 22, at 217-18 (same).
187. See, e.g., GELMAN ET AL., supra note 180, at xx (noting that increases in computing speed
and improvements in computational methods have made Bayesian methods feasible for more
complicated models and larger datasets).

56

1_ADLER FINAL PAGINATED.DOC

12/16/2005 5:25:24 PM

QALYS AND POLICY EVALUATION

institutional routines, and expectations.
B. Second-Best Policy Evaluation: Nontraditional Cost-Benefit Analysis
Current welfarist policy-analytic practices are proxy-based. The best
developed measures of welfare are money and QALYs, neither of which directly
represent spectators’ preferences over complete life-histories, as an LWU scale
would. Further, because money has a much broader range than QALYs,
subsuming not just health impacts but all manner of non-health effects,188 the fact
that regulatory agencies generally use a money rather than QALY scale to
implement the welfarist mandates of presidential cost-benefit orders and of
statutes that require cost-benefit analysis is not surprising.189 This Section will
show how QALYs can play a role within, and improve on, monetized costbenefit analysis.
Monetizing QALYs and incorporating them into cost-benefit analysis is not
a technique much discussed by the scholarly literature on QALYs (where
QALYs are generally seen as an outcome measure for cost-effectiveness
analysis190), or by the cost-benefit literature (where Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, not
overall welfare, is often taken as the gold standard191). Here, practice outruns
scholarship—for, as already mentioned, federal agencies have recently started to
convert QALY measures of various health impacts to dollar amounts and to add
those sums to WTP/WTA measures of non-health effects in evaluating policy
choices. For short, I will call this approach “hybrid” or nontraditional costbenefit analysis.
The leader in this area is the FDA, which to date has used hybrid costbenefit analysis in almost twenty rulemakings.192 The practice apparently began

188. See supra Section IV.D.
189. See Adler & Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 22, at 167-76
(describing use of monetized cost-benefit analysis by regulators); supra text accompanying notes 820 (noting infrequent use of QALYs by regulators, with the exception of the FDA).
190. See supra text accompanying notes 25-30.
191. See, e.g., Richard Revesz & Robert N. Stavins, Environmental Law and Policy, in THE
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 5 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., forthcoming
2006) (“The general view from economics is that other criteria in addition to efficiency [in
particular, distributive criteria] can and should be employed by policymakers, but that the existence
of such criteria does not invalidate the efficiency criterion, which should remain part of social
decision-making.”); sources cited supra notes 49-53.
192. See infra notes 194-195. This count, to be conservative, excludes the handful of
rulemakings in which the FDA has used VSLYs. As mentioned earlier, the EPA has also flirted
with VSLYs. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Lives, LifeYears, and Willingness To Pay, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 205, 252 (2004) (listing regulatory impact
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at the FDA in the early 1990s,193 was employed in the huge tobacco rulemaking a
decade ago,194 and has accelerated since the late 1990s.195 To give one illustrative

statements using life-years or QALYs).
193. In a 1993 rulemaking concerning food standards of identity, the FDA appeared to use the
VSLY approach as one measure of mortality costs. See Food Standards: Amendment of the
Standards of Identity for Enriched Grain Products to Require Addition of Folic Acid, 58 Fed. Reg.
53,305, 53,310 (Oct. 14, 1993). As discussed below, see infra text accompanying notes 233-234,
this approach is identical with the use of QALY-to-dollar conversions to value mortality if the
VSLYs are not age-adjusted or adjusted for other characteristics such as wealth, and if it is assumed
the years lost are perfectly healthy.
194. See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco
To Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,576 (Aug. 28, 1996).
195. The FDA has employed QALY-to-dollar conversions to monetize morbidity or mortality
for purposes of cost-benefit analysis in the following rulemakings. (Where both final and proposed
rulemakings employed conversions, only the final rulemaking is cited.) Performance Standard for
Diagnostic X-Ray Systems and Their Major Components, 70 Fed. Reg. 33,998, 34,019-22 (June
10, 2005); Establishment and Maintenance of Records Under the Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,562, 71,621-22 (Dec. 9,
2004); Prevention of Salmonella Enteritidis in Shell Eggs, 69 Fed. Reg. 56,824, 56,853-55 (Sept.
22, 2004); Requirements Pertaining to Sampling Services and Private Laboratories Used in
Connection with Imported Food, 69 Fed. Reg. 23,460, 23,469 (Apr. 29, 2004); Bar Code Label
Requirement for Human Drug Products and Biological Products, 69 Fed. Reg. 9120, 9159-61 (Feb.
26, 2004); Final Rule Declaring Dietary Supplements Containing Ephedrine Alkaloids Adulterated
Because They Present an Unreasonable Risk, 69 Fed. Reg. 6788, 6837 (Feb. 11, 2004); Food
Labeling; Trans Fatty Acids in Nutrition Labeling; Consumer Research To Consider Nutrient
Content Health Claims, 68 Fed. Reg. 41,434, 41,487-89 (July 11, 2003); Administrative Detention
of Food for Human or Animal Consumption, 68 Fed. Reg. 25,242, 25,261 (May 9, 2003); Medical
Devices; Patient Examination and Surgeons’ Gloves; Test Procedures and Acceptance Criteria, 68
Fed. Reg. 15,404, 15,411-13 (Mar. 31, 2003); Current Good Manufacturing Practice in
Manufacturing, Packing, or Holding Dietary Ingredients and Dietary Supplements, 68 Fed. Reg.
12,158, 12,229-30 (Mar. 13, 2003); Prior Notice of Imported Food, 68 Fed. Reg. 5428, 5455 (Feb.
3, 2003); Registration of Food Facilities, 68 Fed. Reg. 5378, 5410 (Feb. 3, 2003); Marking
Requirements for and Prohibitions on the Reimportation of Imported Food Products That Have
Been Refused Admission to the United States, 66 Fed. Reg. 6502, 6508 (Jan. 22, 2001); Hazard
Analysis and Critical Control Point (HAACP); Procedures for the Safe and Sanitary Processing and
Importing of Juice, 66 Fed. Reg. 6138, 6179-84 (Jan. 19, 2001); Current Good Manufacturing
Practice for Blood and Blood Components, 65 Fed. Reg. 69,378, 69,398 (Nov. 16, 2000);
Surgeon’s and Patient Examination Gloves; Reclassification, 64 Fed. Reg. 41,710, 41,732-36 (July
30, 1999); Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis and Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis of
the Proposed Rule To Require Refrigeration of Shell Eggs at Retail and Safe Handling Labels, 64
Fed. Reg. 36,516, 36,522-24 (July 6, 1999); Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis and Initial
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis of the Proposed Rules To Ensure the Safety of Juice and Juice
Products, 63 Fed. Reg. 24,254, 24,258-61 (May 1, 1998); Quality Mammography Standards, 62
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example: The FDA in 2003 promulgated a regulation requiring food nutrition
labels to disclose information about trans fats.196 The rule was economically
“significant” for purposes of Executive Order 12,866, the current Presidential
cost-benefit order,197 and the FDA therefore published and sent to OMB a
lengthy cost-benefit document, including both monetary estimates of the rule’s
costs (the costs of re-labeling foods, testing them to determine trans fats levels,
and reformulating them) and monetary estimates of the rule’s benefits (avoided
cases of fatal and nonfatal coronary heart disease).
The FDA monetized these benefits in two different ways, once with QALYs
and once without, both showing the rule to have greater monetized benefits than
costs.198 In its QALY-based analysis, the FDA calculated the cost of each
nonfatal case as the sum of medical costs, functional disability costs, and painand-suffering costs. A QALY value for functional disability and pain-andsuffering was estimated, then converted to dollars using a conversion factor of
$100,000 per QALY. As the agency explained:
[A] recent study . . . estimated . . . that the quality adjusted life year for a
[coronary heart disease] survivor was 0.71, which indicates that the annual loss
to the victim is 0.29 quality adjusted years. This loss represents the combined
effects of functional disability and pain and suffering. FDA assumed that the
loss lasts for 13 years, or 8.4 discounted years.199

The agency concluded that the monetized pain-and-suffering and functional

Fed. Reg. 55,852, 55,963 (Oct. 28, 1997). In addition, the FDA in a few rulemakings has employed
VSLYs to monetize mortality without using the term “QALY.” See Labeling Requirements for
Systemic Antibacterial Drug Products Intended for Human Use, 68 Fed. Reg. 6062, 6076 (Feb. 6,
2003); Iron-Containing Supplements and Drugs, 62 Fed. Reg. 2218, 2243 (Jan. 15, 1997); sources
cited supra note 193; infra text accompanying 233-234 (discussing equivalence of QALY and
VSLY approaches under certain conditions).
196. See Food Labeling; Trans Fatty Acids in Nutrition Labeling; Consumer Research To
Consider Nutrient Content Health Claims, 68 Fed. Reg. 41,434.
197. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 §§ 3(f), 6(a)(3), 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. §
601 (2000); see also Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. § 1532 (2000) (requiring
the preparation of cost-benefit analyses for rules resulting in annual expenditures of $100 million or
more).
198. See Food Labeling; Trans Fatty Acids in Nutrition Labeling; Consumer Research To
Consider Nutrient Content Health Claims, 68 Fed. Reg. at 41,487-90. In the proposed rulemaking,
the FDA relied solely on QALY-to-dollar conversions to quantify the benefit. See Food Labeling;
Trans Fatty Acids in Nutrition Labeling, Nutrient Content Claims, and Health Claims, 64 Fed. Reg.
62,746, 62,771-75 (proposed Nov. 17, 1999).
199. Food Labeling; Trans Fatty Acids in Nutrition Labeling; Consumer Research To Consider
Nutrient Content Health Claims, 68 Fed. Reg. at 41,488.
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disability cost of each nonfatal case was 0.29 × 8.4 × $100,000 = $243,600.200
This amount, plus the per-case medical costs, multiplied by the annual number of
nonfatal cases prevented by the rule, was the rule’s annual morbidity-reduction
benefit. The FDA’s QALY-based approach to monetizing the mortality-reduction
benefit of the rule was to estimate the discounted average years of life lost in
each fatal case of chronic heart disease (eight or eleven years, depending on the
discount rate) and then multiply this number by the $100,000 QALY-to-dollar
conversion factor, to arrive at a monetized benefit figure per fatal case prevented.
That figure, multiplied by the annual number of fatal cases prevented by the rule,
yielded the annual lifesaving benefit.201
The FDA practice underscores that hybrid cost-benefit analysis is a genuine
policy-analytic option. The practice puts this novel decision-procedure on the
welfarist’s table, as it were. But how should the procedure be structured, from the
point of view of overall welfare? There are two fundamental issues here. First,
what conversion rate should be used to translate QALYs into dollars? The FDA
in the trans fats rule used $100,000 per QALY as its conversion factor, and also
considered what total benefits would be at a conversion rate of $300,000 and
$500,000 per QALY.202 Elsewhere the agency has used a conversion rate of
$373,000 per QALY,203 and in valuing short-term morbidity it has repeatedly
used a “Quality Adjusted Life Day” value of $630,204 which implies a conversion
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. See Food Labeling; Trans Fatty Acids in Nutrition Labeling; Consumer Research To
Consider Nutrient Content Health Claims, 68 Fed. Reg. at 41,487-90. For other recent rulemakings
in which the FDA has used the trio of $100/$300/$500,000 per QALY to determine possible
benefits, see Prevention of Salmonella Enteritidis in Shell Eggs During Production, 69 Fed. Reg. at
56,855; and Final Rule Declaring Dietary Supplements Containing Ephedrine Alkaloids
Adulterated Because They Present an Unreasonable Risk, 69 Fed. Reg. at 6842.
203. See Medical Devices; Patient Examination and Surgeons’ Gloves; Test Procedures and
Acceptance Criteria, 68 Fed. Reg. at 15,411; Surgeon’s and Patient Examination Gloves;
Reclassification, 64 Fed. Reg. at 41,734.
204. See Requirements Pertaining to Sampling Services and Private Laboratories Used in
Connection with Imported Food, 69 Fed. Reg. at 23,469; Current Good Manufacturing Practice in
Manufacturing, Packing, or Holding Dietary Ingredients and Dietary Supplements, 68 Fed. Reg. at
12,230; Marking Requirements for and Prohibitions on the Reimportation of Imported Food
Products That Have Been Refused Admission to the United States, 66 Fed. Reg. at 6508; Hazard
Analysis and Critical Control Point (HAACP); Procedures for the Safe and Sanitary Processing and
Importing of Juice, 66 Fed. Reg. at 6180; Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis and Initial
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis of the Proposed Rule To Require Refrigeration of Shell Eggs at
Retail and Safe Handling Labels, 64 Fed. Reg. at 36,523; Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis
and Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis of the Proposed Rules To Ensure the Safety of Juice and
Juice Products, 63 Fed. Reg. at 24,261.
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factor of $230,000 per QALY.205 Which of these conversion factors should an
agency such as the FDA employ? More fundamentally, what principles should
guide the choice of factor? Second, what function should the converted amounts
play in cost-benefit analysis? Specifically, under what conditions should they
displace WTP/WTA amounts, where these are available?
1.

How Should QALYs Be Converted to Dollars?

The FDA derives a QALY-to-dollar conversion factor from VSL (the “value
of statistical life”), a number based on WTP/WTA to avoid the risk of death. For
those not familiar with traditional cost-benefit analysis of mortality impacts, the
following very quick summary might be helpful. Imagine that subjects in a
contingent-valuation or revealed-preference study assign a WTP/WTA amount
(for example, $40) to some small risk of death (for example, a 1-in-100,000 risk).
That WTP/WTA amount, divided by the risk, is the “VSL” implied by the study
(in this instance $4 million). It is the cumulative amount that a large population
of individuals with the subjects’ preferences would be willing to pay so as to
avoid, or willing to accept as compensation for, a single death that would occur
for certain, but with an uncertain victim.
The standard cost-benefit technique that agencies currently employ to
monetize the mortality effect of a policy is to estimate the total lives saved or lost
and multiply that number times a VSL figure inferred from a large group of
contingent-valuation and/or revealed preference studies of WTP/WTA for the
risk of death.206 The VSL figures actually employed by agencies are in the
vicinity of $6 million.
Now for the question of QALY-to-dollar conversion factors. Imagine that
we calculate the average VSL from a group of contingent-valuation or revealedpreference studies. The average life expectancy of the individuals in the studies is
X years; life expectancy is discounted at some rate so that the average discounted
life expectancy is Y; and the average health of the group is at QALY level q < 1.
VSL/qY seems, intuitively, like an appropriate QALY-to-dollars conversion
factor—and in any event this has been the approach generally articulated by the
FDA,207 as well as the approach taken in scholarly work by some health
205. See Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis and Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis of
the Proposed Rules To Ensure the Safety of Juice and Juice Products, 63 Fed. Reg. at 24,261.
206. For example, the agency might determine the VSL implied by each study (average
WTP/WTA of the subjects divided by the risk involved), and then average those study-specific
VSLs. On the VSL method and the use of VSL by administrative agencies, see Adler, Against
“Individual Risk,” supra note 112, at 1198 n.300.
207. See, e.g., Prevention of Salmonella Enteritidis in Shell Eggs During Production, 69 Fed.
Reg. at 56,855; Bar Code Label Requirement for Human Drug Products and Biological Products,
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economists.208 VSL/qY is the average WTP/WTA measure of the loss of longevity
that the subjects in these studies were at risk of losing, divided by the average
(discounted) QALY measure of that longevity.
But intuitions can mislead. The approach I will propose for deriving a
QALY-to-dollar conversion factor is, at least conceptually, quite different from
the FDA’s. My approach flows directly from my view of cost-benefit analysis as
a decision procedure maximizing LWUs.
To begin, it makes little sense, I suggest, to think of decision-makers setting
a QALY-to-dollar conversion factor on a one-off basis, for some particular
choice situation. To identify the factor that maximizes LWUs, the decision-maker
needs to have some sense of how QALYs and WTP/WTA amounts translate into
LWUs. If she can do that on a case-by-case basis with relative ease and accuracy,
why not simply analyze the choices at hand directly in terms of LWUs? Why do
a cost-benefit analysis of each option, which translates its various welfare effects
into money amounts and then aggregates, rather than an LWU analysis, which
translates those effects into LWU amounts and then aggregates?
Rather, the choice of the QALY-to-dollar conversion factor is best
understood as a problem at the level of systems design. An agency head or an
oversight body (the “system-designer”) is anticipating that a conversion factor
will or might be used in a range of choice situations confronted by agency
69 Fed. Reg. at 9160; Food Labeling; Trans Fatty Acids in Nutrition Labeling; Consumer Research
To Consider Nutrient Content Health Claims, 68 Fed. Reg. at 41,489; Medical Devices; Patient
Examination and Surgeons’ Gloves; Test Procedures and Acceptance Criteria, 68 Fed. Reg. at
15,411; Current Good Manufacturing Practice in Manufacturing, Packing, or Holding Dietary
Ingredients and Dietary Supplements, 68 Fed. Reg. at 12,230; Current Good Manufacturing
Practice for Blood and Blood Components, 65 Fed. Reg. at 69,368; Surgeon’s and Patient
Examination Gloves; Reclassification, 64 Fed. Reg. at 41,734; Preliminary Regulatory Impact
Analysis and Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis of the Proposed Rules To Ensure the Safety of
Juice and Juice Products, 63 Fed. Reg. at 24,261. The $100,000 per QALY conversion factor that
the FDA periodically uses is based on research by Garber and Phelps, who employ a different
approach to estimating the factor. See, e.g., Prevention of Salmonella Enteritidis in Shell Eggs
During Production, 69 Fed. Reg. at 56,855; Food Labeling; Trans Fatty Acids in Nutrition
Labeling; Consumer Research To Consider Nutrient Content Health Claims, 68 Fed. Reg. at 41,489
(citing Garber & Phelps, supra note 28). A less refined version of the approach described in the text
would assume that q is 1. A more refined version would allow q to vary over time. A related
approach would use average population longevity rather than the average life expectancy of
individuals in WTP/WTA studies for the risk of death. All these variations of the VSL/qY approach
are quite different from the method I advocate, in the text below, and are vulnerable to the
criticisms of the VSL/qY approach articulated below.
208. See, e.g., Richard A. Hirth et al., Willingness To Pay for a Quality-Adjusted Life Year: In
Search of a Standard, 20 MED. DECISION MAKING. 332, 335 (2000); George Tolley et al., State-ofthe-Art Health Values, in VALUING HEALTH FOR POLICY, supra note 1, at 328-29.
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decision-makers, and is determining what the optimal factor would be. The
decision-makers themselves will evaluate choices by performing cost-benefit
analysis, not LWU analysis. As noted above, there are various plausible reasons,
having to do with deliberation costs and with the competence and trustworthiness
of the decision-makers,209 why it might be LWU-maximizing for the decisionmakers to employ cost-benefit analysis rather than LWU analysis as their
decision-procedure, at least at present.
However, the system-designer will employ LWUs in setting the QALY-todollar conversion factor. At a minimum, she will need to have some very rough
sense of the expected LWU gains and losses associated with different conversion
factors. In the set of choice situations that the system-designer is considering,
health effects will be measured by the decision-maker in QALYs and converted
to dollar amounts through some conversion factor f, while non-health effects will
be measured on a WTP/WTA scale.
For simplicity, think of each choice situation as binary, presenting the
decision-maker with a choice between the status quo and some regulatory
intervention or “project,” which has health benefits and non-health costs. Ideally,
for any choice situation in the set, the system-designer would be able to express
probabilistically her judgments about the total amount of the project’s health
benefits and non-health costs, in LWUs, plus her judgments about the likely ratio
between the total WTP and QALY amounts that the agency decision-maker will
observe and the total LWU amounts.210 For simplicity, I will also assume that the

209. See supra text accompanying note 186.
210. To be clear: The WTP/LWU and QALY/LWU ratios here—the ratios that drive the
system-designer’s choice—are the ratios between the aggregate WTP or QALY amounts for project
costs or benefits that the decision-maker will calculate, and the total amount in LWUs of project
costs or benefits. These are ratios of total project impacts, not the average of the QALY/LWU and
WTP/LWU ratios for the various individuals affected by the project (although under some
conditions the average of individual ratios may equal or approximate the ratio of totals).
The graphs in the text are easiest to grasp if it is assumed that the QALY/LWU ratio for
health benefits is independent of the amount of health benefits in LWUs, and similarly that the
WTP/LWU ratio for non-health costs is independent of the amount of non-health costs in LWUs. In
that event, the system-designer has a single subjective probability distribution for the QALY/LWU
ratio and WTP/LWU ratio conditional on any given level of benefits and costs (in LWUs), and the
ratio graphs display this distribution. However, the system-designer’s maximization problem as
modeled here does not require this sort of independence. See infra App. II.
The analysis does make a different sort of independence assumption, namely that the
system-designer’s probability distributions with respect to LWUs, the QALY/LWU ratio, and the
WTP/LWU ratio for a given choice situation remain the same regardless of which choice the
decision-maker selects in any other choice situation. For example, the designer’s probability
distributions with respect to the second choice that the decision-maker will confront are the same
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system-designer’s subjective probability distributions over project LWU benefits
and costs, over the QALY/LWU ratio, and over the WTP/LWU ratio are the
same for every choice situation in the set, represented by the following sorts of
graphs. A more comprehensive analysis would permit the designer to have
different subjective distributions for different subsets of choice situations; but
that analysis would be overly complicated for my purposes here, which is to
explain a general approach to setting the QALY-to-dollar conversion factor.
FIGURE 1: SETTING A QALY-TO-DOLLAR CONVERSION FACTOR
Project Nonhealth Costs

Probability

Probability

Project Health Benefits

0

0

LWUs

WTP/LWU Ratio (Nonhealth Costs)

Probability

Probability

QALY/LWU Ratio (Health Benefits)

LWUs

0

0

QALY/LWU

WTP/LWU

regardless of whether the decision-maker has picked the project or status quo in the first choice
situation.
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Note that both the QALY/LWU ratio for health benefits, and the WTP/LWU
ratio for non-health costs, are variable. This reflects the fact that the actual
QALY or WTP amounts measured by the decision-maker will not be perfect
proxies for LWUs—for all the reasons already discussed. A perfect proxy would
have some single fixed ratio to LWUs with probability one.
With these probability distributions in hand, the system-designer can pick an
optimal QALY-to-dollar conversion factor f*. This is the factor f* that maximizes
expected LWUs. To reiterate: The system-designer anticipates that decisionmakers will perform hybrid cost-benefit analysis across a range of choice
situations, with health effects measured in QALYs and converted to dollars using
a conversion factor that the system-designer will announce, and non-health
effects measured in WTP/WTA. Her underlying objective is to maximize overall
(expected) welfare,211 i.e., total expected LWUs. The optimal conversion factor
f* is the factor that does just that. Cost-benefit analysis, as I see it, is simply a
tool for advancing overall well-being, and should be calibrated (e.g., in the
choice of the QALY-to-dollar conversion factor) with that objective in mind.
What can we say about f*, the optimal QALY-to-dollar conversion factor?
An Appendix to this Article derives some formal results about f*, which are
informally summarized here. First, f* is context-dependent. It depends on the
shapes of all the probability distributions displayed here: on the systemdesigner’s probability distributions with respect to the QALY/LWU ratios for
health benefits and WTP/LWU ratios for non-health costs, as well as her
probability distributions with respect to the total amount of project health
benefits in LWUs, and total project non-health costs in LWUs.212 This may seem
like a negative result, but in fact it underscores the crucial point that specifying
the QALY-to-dollar conversion factor is a pragmatic decision, a matter of
optimizing hybrid cost-benefit analysis with respect to the underlying criterion of
expected overall welfare, representable in expected LWUs. The optimal factor
for one set of choice situations may be f+, given the system-designer’s
QALY/LWU, WTP/LWU, and LWU probability distributions for that set of
situations. The optimal factor for a different set of choice situations, e.g., a
different administrative agency (or for the same set of choice situations but a
different designer, with different probability distributions) may be f++. There is
no single, natural, acontextual “rate” at which QALYs convert into dollars.213

211. The system-designer does not know for certain what choices will be presented to the
decision-makers, and what the WTP/LWU and QALY/LWU ratios will be. Proceeding, therefore,
under uncertainty, she aims to maximize expected LWUs.
212. See infra App. II.
213. In a recent article, Gyrd-Hansen proposes a “pragmatic” approach to determining WTP per
QALY, which is similar in spirit to my proposal. He suggests that “seeking to apply a unique WTP
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Second, one can show that, with some simplifying assumptions, the optimal
conversion factor in a given context, for a given set of QALY/LWU, WTP/LWU
and LWU probability distributions, is a kind of average, which can be calculated
by taking the average WTP/LWU ratio for non-health costs, and dividing that by
the average QALY/LWU ratio for health benefits.214
Conceptually, this approach to setting the QALY-to-conversion factor is
quite different from the FDA’s VSL/qY approach. My approach seeks to calibrate
the conversion factor in terms of LWUs; the FDA’s does nothing of the sort, at
least not explicitly.
Now, it might be objected that FDA’s approach does implicitly incorporate
LWUs. Leaving aside discounting, the FDA in effect takes VSL, which is the
WTP/WTA measure of a certain kind of health impact, namely death, and divides
that by a kind of estimate of the average QALY loss that occurs in death, namely
qX. But this WTP/QALY ratio, VSL/qX, mathematically, is identical to:
(VSL/L)/(qX/L), where L is the LWU loss that on average occurs with death. In
other words, the FDA’s conversion factor can be seen as a rough kind of
approximation for the number that would emerge if a system-designer calculated
the average WTP/LWU ratio for the mortality-reduction benefits of policy
choices, and divided that by the average QALY/LWU ratio for those choices.
Even so, there is a crucial difference between the FDA’s approach and mine.
My analysis shows that, with simplifying assumptions, the optimal conversion
factor is the average WTP/LWU ratio for the non-health impacts of agency
choices, e.g., reduced consumption, or recreation, or employment, divided by the
average QALY/LWU ratio for health impacts. By contrast, the FDA takes the
average WTP/LWU ratio for a particular health impact (the risk of death) and
divides that by the average QALY/LWU ratio for that impact. Think of the point
this way: Hybrid cost-benefit analysis converts QALYs into dollars and then
adds these dollar sums to WTP/WTA amounts for non-health impacts. So what is
crucial in optimizing the conversion is how WTP/WTA amounts for non-health
impacts translate into LWUs and how QALYs translate into LWUs, not how
WTP/WTA amounts for health impacts translate into LWUs.
A final attempt to salvage the FDA’s approach: Assume that the distribution
of WTP/LWU ratios for health impacts is roughly the same as the distribution of
WTP/LWU ratios for non-health impacts. On that assumption, the FDA’s
approach is perhaps a rough and ready way to approximate the optimal

for a QALY should not be seen as defining the theoretical link between CEA and CBA, but rather
as an aid to decisionmakers,” and notes that decision-makers might use “situation-specific” WTP
per QALY values. Dorte Gyrd-Hansen, Willingness To Pay for a QALY: Theoretical and
Methodological Issues, 23 PHARMACOECONOMICS 423, 428, 430 (2005).
214. See infra App. II.
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conversion factor—although even here one would want to consider WTP/LWU
ratios for a range of health impacts, not simply the risk of death (as the FDA
does). Doing that suggests that the range of numbers the FDA has employed
($100,000 to $500,000) per QALY is on the high side; a conversion factor of
$100,000 per QALY looks closer to optimal, and lower factors such as $50,000
or even $10,000 should be considered.215 But in any event the assumption may
not be true, which means that the numbers emerging from this quite rough and
ready analysis would need to be adjusted. For example, the biases that affect
WTP/WTA measurement may tend to inflate WTP/LWU ratios for health as
opposed to non-health impacts, or vice versa. I will not attempt to estimate the
215. Hirth et al. examined a wide range of VSL estimates, based on contingent valuation
studies, wage-risk studies, and other revealed preference studies. Their estimates of the conversion
factor were in the same range as the FDA’s numbers: $93,402 based on the revealed preference
studies other than wage-risk studies, $161,305 based on the contingent valuation studies, and
$428,286 based on the wage-risk studies, or an overall estimate of $265,345. See Hirth et al., supra
note 208, at 338. By contrast, the conversion factor that results from comparing QALY values and
WTP/WTA amounts for light morbidity is substantially lower. I estimated this factor using a
review article by Johnson, which collects WTP/WTA and QALY values for a range of light
symptoms, such as angina, throat congestion, coughs, runny noses, and headaches. See Johnson et
al., supra note 129. The estimation procedure was straightforward. If, for example, a study
determines that average WTP to avoid seven days of a severe cough and sneeze is $87.35, and the
QALY loss associated with a severe cough and sneeze is 0.318, then the conversion factor implied
by this study is (365 × 87.35)/(7 × 0.318), or $14,323. Averaging the conversion factors implied by
the fifty-some WTP/WTA and QALY valuations for light morbidity produces an overall estimate
of $37,663 per QALY. This is an order of magnitude lower than the overall Hirth et al. result of
$265,345 per QALY, and (interestingly) much closer to the number traditionally used by many
public health scholars as the cut-off ratio for cost-effectiveness analysis: $50,000 per QALY. See
Hirth, supra, at 333. It is also very close to the cut-off ratio that, in practice, the Australian
government uses in deciding whether to list a pharmaceutical for public funding, which one study
estimates to be $40,400. See Dorte Gyrd-Hansen et al., Willingness To Pay for a QALY, 12 HEALTH
ECON. 1049, 1049 (2003).
Gyrd-Hansen and colleagues come up with a yet lower estimate of the conversion factor.
They surveyed 3201 Danish individuals and elicited WTP values for changes in health states
described using a standard health state classification system. These money valuations were
integrated with preexisting QALY valuations for the changes, yielding a mean WTP per QALY of
roughly $10,000. See id. at 1058. A simple average of this figure, the $37,663 ratio implied by the
Johnson article, and the $265,345 overall estimate based on VSL set forth by Hirth et al. gives a
value of about $100,000. This rough, heuristic calculation suggests that $100,000, currently the low
end of the FDA’s range, might well be an appropriate central QALY-to-dollar conversion factor for
hybrid cost-benefit analysis—absent further information, for example information concerning the
distribution of LWU costs and benefits across agency choice situations, that would bear on the
optimal conversion factor—and that lower factors, such as $50,000 or even $10,000, should be
considered.
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degree or direction of the appropriate adjustment here.
It might be objected that my approach requires the system-designer to do
something impossible: to estimate project impacts in an esoteric and
unobservable metric, namely LWUs. But that endeavor is not impossible—
although it may be expensive and time-consuming, which is why it may well be
welfare-maximizing for deliberation about LWUs to occur at the level of systems
design, rather than in the evaluation of individual projects. The graphs in this
Section, again, represent the designer’s subjective probability distributions—her
degrees of belief about the different possible quantities of some item. An
individual’s subjective probability distributions for anything (the temperature in
the middle of the sun, the number of electrons in George Washington’s finger,
the number of mistakes that students taking a hypothetical exam under
hypothetical conditions will make) can be generated using Bayesian probabilityelicitation techniques, at least if the individual is smart and patient enough to go
through the exercise.216
LWUs are utility numbers representing the preferences of idealized
spectators with respect to the different combinations of health, consumption, and
other attributes that make up different possible human life-histories. LWUs are
not observable; but neither are QALYs. LWU surveys, asking respondents to
think about, and express numerically, their preferences over possible lives, can
and certainly should be conducted.217 Even without such surveys in hand, systemdesigners can arrive at a sense of how strongly spectators would prefer different
packages of health and non-health attributes by consulting their own preferences,
and by drawing on the rich body of economic and philosophical scholarship
about well-being.218 Sketching a subjective probability distribution over LWUs
means sketching a subjective distribution over the utilities of hypothetical,
idealized spectators. Those utility numbers—like physical magnitudes in
inaccessible places, or the quantities of miniscule items or items in the past or
future—cannot be perceived. But we can at least quantify our beliefs about what
the numbers might be, in the form of subjective probabilities. Once it is
recognized that prevalent policy metrics, such as QALYs and WTP/WTA
amounts, are simply rough proxies for well-being, it becomes plausible—indeed
compelling—to undertake more systematic efforts to estimate LWUs, and to use
such estimates in structuring cost-benefit analysis. That is what I am advocating
here.

216. On Bayesian techniques, see supra text accompanying notes 178-185.
217. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 183-185.
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2.

What Role Should QALYs Play in Nontraditional Cost-Benefit Analysis?

What precise role should QALYs play in cost-benefit analysis? At a
minimum, QALYs can provide alternate estimates of health benefits. Where both
a QALY-based money estimate and a traditional WTP/WTA estimate are
available, the agency should undertake cost-benefit analyses using both
figures.219 If the parallel analyses reach convergent policy recommendations, then
the agency can be especially confident in that course of action. If they don’t, then
the agency has reason to scrutinize the WTP/WTA numbers, perhaps conducting
additional contingent-valuation or revealed-preference studies. In effect, costbenefit analysis in parallel provides a simple heuristic of the value of further
expenditures to estimate WTP/WTA amounts. It is a kind of rough-and-ready
value-of-information analysis.220 The OMB now recommends that agencies
conduct a kind of hybrid cost-benefit analysis as a source of alternate cost-benefit
estimates, at least where longevity is at issue.221
Second, agencies should use QALY-based money estimates of health
benefits where WTP/WTA estimates are not available. This is not a minor
point.222 There is a large empirical literature on WTP/WTA for mortality risks,223
but much less research on WTP/WTA for morbidity;224 and many, perhaps most,
health conditions lack even a single contingent-valuation or revealed preference
study. By contrast, as evidenced by the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis’s
comprehensive compilation of QALY estimates,225 QALY surveys have been
conducted for a large number of conditions. Even where no survey exists for a

219. The FDA sometimes follows this approach, undertaking both traditional and hybrid costbenefit analysis. See, e.g., Food Labeling; Trans Fatty Acids in Nutrition Labeling; Consumer
Research To Consider Nutrient Content Health Claims, 68 Fed. Reg. 41,434, 41,488. (July 11,
2003).
220. On value of information analysis, see, e.g., Maxine Dakins, The Value of the Value of
Information, 5 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 281 (1999). On the usefulness of heuristics,
see generally GERD GIGERENZER ET AL., SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART (1999).
221. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 18, at 30.
222. A dramatic example is provided by the EPA’s cost-benefit analyses in the major arsenic
and radon rulemakings, which employed WTP to avoid chronic bronchitis as an estimate of the cost
of nonfatal cancers, since no WTP data for nonfatal cancers was available. See National Primary
Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic and Clarifications to Compliance and New Source
Contaminants Monitoring, 66 Fed. Reg. 6976, 7012 (Jan. 22, 2001); National Primary Drinking
Water Regulations; Radon-222, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,246, 59,325 (Nov. 2, 1999).
223. See sources cited supra note 56.
224. See Johnson et al., supra note 129, at 642 (“[T]he literature providing monetary health
values is deficient in both breadth and quality.”).
225. See Bell et al., supra note 167.
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particular health state, health classification systems often permit researchers to
extrapolate a valuation for that state from other, surveyed states.226
What about a more robust role for QALYs? When, if ever, should an agency
prefer a QALY-based money estimate to a WTP/WTA amount? The general
welfarist strategy for answering this question is the same as the general strategy
for identifying an appropriate QALY-to-dollar conversion factor: Hybrid costbenefit analysis should be preferred to traditional cost-benefit analysis, over
some range of choice situations, when that increases expected welfare (in
LWUs). Again, the conditions under which this is true will depend on the sorts of
choice situations involved: specifically, the system-designer’s probability
distributions over QALY/LWU ratios, WTP/LWU ratios, and LWU amounts for
these choice situations.
But it is possible to make some general observations. Let us return to the
simple scenario discussed above. A system-designer is considering a range of
binary choice situations that agency decision-makers will face, each involving a
regulatory project with health benefits relative to the status quo and non-health
costs. The designer supposes that the non-health costs will be measured using
WTP/WTA amounts and is now choosing between the following two decision
procedures: traditional cost-benefit analysis, where the health benefits are
measured on a WTP/WTA scale and added to the non-health costs, and hybrid
cost-benefit analysis, where the health benefits are measured on a QALY scale,
converted to dollars at the optimal conversion rate f*, and then added to the nonhealth costs. The designer chooses between these two procedures by determining
which one maximizes expected LWUs, and instructs the decision-makers to use
that procedure.

226. See sources cited supra note 166 (discussing health state classification systems).
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FIGURE 2: CHOOSING BETWEEN TRADITIONAL & HYBRID COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS
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There are two general reasons why hybrid cost-benefit analysis might
produce higher expected LWUs than traditional cost-benefit analysis. First, the
distribution of the WTP/LWU ratio for health benefits might be skewed to the
right or left of the optimal point. In other words, a variant of the traditional
approach in which health benefits are first measured in WTP/WTA, then
multiplied by a constant k, and finally added to non-health costs, also measured
in WTP/WTA, might lead to better results than straight traditional cost-benefit
analysis. This might occur, for example, if the average WTP/LWU ratio for
health benefits is greater or less than the average WTP/LWU ratio for non-health
costs.
FIGURE 3: WTP/LWU RATIOS FOR PROJECT COSTS & BENEFITS

Probability

--- Health Benefits
___

0

Nonhealth Costs

WTP/LWU

In principle, the skewing of the distribution of WTP/LWU for health
benefits, relative to the optimal point, can be corrected by applying a scaling
factor to the WTP amounts.227 Thus, at least in principle, the system-designer
should compare (1) a cost-benefit procedure that measures health in QALYs, and
converts those amounts to dollars using the optimal conversion factor f* to (2) a
cost-benefit procedure that measures health on a WTP/WTA scale, which is then
corrected using the optimal correction factor k*.
In this competition, the QALY-based metric might win out because it has
smaller variance or spread.

227. Cf. Hirth et al., supra note 208, at 340 (discussing use of “calibration factors” to correct
WTP amounts).
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FIGURE 4: CONVERTED QALY/LWU & CORRECTED WTP/LWU RATIOS,
PROJECT HEALTH BENEFITS
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Take the simplest case in which all non-health costs measured in WTP
convert to LWUs at the same rate and in which the designer’s QALY/LWU
distribution and WTP/LWU distribution for health benefits are independent of
the absolute level of benefits and costs, in LWUs. In this simple case, if the ratio
of optimally converted QALYs to LWUs has less “area under the tails” (roughly,
less variance) than the ratio of optimally corrected WTPs to LWUs, then the
QALY metric is better.228 The Appendix demonstrates this rigorously. For each
pairing of health benefits, in LWUs, and non-health costs, in LWUs, the lower
variance of the QALY/LWU distribution means a lower probability that the
QALY metric will reach the incorrect result (that is, choosing the project where
health benefits are less than costs, or choosing the status quo where health
benefits exceed costs).
The idea of variance provides a unifying rubric under which to group the
diverse ways in which QALYs and WTP amounts can fail to track LWUs. Both
(1) the cognitive difficulties that drive a wedge between the QALY or WTP
valuations available to regulators and idealized QALYs or WTP amounts, and (2)
the factors that drive a wedge between idealized QALYs or WTP amounts and
LWUs (such as the wealth effect, dead-anyway effect, and the problem of
background characteristics) can be conceptualized as sources of increased
variance in the QALY/LWU and WTP/LWU ratios.229 This observation also
underscores the point that the choice between hybrid cost-benefit analysis and
228. See infra App. II.
229. To be sure, these various factors and cognitive difficulties determine not only the variance
of the QALY/LWU and WTP/LWU distributions, but also the location of these distributions along
the x-axis, i.e., the absolute level of the average QALY/LWU and WTP/LWU ratio. But that effect,
in principle, can be compensated for through the conversion factor f* and correction factor k*.
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traditional cost-benefit analysis is not clear-cut. It represents an exercise in
optimization, hinging in part on the variance in QALY/LWU and WTP/LWU
ratios in the relevant choice situations. Because the factors producing variance
are different for the two sorts of health metrics (QALYs and WTP), there is no
reason to think that the QALY/LWU variance will always be smaller or larger
than the WTP/LWU variance, and thus no reason to think that hybrid cost-benefit
analysis will always dominate traditional cost-benefit analysis, or vice versa.
C. Why Not Cost-Effectiveness Analysis?
I have argued that a policy-analytic procedure which employs a “hybrid”
cost-benefit analysis, supplementing or displacing traditional cost-benefit
analysis, may increase overall welfare (LWUs) as compared to traditional costbenefit analysis. The observant reader may wonder whether cost-effectiveness
analysis should also be back on the table at this point. As discussed earlier,
welfarists often criticize cost-effectiveness analysis because it deviates from
traditional cost-benefit analysis and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. Now that our
underlying goal is overall welfare, not Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, might not some
version of cost-effectiveness analysis be the optimal procedure for health policy?
The answer is pretty clearly no. Cost-effectiveness analysis, again, is a set of
policy-analytic techniques that monetize non-health impacts but not health,
instead measuring health on some non-monetary scale such as QALYs. The first
variant of cost-effectiveness analysis maximizes health for a given budget. Here,
the shift from Kaldor-Hicks efficiency to overall well-being as the underlying
goal does nothing to salvage the procedure, because it is quite possible that the
net welfare benefits of a health-maximizing exhaustion of the budget are less
than the net benefits of a smaller or even null expenditure. Cost-benefit analysis
tests for that, while cost-effectiveness analysis does not.
The second variant, recall, uses a fixed cut-off ratio to select the best choice.
The problem with this approach, as compared to hybrid cost-benefit analysis, is
not the use of a single cut-off number. Hybrid cost-benefit analysis also does
that, in the form of a single QALY-to-dollar conversion factor. Indeed, hybrid
cost-benefit analysis employing a conversion factor f* and the cut-off ratio
variant of cost-effectiveness analysis employing that same number f* as the cutoff would, I believe, always reach the same results.
The problem with this second variant of cost-effectiveness analysis, rather, is
the abandonment of WTP/WTA valuations of health. I have suggested that
WTP/WTA valuations of health impacts and QALY-to-dollar conversions both
have a useful role in guiding policy choice. First, as stated above, the fact that
traditional cost-benefit analysis and hybrid cost-benefit analysis produce
divergent recommendations in some policy situation has informational value: It
may point to the need for further studies to produce better estimates of
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WTP/WTA or QALY values. Second, given the system-designer’s probability
distributions over WTP/LWU, QALY/LWU, and LWU amounts, traditional costbenefit analysis using WTP/WTA to value health may end up being the welfaremaximizing procedure in some contexts, as compared to a hybrid procedure that
employs QALY-to-dollar conversions to value health.
In short, I suggest that the welfare-maximizing procedure will use QALYbased analysis alongside traditional cost-benefit analysis and, where they
conflict, will sometimes (not always) prefer the results of the latter analysis.
Cost-effectiveness analysis relies solely on QALYs to value health, but since
QALYs are not perfect proxies for LWUs, any more than WTP/WTA amounts,
that seems overly rigid from the point of view of overall welfare.
D. An Example: The Valuation of Lifesaving
What version of cost-benefit analysis, traditional or hybrid, should be
employed to value regulatory measures that cause deaths or save lives? This
question has recently been a matter of considerable political controversy and
concomitant scholarly discussion, triggered by the EPA’s cost-benefit analysis in
connection with the “Clear Skies” legislative initiative. The EPA in an alternative
estimate used an age-adjusted VSL figure: specifically, $3.7 million for deaths of
individuals under seventy, and $2.3 million for deaths of individuals over
seventy.230 Vociferous protests by senior citizen groups ensued,231 prompting the
OMB to issue a memorandum instructing the EPA and other agencies not to use
age-adjusted VSL.232 In the same memorandum, the OMB discusses valuation of
death or life-saving through “VSLYs,” that is, calculating the numbers of lifeyears lost or saved and multiplying by a conversion factor to yield a dollar
230. See U.S. EPA, TECHNICAL ADDENDUM, supra note 15, at 35-37. Recall that VSLs are
derived from WTP/WTA to avoid small risks of death. If an individual is WTP $3 to avoid a 1 in 1
million risk of death, then the VSL figure implied by that valuation is $3 million. Cost-benefit
analysis with age-invariant VSLs looks at the average VSL, observed in the entire universe of
contingent valuation and revealed preference studies (involving subjects of different ages), and
employs that single figure (say, $6 million) to value each death. The age-adjusted VSL
methodology seeks to determine the average VSL of individuals in a particular age group, and then
uses that age-specific VSL number to value deaths in that age group. For a good discussion of
VSLs, age adjustments, and VSLYs, see Lowenstein & Revesz, supra note 15.
231. For a description of the controversy, see Lowenstein & Revesz, supra note 15, at 10,957;
Robert W. Hahn & Scott Wallsten, Whose Life Is Worth More? (And Why Is It Horrible To Ask?),
WASH. POST, June 1, 2003, at B03.
232. Memorandum from John D. Graham, U.S. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to the President’s
Mgmt. Council (May 30, 2003) [hereinafter Graham Memorandum], available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/pmc_benefit_cost_memo.pdf; accord OFFICE OF MGMT. &
BUDGET, supra note 18, at 30.
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amount. If the life-years are priced at a constant conversion factor, and if the
years lived would be years of perfect health, then this “VSLY” method is just the
kind of QALY-based or hybrid cost-benefit analysis that I have been
discussing.233 However, the OMB memorandum encourages agencies to use an
age-adjusted VSLY approach (in particular, to use a dollar conversion factor that
would price life-years saved or lost at a higher amount for senior citizens than for
younger individuals).234
In short, four different cost-benefit approaches to valuing life are now on the
table: (1) using an age-invariant VSL figure (e.g., $6 million), which is standard
practice; (2) using an age-adjusted VSL figure; (3) using QALY-to-dollar
conversions, i.e., converting each life-year lost or saved by regulation to dollars
at an age-invariant conversion rate; and (4) using age-adjusted VSLYs, i.e.,
converting life-years to dollars at an age-specific rate. The OMB memorandum in
response to the Clear Skies controversy, and more recently its authoritative
general guide to agency cost-benefit analysis, discourages QALY-to-dollar
conversions as well as age-adjusted VSLs.235
What is the right approach? If Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is the underlying
criterion, then age-adjusted VSLs are ideal, at least if they can be measured
accurately and cheaply. A decision procedure that sums fully individualized
WTP/WTA amounts will track potential Pareto improvements.236 Measurement
problems may push in the direction of age-invariant VSLs, which represent an
average of VSLs across age groups. But VSLs of some kind are preferable to
VSLYs (either age-invariant, i.e., QALYs, or age-adjusted VSLYs), since the use
of VSLYs to value mortality has no grounding in Kaldor-Hicks efficiency or the
WTP/WTA methodology. In short, conventional economic wisdom prefers a
VSL measure and is skeptical of QALY-to-dollar conversions and age-adjusted
VSLYs.237

233. See generally Lowenstein & Revesz, supra note 15 (discussing life-years approach);
Sunstein, supra note 192 (same).
234. Graham Memorandum, supra note 232; accord OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note
18, at 30.
235. See sources cited supra note 232. By recommending age-adjusted VSLYs, OMB
discourages age-invariant VSLYs, i.e., straight QALY-to-dollar conversions.
236. This statement is only roughly true—a point that traditional proponents of cost-benefit
analysis often overlook—because of the Boadway paradox. See source cited supra note 24.
237. See, e.g., Lowenstein & Revesz, supra note 15, at 10,963-69. The VSLY method, at least
in its simplest variant, values increments to longevity at a linear rate: either a single rate for the
entire population (age-invariant VSLYs), or a rate specific to an age group (age-adjusted VSLYs).
See infra note 246. In either event, a policy that adds five years of longevity (say) to the lives of
some individuals in a particular age bracket will be assigned a monetary value five times that of a
policy that adds one year. But WTP/WTA for the risk of losing five years of life need not be five
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But what if overall welfare, not Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, is the gold
standard? The answer, then, is trickier.
Consider, first, the case in which the system-designer (OMB) is choosing an
optimal procedure for valuing life across a range of choice situations in which all
the individuals whose lives are at stake fall in roughly the same “background
equivalent class”: They have equally valuable non-health attributes. A crucial
question for this case (and for the more general analysis too) is whether
spectators are risk-prone, risk-neutral, or risk-averse with respect to
longevity238—that is, whether the LWU value of an incremental year increases,
stays constant, or decreases as affected individuals become older. It seems
intuitively plausible that longevity, like wealth, has a diminishing marginal
impact on overall well-being; and this assumption is bolstered by some survey
work. Johannesson and Johansson surveyed 1000 Swedes for their policy
preferences as between equally costly programs that differed in the number of
lives saved and the age of the persons saved. Integrating the survey responses
with life expectancy data, they determined that: “[T]hree life-years gained for 50year-olds are judged equivalent to one life-year gained for 30-year-olds, and ten
life-years gained among 70-year-olds are judged equivalent to one life-year
gained for 30-year-olds.”239 Cropper et al. reached similar results in an earlier
U.S. study: “[T]he median respondent in our surveys places more weight on
saving young persons than he would if people were weighted strictly by life
expectancy.”240
If longevity has a diminishing marginal impact on overall well-being, then

times WTP/WTA for the risk of losing one year of life, given wealth effects, horizon effects, the
dead-anyway effect, and so on. Therein lies the basic criticism of VSLYs by those who see costbenefit analysis as a tool to implement Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 156-159.
239. Magnus Johannesson & Per-Olov Johansson, Is the Valuation of a QALY Gained
Independent of Age? Some Empirical Evidence, 16 J. HEALTH ECON. 589, 595 (1997).
240. Maureen L. Cropper et al., Preferences for Life Saving Programs: How the Public
Discounts Time and Age, 8 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 243, 244 (1994). Cropper does not find that the
utility of lifesaving decreases continuously with the age of the person saved. Rather, “[e]ight 60year-olds are judged equivalent to saving one 20-year-old” and “eleven 60-year-olds are judged
equivalent to saving one 30-year-old,” suggesting “that the utility attached to saving an anonymous
life is a hump-shaped function of the age of the person saved.” Id. at 244-45. For a parallel survey
focused on the social value of health improvements at different ages, see Jan J.V. Busschbach et al.,
The Utility of Health at Different Stages in Life: A Quantitative Approach, 37 SOC. SCI. & MED.
153 (1993). A recent review of studies asking respondents to prioritize health benefits for different
members of the population finds that “most studies suggest that health gains to the old are weighted
less.” Paul Dolan et al., QALY Maximisation and People’s Preferences: A Methodological Review
of the Literature, 14 HEALTH ECON. 197, 202 (2005).
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the LWU value of increments to longevity is smaller as individuals get older, and
is a sublinear function of years saved. The monetized QALY value of increments
to longevity is constant as individuals get older, and is a linear function of years
saved. The traditional age-invariant VSL value is, of course, constant as
individuals get older and does not vary with years saved. The age-adjusted VSL
value may not vary much as individuals get older, and does not vary with years
saved.
The fact that age-adjusted VSLs do not vary much is initially surprising, but
not on reflection. If age-adjusted VSLs were a perfect proxy for LWUs, then
these values would decrease with age, as long as life expectancy is decreasing.241
But cognitive errors, the dead-anyway effect, shorter investment horizons for the
aged, and other distorting effects (relative to LWUs) all mean that age-adjusted
VSLs need not decrease with age, even when life expectancy does. Alberini et
al., in a contingent-valuation study, found that WTP to avoid mortality risk did
not decline with age among Americans, even after age seventy.242 Kerry Smith et
al., in one estimation based on wage data, found that VSL increases with age.243
Aldy and Viscusi, in a more recent wage study, estimate an “inverted U”
relationship, with VSL increasing and then decreasing with age. For example,
individuals aged eighteen to twenty-two have a VSL of $3.13 million; VSL
increases until age twenty-eight to thirty-two (where it equals $5.76 million) and
then decreases, reaching $2.51 million for individuals aged fifty-eight to sixtytwo.244
Finally, if age-adjusted VSLYs are calculated by dividing the age-adjusted
VSL by discounted life-expectancy, these amounts, too, will be an “inverted U”
function of age;245 and, for a given age, will be a linear function of years saved.246

241. More precisely, the LWU value of life remaining should decrease with age, assuming life
expectancy decreases and the value of background characteristics does not change.
242. Alberini et al., supra note 104, at 771. WTP declined among Canadians after age seventy.
243. V. Kerry Smith et al., Do the Near-Elderly Value Mortality Risks Differently?, 86 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 423, 427-28 (2004).
244. See Joseph E. Aldy & W. Kip Viscusi, Age Variations in Workers’ Value of Statistical Life
19-23, 42, 49-50 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10,199, 2003), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10199. For reviews of the literature on how VSL varies with age, see
id. at 1-4; Hammitt, QALYs Versus WTP, supra note 1, at 992-94; and Revesz & Stavins, supra
note 191, at 21. Two recent studies are Thomas J. Kniesner et al., Life-Cycle Consumption and the
Age-Adjusted Value of Life (Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Discussion Paper
No. 459, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=580761; and Anna Alberini et al., Willingness
To Pay To Reduce Mortality Risks: Evidence from a Three-Country Contingent Valuation Study
(Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Working Paper No. 2004.111, 2004), available at
http://www.feem.it/NR/rdonlyres/8904A715-57A3-4FDD-A7E9-52318537EEFF/1258/11104.pdf.
245. See Aldy &Viscusi, supra note 244, at 23-24.
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The following graphs suggest how LWUs, and the different proxies for
LWUs, might correlate with longevity and age.247
FIGURE 5: VALUATIONS OF INCREASING INCREMENTS TO LONGEVITY FOR
INDIVIDUALS OF CONSTANT AGE (20 YEARS OLD)
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246. The age-adjusted VSLY technique, in its simplest variant, determines an age-specific
VSLY for each age, and then monetizes the change to someone’s longevity induced by a policy
choice by multiplying the life-years saved or lost by a single age-adjusted VSLY determined by the
individual’s age in the status quo. It is this variant of the approach that is linear in changes to
longevity, and that I focus on in this Section. More complicated variants would incorporate a
discount rate into the policy analysis or use a different age-specific VSLY for each year added or
lost (so that the first incremental year of a policy that adds three years to the life of a fifty year old
would be valued at the age fifty VSLY, the second year at the age fifty-one VSLY, and the third
year at the age fifty-two VSLY). I do not evaluate these refinements to the approach here.
247. In the first graph, the individuals are aged twenty, and five- to fifty-year increments to
longevity are valued using converted QALYs ($100,000 per QALY); unadjusted VSL ($6 million);
age-adjusted VSL (from Aldy & Viscusi, supra note 244, at 42); age-adjusted VSLYs (calculated
by dividing the age-adjusted VSL by the age-specific life expectancy without discounting—since
nondiscounted QALYs and LWUs are employed—and then multiplying by the increment to
longevity); and LWUs (on the assumption that the LWU value of a life is the square root of its
length). In the second graph, the individuals range from age twenty through sixty, and a ten-year
increment to longevity is valued using the same measures.
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Dollars (Millions) or LWUs

FIGURE 6: VALUATIONS OF A CONSTANT (10 YEAR) INCREMENT TO LONGEVITY
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TABLE 2: VARIANCE IN THE DOLLARS/LWU RATIO248
Varying Increments to Longevity
(20 years), Individual of Constant Age
Dollar Measure
Variance
Log (Dollars/LWU)
in ascending order
Converted QALY
0.0017
Age-Adj. VSLY
0.0017
Unadj. VSL
0.0683
Age-Adj. VSL
0.0683

Constant Increment to Longevity
(10 years), Individuals of Varying Age
Dollar Measure
Variance
Log (Dollars/LWU)
in ascending order
Converted QALY
0.0045
Unadj. VSL
0.0045
Age-Adj. VSL
0.0124
Age-Adj. VSLY
0.0282

These analyses suggest that, for sets of choice situations where the age of
persons whose longevity is affected by agency decisions is constant, but
increments to longevity vary, QALYs and age-adjusted VSLYs will correlate
more closely with LWUs than do age-invariant VSLs or age-adjusted VSLs. In
other words, the variance in the QALY/LWU and VSLY/LWU ratio will be

248. For each set of longevity changes (constant age and increasing increments to longevity, or
constant increments and increasing age), I calculated the log QALY/LWU, log VSL/LWU, log adj
VSL/LWU, and log VSLY/LWU ratio for each change, and then calculated the variance.
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lower than the variance in the VSL/LWU or adjusted VSL/LWU ratio.249 For sets
of choice situations where increments to longevity are held constant but age
varies, QALYs and age-invariant VSLs will correlate more closely with LWUs
than do age-adjusted VSLYs and age-adjusted VSLs.
What if background characteristics are allowed to vary? Consider the
simplest version of this case, where the individuals are healthy and vary in the
value of their background characteristics but the longevity changes do not change
the value of those characteristics. The LWU value for the loss or addition of a
life-year to an individual will be the product of a person-specific scaling factor
(for background characteristics) and an amount that decreases as the individual
gets older.250 The QALY value for the loss or addition of a life-year to an
individual will be constant, regardless of the individual’s background
characteristics and age. QALYs, in this context, are clearly imperfect proxies for
LWUs. Age-invariant VSLs, age-adjusted VSLs, and age-adjusted VSLYs could
clearly be better proxies for LWUs if they were adjusted for background
characteristics: if individuals with greater consumption, or better sex lives, were
given greater VSLs, age-adjusted VSLs, or age-adjusted VSLYs. Agencies do
not thus adjust VSLs, and certainly should consider doing so.251 Until they do,
however, it would seem that hybrid cost-benefit analysis incorporating monetized
QALYs is a better way to value lifesaving than the alternatives.
This conclusion, I should stress, is no more than an educated guess. Much
more analysis remains to be done. My rough and ready treatment in this Section
considered only the two limiting cases where the number of years saved or lost
by agency action varies across choice situations but the age of those affected
does not, or vice versa. More realistically, the instructions that OMB or other
system-designers provide to agency decision-makers about the valuation of
longevity will cover a more heterogeneous range of choice situations—where
both the number of years saved or lost and the age of those affected, as well as
their background characteristics, can vary. The most important point of this
Section is not the substantive recommendation to use QALYs in valuing
longevity, but is rather methodological: None of the alternatives on the table
(QALYs, age-adjusted VSLYs, age-invariant VSLs, or age-adjusted VSLs) are
perfect proxies for LWUs when it comes to changes in longevity, and the choice
249. This statement about variance assumes, of course, that QALYs have been converted to
dollars using an appropriate conversion factor. Otherwise the QALY/LWU ratio could have a
different variance from the VSLY/LWU or VSL/LWU variance simply because of the difference in
units. In the variance tables above I have used the variance in the logarithm of the dollar/LWU ratio
to wash out the scaling effect.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 100, 164-165.
251. See Cass R. Sunstein, Valuing Life: A Plea for Disaggregtion, 54 DUKE L.J. 385, 386-89
(2004).
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between them is a complicated exercise in optimization for OMB or other bodies
(“system-designers”) that guide agency decision-makers in performing costbenefit analysis.
E. Recommendations and Summary
The analysis in this Part has been quite complicated, so let me summarize
the main prescriptions that emerge from it. Although, in principle, administrative
decision-makers could seek to maximize welfare directly—by measuring the
welfare effects of their choices on an LWU scale, rather than a dollar scale—this
approach would amount to a radical change in current policy-analytic practice. I
have therefore focused on a less radical possibility: nontraditional or “hybrid”
cost-benefit analysis, where the scale for measuring policy impacts is a monetary
scale, but the dollar amounts for certain welfare effects, such as health, are
calculated by converting QALYs to dollars (or in some other nontraditional way)
rather than by employing the traditional WTP/WTA methodology.
“Hybrid” cost-benefit analysis is no pipe dream. The FDA has used the
approach in almost twenty rulemakings. This Part has described the FDA’s
activities, and has taken a first stab at analyzing how hybrid cost-benefit analysis
should be structured. To begin: At what rate should QALYs be converted to
dollars? On this issue, I have criticized the FDA’s approach (which is to derive
the conversion factor from a VSL value) and have argued that the choice of
conversion factor is, rather, a pragmatic matter of maximizing expected LWUs.
The system-designer who specifies the conversion factor (OMB, or the
Administrator or policy office of a particular agency) will need to estimate, at
least in a rough and ready way, how QALY measures of health effects and
WTP/WTA measures of non-health effects correlate with LWUs, and should
choose a QALY-to-dollar conversion factor that maximizes expected LWUs
given these estimates. There is no natural rate at which QALYs convert to
dollars. The conversion factor should be seen not as a mirror of some spurious
economic reality, but rather as a numerical setting chosen to optimize the
functioning of a decision-making tool, namely cost-benefit analysis.
What role should QALY-to-dollar conversions play in cost-benefit analysis?
First, these numbers should be used in lieu of WTP/WTA amounts where
WTP/WTA data are not available. Second, where both QALY and WTP/WTA
measures of a particular type of health effect are available, agencies should
conduct cost-benefit analysis using both measures. If the policy prescriptions
resulting from the parallel analyses differ, the agency should reexamine its
WTP/WTA data. (In effect, then, the QALY measure functions as a rough test of
the value of acquiring further WTP/WTA information.) If the divergence persists,
then the agency will need to choose between the WTP/WTA and converted
QALY measure. That choice, like the initial choice of conversion factor, is a
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pragmatic one—a matter of maximizing expected LWUs. System-designers
should instruct agencies to be guided by hybrid over traditional cost-benefit
analysis, or vice versa, depending on the designers’ estimates or rough guesses of
the correlation between WTP/WTA, QALYs, and LWUs.
For all the reasons discussed in Parts III and IV, neither QALYs nor
WTP/WTA amounts are perfect proxies for LWUs. In some contexts, traditional
cost-benefit analysis will be a superior tool for maximizing overall welfare. In
other contexts—particularly where background characteristics such as wealth do
not vary much among those affected by policy choice, or where available
WTP/WTA data are not sensitive to background characteristics—nontraditional
cost-benefit analysis will be superior. For reasons discussed in Section V.D.,
measuring the cost of death may well be a policy context where nontraditional
cost-benefit analysis is superior. The existing literature on the choice between
QALYs, age-invariant VSLs, age-adjusted VSLs, and age-adjusted VSLYs
completely misses the crucial point that none of these measures are perfectly
correlated with the welfare value of longevity. Longevity, like money and many
other goods, quite likely has a diminishing marginal impact on individual and
overall welfare. Thus the LWU value of a given life expectancy decreases as
individuals age, but the QALY and age-invariant VSL values remain constant,
and the age-adjusted VSL or VSLY values may increase.252 And both ageinvariant and age-adjusted VSLs, by contrast with QALYs and LWUs, are not
sensitive to changes in the amount of life expectancy holding age constant. This
admittedly preliminary analysis suggests that, absent adjustments to VSL or
VSLY values for wealth or other background characteristics, QALYs are
probably a better measure of the value of lifesaving than alternatives.
CONCLUSION
This Article has provided a novel, welfarist view of QALYs. Although the
academic literature on QALYs is huge, encompassing a wealth of survey data,
cost-effectiveness research, and ancillary analysis,253 QALYs have (until
recently) been little used by governmental bodies in the United States254 —in part
because their policy role has been poorly understood. Welfare economists and
252. As mentioned earlier, age-adjusted VSLs and age-adjusted VSLYs both may have an
“inverted U” shape, first increasing and only later decreasing with age. See supra text
accompanying notes 244-246. If, for example, the age-adjusted VSL and VSLY for a fifty year-old
are greater than for a forty year-old, both methods will place a larger money value on an X-year
increment to the fifty year-old’s expected longevity than on the same, X-year increment to the forty
year-old’s expected longevity.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 3-7.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 8-20.
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other welfarists, who think that well-being related constructs such as KaldorHicks efficiency or overall welfare should play a large role in determining
governmental choices, will be unpersuaded by the “extrawelfarist” perspective on
QALYs that dominates the public health literature. Welfarists wonder: Why
should a policymaker ever use QALYs rather than a WTP/WTA scale to measure
health benefits?255 I have offered an innovative answer to that question, making
claims along the way that will undoubtedly surprise many welfarists.
In particular (here building on my prior work with Eric Posner), I have
argued that policymakers should focus on overall well-being, not Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency, and that cost-benefit analysis is no normative gold standard, but
simply a decision-making tool that can help policymakers maximize overall
welfare.256 I have suggested that overall well-being is, in principle, measurable in
LWUs (lifetime welfare units), and that QALYs and WTP/WTA amounts are
both imperfect, practicable estimates of LWUs.257 WTP/WTA valuations deviate
from LWUs for a variety of reasons—wealth effects, the “dead anyway” effect,
risk and tradeoff biases, and others—and although QALYs certainly have their
own flaws they can, in some contexts, furnish an improved scale of welfare. I
have proposed that QALYs should function, not as the nonmonetary maximand
in a cost-effectiveness analysis, but rather as a valuation of health that is
converted into dollars using some conversion factor and then incorporated into a
monetized cost-benefit analysis. And I have analyzed how this nontraditional or
“hybrid” cost-benefit analysis should be structured: in particular, what the
optimal QALY-to-dollar conversion rate is, and when QALY-to-dollar
conversions should displace WTP/WTA amounts as the monetary measure of
health.258

255. See supra text accompanying notes 31-59 (discussing welfarist and extrawelfarist views of
QALYs).
256. See supra text accompanying notes 57-59.
257. See supra Parts II-IV.
258. See supra Part V.
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Appendix I: Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, and How It Can
Deviate from Traditional Cost-Benefit Analysis259
The following example illustrates the two variants of cost-effectiveness
analysis (fixed budget and cut-off ratio), using QALYs as the metric of
effectiveness, and demonstrating how both variants can deviate from traditional
cost-benefit analysis.
Imagine that a governmental body can implement two general programs,
which are not mutually exclusive. Each program can be implemented through a
variety of mutually exclusive subprograms; if one subprogram within the group
is picked, another cannot be.260
A subprogram is “dominated” by another within the same general program if
the first has smaller total effectiveness (QALYs) and greater total costs.261 A
dominated subprogram can be eliminated from consideration; nothing is lost,
along either the health or cost dimension, by replacing a dominated subprogram
with the one that dominates it.
Table 1 shows the total dollar cost of each subprogram as well as its total
QALY benefit, with “dominated” subprograms eliminated. The subprograms are
listed in order of total effectiveness. To be clear, the numbers in this table are the
total costs for each possible subprogram, relative to the status quo of inaction.
For example, if subprogram A is picked, the total cost will be $1 million and the
total QALY benefit will be 10 QALYs. If subprogram B is picked, the total cost
will be $2 million and the total QALY benefit will be 14 QALYs. A and B are
mutually exclusive, and thus cannot be jointly picked. However, A and F are not
mutually exclusive. If they are jointly picked, the total cost of that policy, relative
to the status quo, will be $3 million and the total QALY benefit will be 22
QALYs.

259. The numerical example used in this section is based on Karlsson & Johannesson, supra
note 26.
260. By contrast with standard presentations of cost-effectiveness analysis, my example
assumes, for simplicity, that the subprograms are indivisible—they cannot be partially
implemented. For each program, the decision-maker has the choice of not implementing any of its
subprograms or fully implementing only one of its subprograms.
261. Strictly, this should be: Subprogram P1 is dominated by subprogram P2 if (1) P1’s health
benefits are less than P2’s and P1’s costs are greater than or equal to P2’s, or (2) P1’s health
benefits are less than or equal to P2’s and P1’s costs are greater than P2’s.
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TABLE 1: TOTAL COSTS AND QALYS OF POSSIBLE SUBPROGRAMS
Subprograms
A
B
C
D
E

Program I
Total Cost
(millions)
$1
$2
$3
$4
$5

Total Benefit
(QALYs)
10
14
16
19
20

Subprograms
F
G
H

Program II
Total Cost
(millions)
$2
$4
$5.5

Total Benefit
(QALYs)
12
16
18

The next table shows the incremental cost, effectiveness, and costeffectiveness ratios of each subprogram, relative to the subprogram above it in
the table.
TABLE 2: INCREMENTAL COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF SUBPROGRAMS
Subprograms
A
B
C
D
E

Program I
∆Cost
∆QALYs
(millions)
$1
10
$1
4
$1
2
$1
3
$1
1

∆Cost/
∆QALYs
$100,000
$250,000
$500,000
$333,333
$1,000,000

Subprograms
F
G
H

Program II
∆Cost
∆QALYs
(millions)
$2
12
$2
4
$1.5
2

∆Cost/
∆QALYs
$166,667
$500,000
$750,000

The fixed-budget variant of cost-effectiveness analysis tells the decisionmaker to choose that mix of subprograms which maximizes QALYs for the given
budget. Assume that, in the case at hand, the budget to be maximized is $4
million. Then the QALY-maximizing mix of subprograms is B and F. No other
mix of subprograms that costs less than or equal to $4 million produces more
QALYs.262
What about the cut-off ratio variant of cost-effectiveness analysis? The
decision rule here is as follows. “Weakly dominated” subprograms are eliminated
from consideration. A subprogram is “weakly dominated” if its incremental costeffectiveness ratio is greater than the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio of the
subprogram immediately below it in the table. In the current example,
subprogram C is weakly dominated. Then, incremental cost-effectiveness ratios
for the remaining subprograms are recalculated, as shown in Table 3. Finally,

262. In the simplified case at hand, the budget maximizing mix of subprograms can be
identified by inspection. In more complicated cases, if certain assumptions are made about the
divisibility of subprograms and the constancy of returns to scale, the budget-maximizing mix can
be identified using a decision rule that looks to incremental cost-effectiveness ratios. See
Johanesson, supra note 26, at 484-85.
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“the [subprogram] within each cluster that has the highest incremental costeffectiveness ratio that is equal to or below the [cut-off ratio] should be
implemented.”263 For example, if the cut-off ratio is $200,000 per QALY, then
the government applying this decision rule picks subprograms A and F.
TABLE 3: INCREMENTAL COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF SUBPROGRAMS, EXCLUDING
WEAKLY DOMINATED (SUBPROGRAM C)
Subprograms
A
B

Program I
∆ Cost
∆QALYs
(millions)
$1
10
$1
4

∆Cost/
∆QALYs
$100,000
$250,000

D
E

$2
$1

$400,000
$1 million

5
1

Subprograms
F
G
H

Program II
∆ Cost
∆QALYs
(millions)
$2
12
$2
4
$1.5
2

∆Cost/
∆QALYs
$166,667
$500,000
$750,000

To see how both variants of cost-effectiveness analysis can deviate from
traditional cost-benefit analysis, consider the following table, which shows the
total costs and the total QALYs as well as total WTP for the different
subprograms in Table 1—on the assumption that Program I benefits a population
all members of which are willing to pay a constant $300,000 per QALY, while
Program II benefits a population all members of which are willing to pay only a
constant $100,000 per QALY.
TABLE 4: PROGRAM COSTS AND PROGRAM BENEFITS (BENEFICIARIES OF
PROGRAM I ARE WILLING TO PAY $300,000 PER QALY, WHILE BENEFICIARIES
OF PROGRAM II ARE WILLING TO PAY $100,000 PER QALY)
Subprograms

Program I
Total Cost Total
(millions) Benefit
(QALYs)

A
B
C
D
E

$1
$2
$3
$4
$5

10
14
16
19
20

Total
Benefit
(WTP,
millions)
$3
$4.2
$4.8
$5.7
$6.0

Subprograms

Program II
Total Cost Total
(millions) Benefit
(QALYs)

F
G
H

$2
$4
$5.5

12
16
18

Total
Benefits
(WTP,
millions)
$1.2
$1.6
$1.8

The fixed-budget variant of cost-effectiveness analysis, with a budget of $4
million, tells the government to pick subprograms B and F. But aggregate WTP

263. Johannesson, supra note 26, at 484.
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for the health benefits would be greater if the government spent the $4 million on
subprogram D instead ($5.7 million versus $5.4 million). The cut-off ratio
variant, with a ratio of $200,000 per QALY (the average of the two populations)
tells the government to pick subprograms A and F—spending a total of $3
million. But aggregate WTP would be increased by spending the $3 million on
subprogram C ($4.8 million versus $4.2 million). The best choice of all, as per
traditional cost-benefit analysis, would be to spend only $2 million on
subprogram B. All of the Program II subprograms have greater total money costs
than benefits. In Program I, by moving from subprogram D to C we save $1
million in costs and give up only $0.9 million in benefits; and by moving again
from C to B, we save $1 million in costs and give up only $0.6 million in
benefits.
Assume now that all individuals in both populations are willing to pay a
constant $200,000 per QALY. In that case, the costs and benefits of the various
subprograms are as follows:
TABLE 5: PROGRAM COSTS AND PROGRAM BENEFITS (ALL BENEFICIARIES ARE
WILLING TO PAY $200,000 PER QALY)
Subprograms

Program I
Total
Total
Cost
Benefit
(millions) (QALYs)

A
B
C
D
E

$1
$2
$3
$4
$5

10
14
16
19
20

Total
Benefit
(WTP,
millions)
$2
$2.8
$3.2
$3.8
$4.0

Subprograms

Program II
Total
Total
Cost
Benefit
(millions) (QALYs)

F
G
H

$2
$4
$5.5

12
16
18

Total
Benefits
(WTP,
millions)
$2.4
$3.2
$3.6

As before, the fixed-budget variant of cost-effectiveness analysis maximizes
QALYs for a budget of $4 million by picking subprograms B and F. As before,
the cut-off ratio variant using the $200,000 per QALY cut-off selects
subprograms A and F. But this time, with WTP constant at $200,000 per QALY,
traditional cost-benefit analysis also selects A and F, as can be seen by
inspection.
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Appendix II: Hybrid Cost-Benefit Analysis

264

I. THE OPTIMAL QALY-TO-DOLLAR CONVERSION FACTOR
When choosing between the status quo and a project that will yield q
QALYs in health benefits while costing w dollars,265 a decision-maker given a
QALY-to-dollar conversion factor f will implement the project if and only if
fq > w . The system-designer, having a subjective probability distribution with
respect to the levels of health benefits in QALYs and non-health costs in WTPs,
as well as their respective ratios to LWUs, should try to determine a fixed value
of f that, when used by the decision-maker, will yield the greatest overall increase
in LWUs.
A. The General Case
Let Af be defined for all f ∈ R+ as the set of pairs q, w ∈ (R+)2, such
that fq > w . In a choice situation where a project will cost w dollars and yield q
QALYs in benefits, a decision-maker using a fixed QALY-to-dollar conversion
factor, f, will select the project if and only if q, w ∈ A f .
Let p(r,s,q,w) be the probability density function of continuous random
variables R, S, Q, and W where
R represents the QALY/LWU ratio for health benefits,
S represents the WTP/LWU ratio for non-health costs,
Q represents the health benefits, measured in QALYs, and
W represents the non-health costs, measured in WTP.
Then, the expected change in LWUs from the implementation of the project
using any conversion factor, f, is

⎛q

w⎞

∫∫∫∫ ⎜⎝ r − s ⎟⎠ p(r,s,q,w) dr ds dq dw ;
Af R2

264. Many thanks to Craig Phillips for preparing this Appendix.
265. Assume here that all of the costs are non-health costs, directly measurable in WTPs, and
that all of the benefits are health benefits, directly measurable in QALYs.
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and so the optimal QALY-to-dollar conversion factor will be the value of f that
maximizes the above function.
B. If r and s are independent of q and w, and if r is independent of s, then the
E (1 )
optimal value of f will be f0 = E ( 1r ) .
s

( )

Because of the above independence assumptions, p can be represented as the
product of p1, the density function of R, p2, the density function of S, and p3, the
density function of Q and W.

⎛⎛ q ⎞ ⎛ w ⎞⎞

∫∫∫∫ ⎜⎜⎝ ⎜⎝ r ⎟⎠ − ⎜⎝ s ⎟⎠ ⎟⎟⎠ p (r ) p (s ) p (q ,w)dr ds dq dw
1

2

3

Af R2

⎛ 1
⎞
1
= ∫∫ ⎜⎜ q ∫ p1 (r )dr − w∫ p2 (s )ds ⎟⎟ p3 (q , w) dq dw
r
s
Af ⎝ R
R
⎠
⎛ ⎛1⎞
⎛ 1 ⎞⎞
= ∫∫ ⎜⎜ qE ⎜ ⎟ − wE ⎜ ⎟ ⎟⎟ p3 (q, w)dq dw .
⎝r⎠
⎝ s ⎠⎠
Af ⎝
When the conversion factor is set at f 0 , the increase in overall LWUs is
determined by integrating over the set A f 0 , which is the set of all q, w ∈ (R+)2
E (1 )
such that q E (1r ) > w or, equivalently, where qE ( 1r ) − wE (1s ) > 0 . The expected
s
increase in overall LWUs thus reaches its maximum when the decision-maker
uses f0 as the conversion factor.

( )

C. When (1) the probability density function, u, of the log of the QALY/LWU ratio
is symmetric about its mean, log r0, increasing only when r < r0; (2) the
WTP/LWU ratio for costs is fixed; and (3) the value of the probability density
function for costs and benefits, v(c,b), is such that v(x,y) = v(y,x), the optimal
conversion factor, f* , is rs0 , where s is the fixed WTP/LWU ratio for costs.
Let
s be the fixed WTP/LWU ratio for costs,
r0 be such that u has its mean at log r0,
f be the QALY-to-dollar conversion factor,
R be the continuous random variable representing the QALY/LWU ratio,
u(log r) be the probability density function of log R,
u be independent of v and increasing when r < r0 and decreasing
otherwise,
U(x) be the cumulative distribution function for log R, and
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the probability density function of the costs and benefits in LWUs,
v(c,b), be such that, for all x,y ∈ R+, v(x,y) = v(y,x).
Let x,y ∈ R+, such that x ≥ y.
When b = x and c = y, there will be a loss of x – y whenever frx < sy , or

r<

sy
fx

.

When b = y and c = x, there will be a loss of x – y whenever fry > sx , or

r>

sx
fy

.

If there is a single QALY-to-dollar conversion factor that minimizes the sum
of the probabilities that r <

and that r >

sy
fx

sx
fy

for all x, y ∈ R+, then that factor

will be the optimal conversion factor.
The probability that r <

sy
fx

is

sy
log fx

1

−∞

−∞

log

sy
fx

∫ u(log r )d (log r ) = ∫ u(log r )d (log r ) + ∫ u(log r )d (log r ) ,
1

and, similarly, the probability that r >

sx
fy

is

+∞

1

+∞

log sx
fy

log sx
fy

1

∫ u(log r )d (log r ) = ∫ u(log r )d (log r ) + ∫ u(log r )d (log r ) .

In order to find the value of f that minimizes these probabilities, we
differentiate the sum of these two probabilities with respect to f, so that
log fx
⎞
⎛ 1
d ⎜
⎟
u (log r )d (log r ) + ∫ u (log r )d (log r )⎟
∫
⎜
df ⎜ log sx
⎟
1
⎠
⎝ fy
sy
⎛ log fx
⎞
d ⎜
⎟
(
)
(
)
u
log
r
d
log
r
=
⎟⎟
df ⎜⎜ log∫sx
fy
⎝
⎠
d
1
(
=
U (log syfx ) − U (log sxfy )) = − u log syfx − u log sxfy .
df
f
sy

((

(

Let f* be such that u log

sy
f* x

) (

))

) = u (log ). It follows from the above that the
sx
f* y

sum of (1) the probability of error when costs are x and benefits are y and (2) the
probability of error when costs are y and benefits are x reaches its minimum for
all x, y ∈ (R+)2 when f = f* . Because u (log r ) is symmetrical about its
mean, log r0 , it follows that if f* =

s
r0

, then:
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) = u (log ) = u(log(r ) + log( )) = u(log(r ) − log( )) = u(log ).
r0 y
x

y
x

0

y
x

0

The optimal WTP/QALY conversion factor is therefore f* =

s
r0

sx
f* y

.

II. CHOOSING BETWEEN QALYS AND WTPS AS THE MEASURE OF HEALTH
BENEFITS
Let the WTP/LWU ratio for costs of a set of projects be fixed at s and let the
random variables Rw and Rq represent the WTP/LWU and converted
QALY/LWU ratios for the health benefits, respectively. Assume that Rw and Rq
are independent of the levels of costs and benefits in LWUs. Then, if the
probability density functions, pw (r ) of Rw and pq (r ) of Rq , are such that

∫

x
−∞

pq (r )dr < ∫

x
−∞

pw (r )dr for every x < s and

∫

+∞
x

pq (r )dr < ∫

+∞
x

pw (r )dr for

every x > s , then using a converted QALY measurement of benefits, rather than
a direct dollar measurement, will yield greater expected overall welfare in
LWUs.
If c > b, then the project will be implemented at a loss if sc < rb, or r > scb ,
when r is the ratio of the monetized benefit measure (WTP or converted QALYs)
to LWUs. By hypothesis, because scb > s, the probability that the project will be
implemented at a loss is greater when measuring benefits directly in WTP than
with converted QALYs. Analogous reasoning yields the same result where c <
b, and so measuring benefits in converted QALYs will yield greater expected
overall LWUs than a direct dollar measurement.
Conversely, if

∫

+∞
x

pw (r )dr < ∫

+∞
x

∫

x
−∞

pw (r )dr < ∫

x
−∞

pq (r )dr for every x < s and

pq (r )dr for every x > s, then, by analogous reasoning,

using a direct dollar measurement of benefits will yield greater overall welfare in
LWUs than a converted QALY measurement will yield.
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